*By Dr Sharifullah Dorani
Introduction
This essay explains what the George W Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) Strategy in Afghanistan was ― a strategy that marked the decision to intervene in Afghanistan. It goes further to explain what factors influenced the decision. Domestic influences, personal characteristics of the policymakers and bureaucratic politics are stated as one of the main factors that shaped the strategy. The essay also explains who was the driving force behind making the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan. The essay ends with a conclusion.
What was the GWOT Strategy in Afghanistan? Was the Defense Department or the CIA the driving force behind its creation?
After much talk of quagmire and the panic of whether the Afghan strategy was working in late 2001, Afghanistan was, in the words of the policymakers, ‘liberated’ within two months and a few days.
CIA Director George Tenet claims that with 110 CIA officers, 316 Special Forces personnel and US air power following the CIA’s plan, the CIA won one of the greatest successes in the history of the Agency when they defeated the Taliban and Al Qaeda in most of Afghanistan.[1]
But Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith gives most, if not all, credit to the Defense Department and hardly mentions the CIA’s efforts. According to Feith, it was the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who helped the President to develop the strategy for the Afghan campaign.[2] Feith explains the Afghan strategy as follows: remove the Taliban regime and do not just aim at Al Qaeda; involve a small number of US ground forces to avoid the mistakes the Soviet Union had made; support the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan in the Afghan war against foreigners; and give utmost importance to the precision strikes. The goals were to make an example of the Taliban as a state supporting terrorism and to disrupt and defeat a part of the international terrorist network in order to reduce the capability of international terrorists to launch new attacks on the US homeland. It was important for the strategy to deal with the Taliban as soon as possible and with maximum effect to force other terrorist-supporting states to change course.[3]
The toppling of the Taliban would also result in the incidental objective of the Afghan strategy: the ‘liberation’ of the Afghans, especially of the ‘oppressed’ Afghan women, and the establishment of democracy and the spreading of liberal values – though the Defense Department did not seem committed to doing its share. For enhancing these liberal ideas, a political process was needed, but it was not something debated enough in National Security Council (NSC) meetings, but rather left to be improvised on the ground.
However, as I explain in one of my essays,[4] the CIA war proposal for Afghanistan at Camp David included all the above aspects of the strategy mentioned by Feith. Tenet admits that the CIA was not a policymaker, but a policy implementer. The policymakers, the President in particular, tell the CIA what it is allowed to achieve. But in Afghanistan’s case, Tenet argues, the CIA first entered Afghanistan, as it was an intelligence war, and hence the CIA played a prominent role.[5] Moreover, the CIA had extensive contacts in Afghanistan and developed a covert plan years back. The Defense Department lacked both, and was extremely slow in making a military plan from scratch; a plan that dealt with unconventional warfare in a ‘primitive’, landlocked rugged terrain of Afghanistan where the enemy was ‘guerrilla fighters’ that lived in ‘caves and rode mules’. Feith himself admits that Rumsfeld was sensitive and unhappy with CIA officials making policy arguments. There was a difference between ‘describing a situation and prescribing a way to deal with it’.[6] The CIA, maintains Feith, was ‘prescribing a way’ when it put forward the Blue Sky plan.
The CIA not only made the policy for Afghanistan, but also (arguably) accelerated the process of decision-making by constantly warning of imminent future attacks if Bush did not act pre-emptively to defuse them.
