By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘The Riedel report, though, made one thing clear: Unless Pakistan stopped sheltering the Taliban, our efforts at long-term stability in Afghanistan were bound to fail.’[1] President Obama
Introduction
In June 2011, President Barack Obama made the decision to withdraw the 30,000 US troops by the end of 2012, and the rest by 2014. The decision, in effect, marked the beginning of the end of the US’s longest war, the Afghanistan War, highlighting a major turning point in US Afghan policy. According to the decision, while most, if not all, US forces would leave by the end of 2014, the decision set out US long-term policy for the next decade and beyond.
As seen in my other articles, the surge in 2009 had three components to it: military, civilian and diplomatic. There were numerous assumptions that each pillar of the strategy carried. Most of these assumptions, however, were doubted by the Vice-President Joe Biden group in 2009. Biden and his group in turn made their own assumptions during the Af-Pak review. The accuracy or otherwise of these assumptions was directly linked to Obama’s decision to draw down. This article focuses on the diplomatic pillar of the surge decision by examining which sides’ diplomatic assumptions proved mistaken, and why and how.
The diplomatic surge had two aspects: negotiation with the Taliban, and finding a regional solution. Section one of this article focuses on the Obama Administration’s peace talks with the Taliban, and section two focuses on the administration’s efforts to find a regional solution to the Afghanistan conflict.
Peace talks with the Taliban
For the reconciliation aspect of the diplomatic surge, there existed several impediments.
The diplomatic surge had two aspects: negotiation with the Taliban, and finding a regional solution. For the reconciliation aspect of the diplomatic surge, there existed several impediments.
Firstly, the unrealistic US conditions for peace talks ─ the Taliban cut ties with Al-Qaeda, stop violence against the Afghan state, and accept the Afghan Constitution, including the rights of women and minorities ─[2] were unlikely (explained below) to be accepted by the Taliban .
Secondly, reportedly Pakistan’s presence and its veto power made the reconciliation process much more complicated, if not impossible. The Inter-Services Intelligence’s arrest of Mullah Baradar, who had been negotiating directly with Karzai, was a demonstration that Pakistan would shun any unauthorised negotiation. In fact, as many argued, Pakistan’s presence made negotiated peace impossible.[3]
Thirdly, against the wishes of the Head of US Central Command General David Petraeus (who became the Commander of the International Security Assistance in July 2010) and US Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal, the security situation had not improved, and the Taliban still enjoyed momentum in much of the country. Insecurity made reconciliation difficult for most of the ‘moderate Taliban’, who were likely to accept women’s rights and abide by the Constitution, because they could not be offered safety of employment and security for their families by the government and the coalition forces.[4]
Fourthly, as was argued by so-called Western experts on Afghanistan and certain elements from the Afghan Government, Afghans tended to switch to the party that they believed would be winning: those who have more guns, power and money often remain victors in Afghanistan. Obama’s caveat was taken as a sign by foes and friends alike that the US would eventually leave and the Taliban would be the ultimate victor. Until and unless the Taliban did not feel they were on the verge of defeat, negotiating with the Taliban was fruitless.[5]
Fifthly, as argued again by Western experts on Afghanistan and certain elements from the Karzai Government (see reason number eight), persuading the hardliners, such as Mullah Omer or Haqqani, to join the government seemed unfeasible. Mullah Omar was ‘The Commander of the Faithful’, a leader of all Muslims, a hardliner (the experts referred to as ‘fanatic’) with ‘significant delusions of grandeur’,[6] and negotiations with such religious hardliners, normally, did not go well in the past. (Encouraging the defection, reintegration and reconciliation of lower-level Taliban seemed to be fruitless, because they would reconcile themselves three or four times just to claim more financial rewards.) They are not rational realists but religious extremists whose behaviours are conducted in accordance with their interpretation of Sharia Law. Mullah Omar gave up governance but not Osama Bin Laden in 2001 (and beyond). He never denounced Al-Qaeda, even though Saudi Arabia, once the Taliban’s benefactor, repeatedly urged him to do so. Consequently, Saudi Arabia, which could have played a major role, was less willing to facilitate the talks.[7]
