By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘[M]assive U.S. contracts to some of Kabul’s shadiest business operators undermined the very anti-corruption efforts designed to win over the Afghan people.’[1] President Obama
Introduction
In June, 2011, President Barack Obama made the decision to withdraw the 30,000 US troops by the end of 2012, and the rest by 2014. The decision, in effect, marked the beginning of the end of the US’s longest war, the Afghanistan War, highlighting a major turning point in US Afghan policy. According to the decision, while most, if not all, US forces would leave by the end of 2014, the decision set out US long-term policy for the next decade and beyond.
As seen in my other articles, the surge in 2009 had three components to it: military, civilian and diplomatic. There were numerous assumptions that each pillar of the strategy carried. Most of these assumptions, however, were doubted by the Vice-President Joe Biden group in 2009. Biden and his group in turn made their own assumptions during the Af-Pak review. The accuracy or otherwise of these assumptions was directly linked to Obama’s decision to draw down.
This article focuses on the civilian pillar of the surge decision by examining which sides’ civilian assumptions proved mistaken, and why and how.
The article contends that the ‘civilian surge’ in Afghanistan was intended as an essential complement to the military effort, but failed to achieve its primary objectives of improving governance and curbing endemic corruption. The failure can be attributed to mistaken assumptions by US military and civilian leaders, as well as to unintentional obstruction by the Afghan government. Specifically, it highlights numerous policy differences between the US and President Hamid Karzai’s Administration, including divergent views on who the true enemy is, the appropriate level of decentralisation, and the nature of corruption. By analysing these critical points of friction, this article demonstrates why the US civilian surge could not succeed, showing that the military’s gains were effectively meaningless without a functioning, cooperative civilian partner to build on.
The Civilian Surge
US Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal’s COIN or counterinsurgency strategy campaign focused primarily on 81 out of 400 districts in Afghanistan, most of them in the south, and, due to the lack of human capital and the presence of endemic corruption, only ten would receive representatives from the Afghan Government by the end of 2010, and another 10 by the end of 2011.[2] McChrystal’s assumption that he had ‘a government in the box, ready to roll in’ proved wrong, owing to the government being ‘illusory’.[3]
According to John Kael Weston, Brigadier General Larry Nicholson’s political advisor from the State Department in Helmand, the Marines in Helmand did not fail, as they cleared and held areas, but the Afghan Government failed because it lacked the capacity and willingness to seize the opportunity provided by American troops.[4]
Thus the Afghan Government was unable to provide basic services in the areas cleared by the military in Helmand and Kandahar, failing to build upon the gains the military had made. Providing good governance in those contested areas had been one of the goals of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, but remained unachieved.
The overall objective of the civilian surge of the suggested counterinsurgency strategy was to preserve the Afghans from corruption and criminality in the Afghan Government. But the Afghan Government continued to suffer from pervasive corruption, criminality, warlordism, favouritism and lack of accountability. In fact, corruption increased as Afghanistan in 2010 was ranked as the second most corrupt country by the report of Transparency International.[5]
The poor relationship between the US and the most ‘troublesome’ ally the US had since WWII,[6] Afghan President Hamid Karzai, is said to be one of the most crucial reasons that little progress was made on the political side of the strategy, markedly on Karzai’s promises to curb corruption.[7]
It was caused by numerous factors, including Karzai’s disagreement with US Afghan policy, including with some, if not most, aspects of the military and civilian surges.[8] Incidentally, the disagreement had started in 2005, but became more public during the Obama Administration.[9] So the analysis below is also relevant to the Bush Administration’s Afghan policy. Incidentally, the analysis is very brief as I cover the US-Karzai policy differences in great detail in another article.