However, one should never see US intervention in Afghanistan in isolation. Afghanistan was part of an overall strategy of the GWOT, which the Defense Department greatly shaped with the support of Vice-President Dick Cheney. However, where Cheney did not agree with Rumsfeld on certain aspects of the strategy, such as the inclusion of Iraq in the first phase of the GWOT or the issue of defeating the Taliban, even if it accepted US conditions, Bush seemed to have listened to Cheney’s advice rather than Rumsfeld’s.[7] But overall, the Defense leadership greatly influenced the policy. The CIA, for example, believed an attack or attacks like 9/11 would come again from Afghanistan where Al Qaeda were freely and actively operating, but the Defense Department argued that further attacks were possible not just from Afghanistan, but from terrorist organisations (namely, Islamic extremists) around the world, as well as rogue states with a history of having supported terrorism or having tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction or WMD. Together, they all constituted an enemy.[8]
It was the Defense Department’s civilian leadership that argued that the US’s chief purpose was not to punish terrorism but to prevent further attacks. To do so, it needed to employ a long and sustained campaign against terrorism and states that sponsored terrorism all around the world. Once they were done in Afghanistan, they argued, they were to strangle other terrorist-supporting states and organisations. That is what they did, as the war plan for Iraq never stopped being made. As early as the beginning of 2002, US policymakers’ focus, especially those from the Defense Department and the White House, shifted towards Iraq.[9]
Therefore, Afghanistan was part of the overall strategy for the GWOT, which was as follows: warn the government or organisation to give up terrorism; in case of disobedience, deploy a small member of US forces; make the maximum effect of US technology (or in two words: ‘fight smart’); strangle the regime; and move to the next organisation or state. Using or ‘supporting’ the population (mainly opposition like the Northern Alliance) against the regime was an important part of the overall strategy; so was the propaganda of ‘liberating’ the population. The spreading of democracy, or advancing hope and liberty instead of fear and repression, was its incidental outcome, however. Coalitions were welcomed if they joined on the US’s terms, or else it was a US war, and if need be, it could fight it alone. By authorising Tenet’s Blue Sky war plan, the GWOT’s overall objective emerged as ‘destroying international terrorism’ with the ‘initial hook’ being ‘destroying’ Al Qaeda and ‘Closing the Safe Haven‘ in Afghanistan in order to prevent further attacks on the US homeland, as well as safeguarding the American way of life. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US Grand Strategy of ‘containment of Soviet expansionism’ seemed to be replaced by the Grand Strategy of ‘destroying international terrorism network’, or, in the political scientist Joseph Nye’s words, making terrorism ‘obsolete’,[10] to defuse the threat against the US (and its allies).
Like containment, this new grand strategy would take years rather than months, as the GWOT was a wide and sustained campaign against international terrorism and rogue states that would start in Afghanistan but (arguably) end once terrorism was defeated/rooted out in its entirety in all four continents, and (rogue) states that supported terrorism or acquired or had weapons of mass destruction either changed their behaviour or faced, in plain language, regime change.[11] The strategy truly was ‘revolutionary’.[12]
In summary, while the Defense leadership was mostly responsible for the definition of terrorism (broad as opposed to narrow that included rogue states), the length (long as opposed to short) of the campaign, and the objectives (not to punish, but rather to prevent further attacks by destroying terrorism and its supporters worldwide), and the CIA for the war plan, the decision to launch the GWOT was the decision of Bush himself. It was his gut reaction to the 9/11 terrorist events.
What factors influenced the intervention decision for Afghanistan?
I. The Bush Doctrines
At the centre of his decision were President Bush’s three doctrines and his extraordinary invocation of war. They opened up the possibility for many countries and organisations involved in terrorism to be considered as terrorists or supporting terrorists and hence US enemies. It was these doctrines that brought Afghanistan to the forefront of the GWOT: there was no evidence to connect the Taliban regime to the 9/11 events, yet they were to be targeted because they were harbouring Al Qaeda and posing further threats; Article 51 of the United Nations Charter only qualifies a country to self-defence and to go to war when there is an imminent attack against the country – in the case of the US, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had already taken place. Bush nevertheless believed Al Qaeda and the Taliban posed a threat and he took the fight to the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in order to confront the threat before it fully materialised (pre-emptive self-defence).
To make matters worse, whether the 9/11 attacks constituted an act of war under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter was questionable,[13] yet Bush thought it did and involved the US in what later became known to be its longest war; and, to keep the US further safe, the US advanced the ideas of hope and liberty in Afghanistan, instead of the Taliban’s ‘fear and repression’.
II. The policymakers’ belief systems
The Bush doctrines were in turn influenced by Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney’s belief systems that being offensive was the answer to the threat of terrorists. Both Bush and Rumsfeld believed that previous administrations’ leniency towards terrorist attacks upon US interests had made terrorists bold, and had showcased America as a paper tiger. The administration needed to act with severity to prove that Bush’s America was not a paper tiger.