Sixthly, there were several independent Taliban groups then ─ the Haqqani network, the Hekmatyar group, and the Mullah Omer-led organisation ─ so a deal with one would not mean a deal with all. It was not even certain whether a deal with Mullah Omer would make his commanders in the south, who led local groups distant from the Quetta Shura, put down their guns. Moreover, none of the groups had any formal structure, including offices and mailing addresses, making it difficult to determine whether a party to the negotiation represented a group of insurgents.[8]
Seventh, even though a deal with the Taliban ‘could not be trusted’ (as they broke it over and over again in Pakistan, e.g. in Swat in 2009), talks had been pursued in Mecca and the Maldives in early 2010, but produced nothing, and one could not be very hopeful that it would do so in the future – especially when the history of negotiation, including the US one, required years, if not decades, but the Obama Administration wanted results in 18 months, treating the peace talks as a short cut to an exit.[9]
Eighthly, a strong party to the negotiation was the Northern Alliance that overwhelmingly consisted of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras (and many Pashtuns). They had high-profile jobs in the Karzai Government and were generally against the Taliban reconciliation, especially with hardliners like the Haqqani group, because they believed the Taliban would again persecute them as minorities and lead the country towards another civil war.[10]
Afghan women and their supporters equally feared the Taliban reconciliation with the Afghan Government. The supporters were found everywhere: the Afghan Government, the Afghan Parliament, Afghan civil society, the Afghan media, US Government, US Congress, and the US media. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, Chair of Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and numerous activists such as American author Gayle Tzemach Lemmon made it clear that the rights of the Afghan women were never open to negotiation or haggling.[11]
So Obama and the realists in his administration (as well as Karzai) were under tremendous pressure not to give away any human rights enjoyed by the Afghan women, whereas the Taliban did not agree with many of them, believing them to be incompatible with Sharia Law. American foreign policy expert and author Stephen Biddle claimed that unless the US was prepared to accept compromises, negotiating with the Taliban was fruitless.[12] The Obama Administration, due to the pressure, could hardly accept compromises.
Finally, the lack of a unified US policy on negotiation with the Taliban and bureaucratic fights between US officials were two other major obstacles to a peace settlement. A clear policy by all US bureaucracies, especially by the White House, was not issued or followed. The CIA and the military evidently saw the Taliban as ‘misogynous, intolerant, ruthless [and] barbaric’, and were psychologically unwilling to negotiate with them. For the military leaders, especially Petraeus, it was too early to talk about reconciliation as they believed that the Taliban first needed to be militarily weakened before talks about reconciliation began.[13]
Perhaps the lack of a clear policy made Afghan President Hamid Karzai think that the US, like Pakistan, had the ability to bring the Taliban to the peace table but, like Pakistan, did not want to.[14]
Despite all this, US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke made it easy for the Afghan Government to talk to any Taliban by abolishing constraints imposed by the US Government. Furthermore, Holbrooke made consistent attempts to bring a closer relationship between Islamabad and Kabul so that talks with the Taliban could be facilitated.[15]
While he was fruitlessly encouraging a warmer relationship between the two neighbours, his personal relationship with Kabul and Islamabad, as well as US officials both in Kabul and the White House, kept deteriorating. As seen in one of my articles, and as revealed by America journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran,[16] US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, US Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan Douglas Lute, and National Security Advisor James Jones weakened Holbrooke’s standing in Kabul (e.g. restricted Holbrooke’s deputies’ ability in Kabul to travel and meet with Afghans) and in the White House (e.g. Lute and Jones would arrange key NSC meetings when Holbrooke was out of Washington), refusing to provide support for Holbrooke’s diplomatic strategy.