Firstly, for the ‘pacifist’ Karzai, the roots of the problems did not lie in the Afghan villages and provinces, but over the borders in Pakistan which had the sanctuaries,[10] and since the sanctuaries were not addressed, Karzai was ‘outright convinced’ that the strategy would fail.[11]
Secondly, Karzai clearly seemed to be at a loss to ascertain what really the US goal in Afghanistan was! Karzai was told by the Americans that the Taliban was not their enemy anymore and that Al-Qaeda was not present in Afghanistan. If the Taliban were not an enemy, and if there was no Al-Qaeda present in Afghanistan, why were American forces in Afghanistan, and who were they fighting? For Karzai, especially National Security Advisor Rangin Spanta, those Taliban who were killing innocent Afghans, burning schools, and destroying crops on a daily basis were terrorists. For the Afghan Government, defeating Taliban was more important than defeating Al-Qaeda, whose very existence Karzai doubted. For Karzai, the Afghanistan War was not an insurgency but a war on terrorism. If the former, then it was an Afghan issue and the US should not be in the country to support one brother against another.[12]
Thirdly, Karzai continuously pleaded with the US to put a stop to their collateral damage, night raids, American prisons, the use of dogs on patrols, body searches of Afghan women, and other human rights abuses. But the Americans seemed to have been not doing enough, or even not listening to the Afghan President. Karzai was right to claim that these human rights abuses strengthened the Taliban and other anti-coalition forces.
Fourthly, the presence of warlords likewise bolstered the number of the Taliban fighters, and Karzai put the blame on the US for nurturing the warlordism strategy. By 2010, the Afghan Government was mostly made up of warlords and tribal leaders, and McChrystal (and US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry) had no choice but to work with the strongmen in the south, east and north. In the end, the military leaders (and the civilian ones) were unable to ‘protect’ the Afghans from these warlords/strongmen and their criminality and corruption; safeguarding the Afghans against all evil forces had been the main objective of McChrystal’s 2009 assessment. Working with these strongmen disappointed the Afghans, who went on believing that the new American leadership in Afghanistan continued to give warlords the US Government’s seal of approval.[13]
Fifthly, Karzai equally disagreed with the Obama Administration that the solution to curbing corruption lay with himself. Karzai believed that the lack of oversight on large contracts offered by the West, money distributed to warlords and strongmen by the CIA, and money given out by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were the main cause of corruption.[14] But[15] the Obama Administration publicly blamed (and humiliated) Karzai for corruption and lack of effective governance, demanding a change to ‘good governance’ that was far more complete, and therefore unrealistic, than the situation in any of the neighbouring countries. Whilst the Bush Administration used all carrots and no sticks, the Obama Administration used it the other way around, effectively working not with Karzai, but against him. (Though Obama in his memoir, agrees that ‘massive U.S. contracts to some of Kabul’s shadiest business operators undermined the very anti-corruption efforts designed to win over the Afghan people.)[16]
The administration’s assumption that pressuring Karzai would change his behaviour backfired since Karzai became resentful of the US and the West’s continued criticism, and instead blamed the US for everything that had gone wrong in Afghanistan, including corruption. Karzai knew that toughening his stance would make him even more popular with the Afghans.[17]
Sixthly, Karzai did not support the decentralisation component of the strategy. Almost every expert on Afghanistan in 2011 wanted its acceleration due to the surge having produced no tangible results. For them, it could also prove to be a quick way out of Afghanistan for US forces. They suggested a variety of decentralised models, ranging from ‘decentralised democracy’ to ‘internal mixed sovereignty’ to a ‘de facto partition of Afghanistan’.[18] For Karzai, Afghanistan was not a laboratory in which the US (or theoreticians) tried to experiment with their new ideas. All of these ideas were proposed having US interests in mind. All were made in America without taking account of the realities on the ground. A new idea had to be a new evolution created by the Afghans, not by ‘superficially informed foreigners’ who tried to re-create ‘a partially mythical past’ that they neither understood well, nor could feasibly apply.[19]