The doctrines, and consequently the GWOT, were also influenced by Bush’s tendency to formulate doctrines based on his gut feeling, rather than having them developed (like President Barack Obama) through an analytical and intellectual decision-making process.[14] Bush’s strong belief in himself also influenced the resulting policy; he believed he was the man and America the country to defeat evil and spread freedom and democracy (his ‘freedom agenda’), thus creating a world in which he and America would be received in the same way (as hero) as he had been received at Ground Zero.[15]
III. Domestic influences
Domestic influences, mainly the public-media-Congress support (or pressure to do something) equally impacted the decision, forcing Bush to deliver justice as well as give the administration the confidence to define terrorism so widely. One of my articles also attempted to highlight the circumstances and milieu in which the War Cabinet decided the GWOT.[16] A period when the possibility of another wave of attacks, especially attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, was real and imminent in the policymakers’ minds. The fear had affected the day-to-day lives of both ordinary Americans and the policymakers themselves, and they could not allow it to continue forever.
The milieu equally favoured the resulting policy, widening the definition of terrorism in order to defuse further attacks. The policymakers were under the impression that, if they did not defeat terrorism worldwide, and did not do it as soon as possible before it launched more attacks, it would greatly challenge America as a country and its way of life. After all, it was bad enough that 9/11 happened on their watch. Another attack and their administration would have come across as too incompetent to protect America. Bush and his principals were under tremendous pressure to defeat those who caused the threat and get the country back to normal. Thus ‘self-defence’ or, to be precise, ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ was the most important factor in US foreign policy after 9/11. It was this pre-emptive self-defence that eventually involved the US in war with Iraq because the latter was believed to have had weapons of mass destruction and could equip terrorists to use them against the US.
It was not the liberty agenda that factored into the GWOT. Bush and his advisors did not appear to be concerned by the democratic or other rights of the Afghans. Afghanistan only became a concern when it had become a haven for Al Qaeda. Had the Taliban given up Al Qaeda, the US might not have intervened in Afghanistan at all. (These arguments also negate all the other possible motives discussed in one of my articles.)
IV. Bureaucratic Politics
Finally, bureaucratic politics (discussed in more detail in my articles)[17] played its part in the resulting policy. Firstly, Rumsfeld’s strong personality traits, coupled with support from the Office of the Vice-President, reportedly derailed the focus of the decision-making process. Instead of analysing all aspects of the policy for Afghanistan in detail, Rumsfeld and his deputy were more concerned about defining terrorism; they wanted it broad enough to include at least Iraq, a country for which the Defence Department had a contingency plan. However, this was not the case regarding Afghanistan, giving the CIA the upper hand.
The strong approval by Cheney and Rumsfeld of the Bush Doctrines equally (and arguably) enabled the doctrines to go unchallenged in the decision-making process.[18] As far as policymaking in regard to Afghanistan was concerned, both the State Department and the CIA produced impressive results: one managed to sign up a broad range of countries in support of the US, including those that had previously supported the Taliban regime, and the other came up with a strategy that could be executed within weeks, requiring only a few hundred US forces on the ground and with no substantial financial cost. Nevertheless, since Afghanistan was the first stop of the GWOT, the Defense Department shaped the overall strategy, enabling Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (and of course Cheney) to gain the upper hand as the GWOT continued being applied in Afghanistan and later in Iraq.
Conclusion
The campaign in Afghanistan was an integral part of GWOT, aligning with a broader strategy that involved several key phases: first, issuing warnings to governments or organisations to cease terrorist activities; second, deploying small US forces if warnings were ignored; third, maximizing the impact of US technology to ‘fight smart’; fourth, dismantling the existing regime; and finally, moving on to target other threats. A critical component of this strategy was supporting local populations, particularly opposition groups like the Northern Alliance, against the reigning regime, coupled with propaganda promoting ‘liberation’. The spread of democracy, hope, and liberty was an incidental outcome, not a primary goal. The US welcomed coalitions that adhered to its terms, otherwise prepared to fight independently. The overarching objective constituted ‘destroying international terrorism’. The immediate priority was specifically to ‘destroy Al Qaeda’ and ‘eliminate its safe haven’ within Afghanistan, thereby preventing further assaults on American soil and preserving the nation’s way of life.[19]
Both the articulation of war and the invention of the three doctrines by Bush informed US foreign policy for years, including the Bush Administration’s strategy for the intervention decision. The support from the Vice-Presiden’s office and the defense department proved critical for the implementation of those doctrines. Bush’s support for his vice-president and secretary of defense in turn enabled them to be the driving force behind policymaking.