Lute and Jones supported negotiation with the Taliban but they wanted Holbrooke replaced by Lakhdar Brahimi, who had the trust of Karzai as well as Iran and Pakistan in a way that Holbrooke did not. A furious Hilary Clinton had to interfere to tell Lute and Jones that the US did not outsource its foreign policy.
The bureaucratic war continued between the two parties, but the White House did not intervene, sometimes even promoted it. This was an example of what was going on in the White House during the surge while US forces were fighting in Afghanistan. The policymakers of the Obama Administration could hardly win the Afghanistan War, the big war, when it was involved in small wars among themselves.[17]
Holbrooke was seemingly the only actor in the administration who really strove for a peace deal with the Taliban , but for all the factors covered above (and in my previous articles), his hard work produced nothing other than ‘a big zero’.[18]
A regional solution vs a great game
As for a regional solution, the State Department, Holbrooke and his advisor, who is considered to be the leading expert on Afghanistan, Barnett Rubin in particular were to persuade the regional powers/neighbours (Pakistan, India, Iran, China, Russia and the Central Asian states) that stability in Afghanistan and the region was good for all. So attempts were made to get the neighbours to ‘develop strategic partnerships to build up infrastructure, boost trade, increase investment, and fight terrorism’.[19]
But neither did Afghanistan’s neighbours support a US presence in Afghanistan, nor did their conflicting interests allow them to support a peaceful regional solution.
Pakistan continued to see its interests in a military victory by the Taliban over the Afghan Government, not in a regional solution.
India saw its interests in backing up the Karzai Government, and, to the abhorrence of Pakistani officials, continued to increase its influence with Afghan parties. Holbrooke could not persuade India effectively to reduce its heavy involvement, since his portfolio did not include the country.[20] Thus the Great Game held on to be alive and well in 2010 and 2011.
As for Iran, US relations with the country in 2009 and 2010 became even worse over the latter’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and over its crackdown on domestic dissidents.[21] Iran continued to defy the US and the West while it, according to Western experts on the region, kept ‘interfering’ in neighbouring states, Afghanistan included. Its interference in Afghanistan was complicated: Iran saw its long-term strategic interest in the Hamid Karzai Government, so it provided support, including secret bags of US dollars delivered to Karzai’s office (something that Karzai – and his aides such as Mohammad Omar Daudzai – later unashamedly admitted); it equally provided secret support for the Taliban to weaken the US and to eventually force it to leave Afghanistan. Reportedly, Iran worked against the interests not only of the US, but also of Saudi Arabia, and both countries carried on their interference; elements from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Gulf states provided financial assistance to the Taliban and other extreme elements, who disapproved of Shi’ism, while Iran supported certain sects of the Shia groups to counter the influence of the radical Sunni groups.[22]
Like Iran, both China and Russia feared a permanent US presence in Afghanistan, and they continued to disagree with the US’s continuous presence, and both refused to commit militarily. None showed interest in using their weight and influence in the region to put pressure on those who were fostering terror in Afghanistan against both the Afghans and the coalition forces. On the contrary, they undermined US efforts in Afghanistan: allegedly, Russia continued to support its proxies in Afghanistan, as well as jostling for influence in the Central Asian states, and China reportedly supported the Taliban through the ISI.[23]
The Central Asian states, those neighbouring Afghanistan, likewise carried on supporting their respective proxy groups in Afghanistan, while, simultaneously, benefiting from the US presence and instability. According to Professor George Gavrilis, Tajik officials, for example, regularly presented international donors with long lists of “win-win” cross-border development projects that, they insisted, must be built on their side of the border’.[24]
Professor Gavrilis was not wrong to conclude, even though the neighbours were eager to ‘talk up solving common problems such as the drug trade, extremism, and poverty together, they have each found ways to live with and even profit from Afghanistan’s debilitated state’.[25]
A pledge to talk to the neighbours required a huge commitment by the US, but the US saw the dialogue with other governments as ‘politically uncongenial’, ‘insufficiently subservient to American interests’, and, most importantly, practically impossible due to the clashes of interests of the different players within Afghanistan.[26] The opposing interests between Iran and Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, and the US and Russia/Iran/Pakistan/China dated back years, if not decades, and it was unrealistic to assume that they could be solved within 18 months.