What Afghanistan needed was a strong and centralised government ─ with all the necessary governmental functions in the hands of the central Government in Kabul ─ to minimise the risk of a civil war by keeping a tight control over the strong men; empowering a strong centre over rural areas which had less interest in human rights and other democratic ideals; providing decisive action against terrorists; making rational investments in the national economic infrastructure; and working towards a regional solution, as well as a peace settlement with the Taliban.[20] American foreign policy analyst Stephen Biddle himself admitted most of the above advantages of a centralised Afghanistan, but believed it could not be achieved.[21]
Seventhly, one aspect of the decentralisation was training local forces to defend their local areas because Obama did not want US forces to play the role of sheriff in every street or village in Afghanistan. But local forces were to be made up of opposing tribes, who did not get on with each other. Empowering these tribes could facilitate conditions in which they would fight with each other once again, rob ordinary Afghans on the highway, or even, as the General (now ‘Marshall’) Abdul Rashid Dostum militia had done in 1992, turn against the central government itself. Karzai and Afghans remembered that it was a combination of these militia and Mujahedeen groups that fought with each other, causing the bloody civil war of 1992-96. Karzai saw this aspect of the strategy, as well as working with ‘local leaders’ in an attempt to divide Afghanistan into many small states. What Karzai and most Afghans wanted was a well-equipped (including air power and modern weaponry), well-trained and well-entrenched Afghan National Security Forces (in the long run, shorter in number, though, so that Afghan taxpayers could afford to pay their salaries) that represented all Afghan ethnicities.[22]
Finally, the presence of US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke and Eikenberry added more complications to the relationship. Holbrooke launched a failed ‘coup’ to replace Karzai with Ashraf Ghani, or at the very least, create two governments, one run by Karzai and the other by a ‘Chief Executive’, who would accept all US conditions. Both civilian ambassadors constantly criticised Karzai, treating him with contempt; Eikenberry’s cables, leaked by WikiLeaks, called the Afghan President erratic, unpredictable, and delusional. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen were not happy with Eikenberry’s treatment of Karzai and with the ambassador’s constant negativity that the surge was failing, but they could not have him removed, owing to the support he received from the White House.Consequently, ‘Karzai had no use for Eikenberry, Holbrooke, or Biden, and his relationship with Obama was a distant one’.[23] The one person Karzai liked and respected was McChrystal (and the military camp in general), who tried to listen to the Afghan President’s concerns, but McChrystal was fired, even though Karzai made attempts to persuade Obama not to.[24]
In summary, the strategies of not treating the Taliban as an enemy, not dealing with terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan, creating a decentralised government, creating parallel structures to the police (security firms) and the government (non-governmental organisation or NGOs and provincial reconstruction teams or PRTs), a lack of oversight on large contracts, the inflow of CIA money to strongmen and warlords, and the weakening of Afghan resolve (or waging a psychological war) by threatening that Afghanistan would be plunged into a civil war if it did not accept US demands all made Karzai almost convinced that the US had other ulterior motives, and, in order to keep the war going on to justify its presence, it purposely weakened the Afghan institutions by actively promoting insecurity and corruption.[25] Reports by Afghan sources to the Afghan President added more to his conviction that the violence by the Taliban was in the service of America. Karzai, in numerous speeches, told Afghans that he had reports that the US and NATO forces aided the Taliban to infiltrate in the previously peaceful parts of Afghanistan such as the north, that containers were being dropped in areas beyond the reach of the Afghan Government and under the control of the Taliban,[26] and that those Taliban who showed a willingness towards reconciliation would suddenly get arrested by the Americans. In short, Karzai found the allies to be not ‘good and honest’ and he seriously mistrusted their good intentions for Afghanistan. Quoting the British poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Karzai told The Sunday Times: ‘I met murder on the way’.[27]
Karzai might have been engaged in a war of words and propaganda with the Obama Administration, or certain US policies and the abovementioned reports might have genuinely made him believe in those conspiracy theories; his speeches, nevertheless, created a very confused environment. Afghans could not differentiate between friends and foes. Like Karzai, Afghans were ‘confused’ and ‘bewildered’ whether the US was creating ‘stability’ or ‘instability’ in Afghanistan. As the NBC reporter found out, the mistrust was strong and countrywide.[28] Despite hundreds of billions of US aids to Afghanistan, many Afghans, especially Karzai, still looked at the US with a suspicious eye!