The (consistent) belief systems and images (beliefs and past experiences) of Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney of how terrorism/states sponsoring terrorism could be a significant threat to the world and how to deal – offensively as opposed to defensively – with terrorism enormously helped construct the Bush Doctrines. To put these doctrines into practice, Bush declared the GWOT, resulting in an American foreign policy that aimed at destroying and eliminating terrorism worldwide, which began in Afghanistan.
A combination of public, media and congressional pressure increasingly compelled Bush to deliver justice, and to do so as soon as possible. The overwhelming public-media-Congress support, seen partly in Bush’s high approval rating, was an important variable in building up confidence levels among the policymakers, Bush in particular, to launch such a broad war on terrorism with the objective to wipe out terrorist networks from all continents of the world.
The milieu in which the policymakers operated during the decision-making period to intervene in Afghanistan, and concludes that the milieu was evidently one of the most important independent variables or causal factors; a constant fear of further attacks by terrorists, attacks involving weapons of mass destruction in particular, and the constant pressure upon the President to do something to defuse the threat greatly impacted the resulting GWOT decision. And that ‘something’ in relation to Afghanistan was to invade the country in order to defeat Al Qaeda and its harbourers, the Taliban.
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bush, George W, ‘Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress, White House, 20 September, 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.
Bush, George W, National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service, September 14, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
Bush, George W, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
Bush, George W, State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress, January 29, 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: Its Application, Its Limitations, and Its Strengths’, 2018, Political Reflection Magazine, 4(5): 36-46.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Why did the US intervene in Afghanistan?’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2024, <https://cepsaf.com/what-was-the-us-motive-in-afghanistan/>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Dynamics of Policymaking in the Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden Administrations’, CEPSAF, 17 March 2024, <https://cepsaf.com/the-dynamics-of-policymaking-in-the-bush-obama-trump-and-biden-administrations/>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The milieu in which the Bush Administration made the decision to intervene in Afghanistan: the ‘fear’ of another 9/11’, CEPSAF, 23 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-milieu-in-which-the-bush-administration-made-the-decision-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-the-fear-of-another-9-11/>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART I’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-in-afghanistan-part-i/>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART II’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-for-afghanistan-part-ii/>.
Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper.
Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>.
Gray, Christine D. 2008. International law and the use of force. Oxford. Oxford University Press
Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-pleffler/september-11-in-retrospect>.
Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-s-nye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>.
Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher.
Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster.
[1] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 287-288, 343.
[2] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 89, 100, 130-132.
[3] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 89, 100, 130-132.
[4] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART I’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-in-afghanistan-part-i/>.
[5] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 218, 316; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 67.
[6] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 98-99.
[7] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART II’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-for-afghanistan-part-ii/>.
[8] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART I’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-in-afghanistan-part-i/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART II’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-for-afghanistan-part-ii/>.
[9] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>.
[10] Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-s-nye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>.
[11] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 18, 21, 84; Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-s-nye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>; Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-pleffler/september-11-in-retrospect>; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 48, 73; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, p. 275; Bush, George W, ‘Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress, White House, 20 September, 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>; Bush, George W, National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service, September 14, 2001,<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>; Bush, George W, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001,<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>; Bush, George W, State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress, January 29, 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
[12] Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>.
[13] Gray, Christine D. 2008. International law and the use of force. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
[14] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Dynamics of Policymaking in the Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden Administrations’, CEPSAF, 17 March 2024, <https://cepsaf.com/the-dynamics-of-policymaking-in-the-bush-obama-trump-and-biden-administrations/>.
[15] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>.
[16] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The milieu in which the Bush Administration made the decision to intervene in Afghanistan: the ‘fear’ of another 9/11’, CEPSAF, 23 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-milieu-in-which-the-bush-administration-made-the-decision-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-the-fear-of-another-9-11/>.
[17] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: Its Application, Its Limitations, and Its Strengths’, 2018, Political Reflection Magazine, 4(5): 36-46.
[18] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>.
[19] Other studies have considered several independent variables or causal factors that possibly influenced the making of the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan and beyond. Some of those causal factors are covered in my article: Dorani, Sharifullahhttps://cepsaf.com/what-was-the-us-motive-in-afghanistan/, ‘Why did the US intervene in Afghanistan?’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2024, <https://cepsaf.com/what-was-the-us-motive-in-afghanistan/>.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.