While the US failed to persuade neighbours to agree to a regional solution, it similarly could not persuade its NATO allies to contribute the way they had been expected to do after Obama announced the surge. Senator Richard Lugar, who served as Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 2003 to 2007, complained that the US had contributed $26.2 billion in military and $22.8 billion in non-military assistance from 2002 to 2011, while the rest of the allies only gave $2.6 billion in military and $4.2 billion in non-military for the same period. It was unacceptable for the US to continue to carry the lion’s share of the economic and military burden in Afghanistan.[27]
Conclusion
As seen, the two components of the diplomatic surge—reconciliation with the Taliban and the pursuit of a regional solution—did not yield positive results. The peace negotiations with the Taliban remained a distant dream due to the presence of a number of obstacles, including unacceptable conditions by both sides, as well as a clear commitment on the US side. Likewise, the conflicting interests of the players involved, particularly the regional powers, made it impossible to achieve a regional solution. Regional powers—such as India, Iran, and especially Pakistan—continued to back their proxies in Afghanistan: the Great Game was on and in full force.
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[1] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 321.
[2] Obama, Barack, (2011). Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan. [The White House]. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan>; Clinton, Hilary R., ‘Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, D.C.’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2011, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062211%20Secretary%20Clinton%20Testimony%20for%20SFRC%20Af-Pak%20Hearing.pdf>; Holbrooke, Richard C., ‘Civilian Strategy for Afghanistan: A Status Report in Advance of the London Conference, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HolbrookeTestimony100121p.pdf>.
[3] DeYoung, Karen. ‘Without large U.S. force after 2014, Afghanistan is headed for civil war, opposition leader warns’, The Washington Post, November 17, 2011;Krepon, Michael, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-us-policy-and-its-limits-in-pakistan> ;Full transcript of President Karzai’s interview with Aryn Baker from Time Magazine. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 13, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2> ; Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. September 4, 2012;Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>; Haass, Richard N., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 477; Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 154; Transcript of interview by President Hamid Karzai with Pakistani Geo TV. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. October 21, 2011. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithGeoTV21October_English24102011181716563553325325.pdf>.
[4] Salbi, Zainab, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Baker, Kim, ‘Letter From Kabul: Solving Afghanistan’s Problems; What the United States Must Overcome in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 2009, November 30, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabul-solving-afghanistans-problems>.
[5]Biddle, Stephen, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014- transition-in-afghanistan>;Biddle, Stephen, ‘Running out of time for Afghan Governance Reform; How Little Can We Live With?’ Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2011-12-15/running-out-time-afghan-governance-reform> ;Bernard Gwetzman Interviews Max Boot. ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, the Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2010; Kilcullen, David, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Baker, Kim, ‘Letter From Kabul: Solving Afghanistan’s Problems; What the United States Must Overcome in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 2009, November 30, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabul-solving-afghanistans-problems>.
[6] Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.
[7] Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>; Salbi, Zainab, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>.
[8] Transcript of interview by President Hamid Karzai with Pakistani Geo TV. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. October 21, 2011. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithGeoTV21October_English24102011181716563553325325.pdf>; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 236; Haass, Richard N., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.
[9] Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Bernard Gwetzman Interviews Max Boot. ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, the Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2010; Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.
[10] Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>;Biddle, Stephen, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014- transition-in-afghanistan>;Biddle, Stephen, ‘Running out of time for Afghan Governance Reform; How Little Can We Live With?’ Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2011-12-15/running-out-time-afghan-governance-reform> ; Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Salbi, Zainab, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Biddle, Stephen, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014- transition-in-afghanistan>;Biddle, Stephen, ‘Running out of time for Afghan Governance Reform; How Little Can We Live With?’ Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2011-12-15/running-out-time-afghan-governance-reform>; Salbi, Zainab, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 154.