Due to all these deep Afghan-American differences and Karzai’s mistrust of US intentions, the troublesome ally Karzai blamed the US more than the Taliban for the violence in his country,[29] and did not (or, in certain cases, could not) provide the support he was meant to. In a counterinsurgency strategy , the intervening power would be as good as the government it supported, and since the Karzai Government remained corrupt (and Karzai himself as unreliable as he had ever been), and the US did not have leverage over him to change his behaviour, the civilian surge for the purpose of improving governance and reducing corruption was doomed to fail.[30]
In practical terms, this meant that the minimal success in the military surge did not mean a lot, because there was not a civilian government to provide basic services that McChrystal and Petraeus had planned as part of their supposed counterinsurgency strategy .
Conclusion
In conclusion, the civilian surge in Afghanistan was an ambitious but ultimately failed component of the US counterinsurgency strategy or Obama’s three-track strategy. As this article has demonstrated, the military’s successes in clearing and holding territory were never fully leveraged because the civilian pillar of the strategy rested on a series of false assumptions. The central assumption that a capable and willing Afghan government was a reliable partner proved to be an illusion. President Karzai’s government remained mired in corruption and lacked the capacity and, at times, the willingness to provide governance and services. Indeed, at local levels, in areas cleared by the military, the civilian government was either absent or delivered late. Even then its personnel suffered from corruption, incompetence and criminality. This failure was compounded by the deep mistrust and policy disagreements between the two nations, which effectively crippled any political progress. Ultimately, the civilian surge could not succeed because the US was working with a ‘troublesome ally’, Karzai, who was at odds with key tenets of the strategy.
This article is of the view that most, if not all, assumptions made by the military leaders regarding the civilian surge were illusory. And most assumptions made by the Biden camp proved accurate.
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[1] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 316.
[2] O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>
[3] Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>
[4] Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 143.
[5] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 239. The same was the case in 2012, Saikal, Amin. 2014. Zone of crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. London: I. B. Tauris, p. 11.
[6] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 470.
[7] Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>.
[8] Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Washington Post. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. March 3, 2014. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>.
[9]Full Transcript of President Karzai’s interview with IRD. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. April 5, 2014, <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>.
[10] Full transcript of President Karzai’s interview with Aryn Baker from Time Magazine. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 13, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>; Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Washington Post. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. March 3, 2014. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>; Blackwill, Robert D, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan>; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 165.
[11] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 496.
[12]Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with BBC Newsnight. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. October 03, 2013. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=1>; Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. September 4, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/docments/category/interviews?page=2>; Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Newsweek.[Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. January 3, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithNewsweek1012012201158906553325325.pdf>; Full Transcript of President Karzai’s interview with IRD. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. April 5, 2014, <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1> ; Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Washington Post. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. March 3, 2014. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>; Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan. [Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. September 4, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>; Karzai, Hamid, Full text of the Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the Russian Media. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 5, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/FulltextoftheInterviewbyPresidentHamidKarzaiwiththeRussianMedia1452012154150781553325325.pdf> ; Christia, Fotini, Michael Semple, ‘Flipping the Taliban; How to Win in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65151/fotini-christia-and-michael-semple/flipping-the-taliban>.
[13]Full transcript of President Karzai’s interview with Aryn Baker from Time Magazine. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 13, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>; Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, ‘Washington Colonial Conundrum in Afghanistan; Why the United States Cannot Stay Forever?’ Foreign Affairs, 2011, December 15, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136881/ivan-arreguin-toft/washingtons-colonial-conundrum-in-afghanistan>; Neumann, Ronald, Stephen Hadley and John D. Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame: How to Help Kabul Stand on Its Own’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138215/ronald-e-neumann-stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/afghan-endgame>;Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 86, 262-263; Baker, Kim, ‘Letter From Kabul: Solving Afghanistan’s Problems; What the United States Must Overcome in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 2009, November 30, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabul-solving-afghanistans-problems>; Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 27; Gannon, Kathy, ‘Afghanistan Unbound’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/afghanistan-unbound>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 358.
[14]The CIA would refuse to put a stop to it, Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 501.
[15] Though Gates and Clinton privately agreed and raised the issue in several NSC meetings but to no avail, Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 359-60.
[16] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 316.
[17] Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Danish DR TV. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 2, 2013. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=1>; Baker, Kim, ‘Letter From Kabul: Solving Afghanistan’s Problems; What the United States Must Overcome in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 2009, November 30, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabul-solving-afghanistans-problems>; Full Transcript of the Interview by President Hamid Karzai with The Washington Post. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. November 14, 2010. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=1>; Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan. [Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. September 4, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>;
Full Transcript of President Karzai’s interview with IRD. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. April 5, 2014, <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>; Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>;Full transcript of President Karzai’s interview with Aryn Baker from Time Magazine. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 13, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2> ; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 202; Biddle, Stephen, ‘Q&A with Stephen Biddle on Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, August 11, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-stephen-biddle-on-afghanistan>; Crocker, Ryan C., ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>.
[18] Blank, Jonah, ‘Q&A With Jonah Blank on Afghanistan; The ‘Best-Case Scenario’ for the United States’, Foreign Affairs, 2011, September 7, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-jonah-blank-on-afghanistan>; Jones, Seth G., ‘It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-villages>; Biddle, Stephen, ‘Running out of time for Afghan Governance Reform; How Little Can We Live With?’ Foreign Affairs, 2011, December 15, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136875/stephen-biddle/running-out-of-time-for-afghan-governance-reform>; Kerry, John F. ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014-transition-in-afghanistan>; Blackwill, Robert D, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan>.
[19] President Karzai: Afghanistan not Political Lab for New Experiments by Foreigners. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. January 21, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/news/6409>; Frogh, Wazhma, ‘Afghans can’t trust anyone’, The Guardian, September 22, 2009; Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan. [Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. September 4, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>.
[20] Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan. [Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. September 4, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>; NeuMann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking; Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>; Jawad, Said T., ‘Hunting Al Qaeda’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62834/said-t-jawad/hunting-al-qaeda>.
[21] Biddle, Stephen, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014- transition-in-afghanistan>; Biddle, Stephen, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014- transition-in-afghanistan>;Biddle, Stephen, ‘Running out of time for Afghan Governance Reform; How Little Can We Live With?’ Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2011-12-15/running-out-time-afghan-governance-reform>.
[22]Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Wall Street Journal conducted by Yaroslav Trofimov and Matt Murray. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. February 15, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithWallStreetJournalconductedbyYaroslavTrofimovandMattMurray2522012162819915553325325.pdf>
; Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-anacceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Salbi, Zainab, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 559.
[23] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 484.
[24] Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Newsweek.[Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. January 3, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithNewsweek1012012201158906553325325.pdf>; Eikenberry Karl. W, ‘US embassy cables: Karzai feared US intended to unseat him and weaken Afghanistan’, July 07, 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables>; Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Wall Street Journal conducted by Yaroslav Trofimov and Matt Murray. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. February 15, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithWallStreetJournalconductedbyYaroslavTrofimovandMattMurray2522012162819915553325325.pdf>
; ‘Generation Kill: A Conversation With Stanley McChrystal’, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill>; Full Transcript of the Interview by President Hamid Karzai with The Washington Post. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. November 14, 2010. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=1>; Karzai, Hamid, Transcript of President Karzai interview with ABC News, Good Morning Program. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. October 13, 2009. ; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 481-482, 484, 489.
[25] Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with British Newspaper, the Sunday Times. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. January 27, 2014. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>; Karzai, Hamid, Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. December 6, 2012. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/exclusive-us-nato-behind-insecurity-afghanistan-karzai-says-flna1c7456895>; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 116-117; Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with BBC Newsnight. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. October 03, 2013. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=1>.
[26] Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with BBC Newsnight. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. October 03, 2013. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=1>.
[27] Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with British Newspaper, the Sunday Times. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. January 27, 2014. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>; Karzai, Hamid, Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. December 6, 2012. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/exclusive-us-nato-behind-insecurity-afghanistan-karzai-says-flna1c7456895>; Full Transcript of President Karzai’s interview with IRD. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. April 5, 2014, <http://president.gov.af/en/documents?page=1>.
[28] Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with BBC Newsnight. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. October 03, 2013. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=1>; Karzai, Hamid, Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. December 6, 2012. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/exclusive-us-nato-behind-insecurity-afghanistan-karzai-says-flna1c7456895>.
[29] Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster,, p. 143.
[30] Kilcullen, David, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.