[11] Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach, ‘What Leaving Afghanistan Will Cost; Parsing the President’s War Promises’ Foreign Affairs, May 9, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137621/gayle-tzemach-lemmon/what-leaving-afghanistan-will-cost>; Clinton, Hilary R., ‘Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, D.C.’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2011, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062211%20Secretary%20Clinton%20Testimony%20for%20SFRC%20Af-Pak%20Hearing.pdf>; ‘Chairman Kerry Opening Statement As Delivered At Hearing On “Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan”‘, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement100727a.pdf>; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking; Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 151.
[12] Biddle, Stephen, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014- transition-in-afghanistan>;Biddle, Stephen, ‘Running out of time for Afghan Governance Reform; How Little Can We Live With?’ Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2011-12-15/running-out-time-afghan-governance-reform>.
[13]Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 231-235; Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 157; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 228.
[14]Full Transcript of President Karzai’s interview with IRD. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. April 5, 2014, <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>.
[15] Holbrooke, Richard C., ‘Civilian Strategy for Afghanistan: A Status Report in Advance of the London Conference, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HolbrookeTestimony100121p.pdf>; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 232.
[16] Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 222, 227-232, 235.
[17] Crocker, Ryan C., ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>.
[18] Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.
[19] Gavrilis, George, ‘Why Regional Solutions Won’t Help Afghanistan; The Myth of Neigborly Harmony’, Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136598/george-gavrilis/why-regional-solutions-wont-help-afghanistan>; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 226.
[20]Gavrilis, George, ‘Why Regional Solutions Won’t Help Afghanistan; The Myth of Neigborly Harmony’, Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136598/george-gavrilis/why-regional-solutions-wont-help-afghanistan>; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 226; Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking.
[21] Obama, Barack, ON NW Flight 253 Terrorist Threat and Iran Violence, December 28, 2009,<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamaflight253terrorismiranviolence.htm>; Obama, Barack, Speech on UN Security Council Sanctions Against Iran, June 9, 2010,
<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamairansanctions.htm>.
[22] Rosenberg, Matthew, ‘With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, April 28, 2013;Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & C, p. 276; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 12-13, 87; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 221; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 227; DeYoung, Karen. ‘Without large U.S. force after 2014, Afghanistan is headed for civil war, opposition leader warns’, The Washington Post, November 17, 2011; Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Transcript of interview by President Hamid Karzai with Pakistani Geo TV, .[Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. October 21, 2011. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithGeoTV21October_English24102011181716563553325325.pdf>.
[23] Gavrilis, George, ‘Why Regional Solutions Won’t Help Afghanistan; The Myth of Neigborly Harmony’, Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136598/george-gavrilis/why-regional-solutions-wont-help-afghanistan>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 212; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 227; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 216.
[24] Gavrilis, George, ‘Why Regional Solutions Won’t Help Afghanistan; The Myth of Neigborly Harmony’, Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136598/george-gavrilis/why-regional-solutions-wont-help-afghanistan>.
[25] Gavrilis, George, ‘Why Regional Solutions Won’t Help Afghanistan; The Myth of Neigborly Harmony’, Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136598/george-gavrilis/why-regional-solutions-wont-help-afghanistan>.
[26]Krepon, Michael, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-us-policy-and-its-limits-in-pakistan>; Haass, Richard N., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 227.
[27]Lugar, Dick, Opening Statement’, ‘Lugar Says Obama Lacks Vision of Success in Afghanistan Strategic Value of Long-Term Engagement and Cost No Longer Justified’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/lugar-says-obama-lacks-vision-of-success-in-afghanistan-strategic-value-of-long-term-engagement-and-cost-no-longer-justified>; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 241.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.