By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘If some later contended that we never had a plan for full-fledged nation building or that we under-resource such a plan, they were certainly correct. We didn’t go there to try to bring prosperity to every corner of Afghanistan. I believe…that such a goal would have amounted to a fool’s errand…. [S]ending U.S. servicemen and -women in pursuit of an effort to remake Afghanistan into a prosperous American-style nation-state or to try to bring our standard of security to each of that nation’s far-flung villages would be unwise, well beyond our capability, and unworthy of our troops’ sacrifice.’[1] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Introduction
Following the swift military success in ousting the Taliban regime in 2001, the George W Bush administration adopted a ‘small footprint’ counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan. This approach, heavily influenced by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, prioritised a lean, mobile US military presence while intentionally limiting resources for large-scale nation-building and stabilisation. The underlying assumption was that a small force, supported by local Afghan allies, would be sufficient to prevent the country from becoming a terrorist haven once more. However, this essay argues that this strategy proved to be a critical miscalculation once it was implemented. By examining the disastrous consequences of insufficient troop levels, the reliance on a problematic warlord-based security model, and the failure to deliver on promised reconstruction aid, this article attempts to demonstrate that the small footprint strategy created a security vacuum and widespread disillusionment among the Afghan people, ultimately paving the way for a devastating insurgency and long-term instability.
The ‘small footprint’ counter-terrorism strategy meets reality in Afghanistan
The small footprint aspect of the strategy, especially in the first two years, resulted in insufficient troop levels (1.6 troops per thousand Afghans compared to 19.3 per thousand in Kosovo, or 17.5 troops in Bosnia) and resources ($60 per Afghan, compared to $577 per inhabitant in Kosovo, or $277 per inhabitant in Bosnia) in any post-conflict construction since World War Two (WWII). Even though there were increases in US aid in 2004 and then in 2007 (mainly for reconstruction purposes), it was still insufficient, as most of it was spent either on security-related areas, i.e. military training and drug eradication, or on humanitarian projects.
The failure to build the nation,[2] particularly the implementation of an economic infrastructure ─ such as building roads, a water system and electricity ─ disappointed the Afghans and strengthened the insurgency. It had a more severe impact when Bush announced a ‘Marshall Plan’ ─ the military victory to be followed by a moral victory that would result in better lives for the Afghans ─ and did not deliver it. To make matters worse, US assistance was conditional on American goods and services (five times more expensive), and 95 percent of it was channelled through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other international organisations, thereby creating a parallel bureaucracy and inevitably weakening the Afghan Government.[3]
While Afghanistan would not be as ‘prosperous’ as America, it at least required a sufficient number of troops to establish security. By limiting ‘the size, geographical scope, and functions’ of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and by repudiating the need to engage US forces in peacekeeping, the administration allowed large parts of Afghanistan to remain without authority─ parts that were eventually filled in by former Mujajideen commanders (‘warlords’) and other criminals.
Rumsfeld and Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, as well as Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney, assumed that low-profile US presence supported by warlords would make the US come across as liberator rather than occupier. While the propaganda spread by the Taliban and their foreign backers (such as – reportedly – elements from the Pakistani military establishment) did not allow for this characterisation, the warlords (and strongmen and some women) played a major role in the lack of security, the collapse of law and order, and the weakening of the Afghan Government by hampering the rebuilding of key institutions such as defence and interior, extorting money from ordinary Afghans, getting involved in the illegal drug trade/other criminalities such as land-grabbing, and establishing monopoly on revenues.[4] The warlord strategy distanced ordinary Afghans from the US, planting the seeds for more and more distrust.[5]
To make matters worse, since there were fewer troops, the US relied more and more on aerial bombardment, resulting in more civilian killings.This caused another blow to the Bush Administration’s effort to convince the Afghans that the US was there to help establish a peaceful Afghanistan.[6]
Thus almost every expert on Afghanistan ─ including many US officials, such as Bush, Cheney, Wolfowitz, four former US Ambassadors to Afghanistan, namely, Zalmay Khalilzad, Robert P. Finn, Ronald E. Neumann, and Karl Eikenberry ─ believed that the light footprint part of the strategy proved disastrous for Afghanistan.[7]
Bush admitted that the light footprint strategy ‘worked well at first. But in retrospect, our rapid success with low troop levels created false comfort, and our desire to maintain a light military footprint left us short of the resources we needed. It would take several years for these shortcomings to become clear.’[8] By the time they were clear – that is, by the time the administration realised that in stabilisation and reconstruction operations ‘transformational’ technology could not be a substitute for ‘manpower, money, and time’ – it was too late since by then the insurgents had strengthened, the rural population had not seen improvement in their material well-being, so had little incentive to risk their lives by standing against the insurgents,[9] and the administration was so embroiled in Iraq[10] that it could not provide the necessary resources and troop levels to put things right.
Conclusion
The failure of the ‘small footprint’ was rooted in several key miscalculations or false assumptions. First, by severely limiting troop levels and resources, the administration failed to establish security in large parts of the country. This absence of authority allowed warlords and other criminal elements to fill the power vacuum, undermining law and order and weakening the new Afghan Government. Second, the reliance on these same warlords for local security was a betrayal of the Afghan people. These individuals, many with histories of alleged human rights abuses, contributed to insecurity and corruption, alienating the population and fueling distrust toward the US and the new government. Finally, the strategy’s heavy reliance on aerial bombardment as a substitute for on-the-ground presence led to a significant number of civilian casualties, which further eroded support for the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror in Afghanistan. Those miscalculations or false assumptions ensured that the US would be mired in a much longer and more costly war.
References
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers.
Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition.
Dobbins, James, Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, March 08, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DobbinsTestimony070308.pdf>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The impact of the Iraq War on the Afghanistan War and its consequences for the Bush War Cabinet’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-impact-of-the-iraq-war-on-the-afghanistan-war-and-its-consequences-for-the-bush-war-cabinet/>.
Gannon, Kathy, ‘Afghanistan Unbound’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/afghanistan-unbound>.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Jawad, Said T., ‘Hunting Al Qaeda’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007.
Jones, Seth G, ‘It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2010.
Khalilzad, Zalmay, ‘Statement Ambassador and Special Presidential Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2005, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KhalilzadTestimony050607.pdf>.
Loyn, David. 2008. Butcher and Bolt. London: Hutchinson.
Maley, William. 2006. Rescuing Afghanistan, Hurst and Company, London, p. 65; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin.
Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007.
Rubin, Barnett R., ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62270/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan>.
Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel.
Simon, Steven. ‘Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/can-right-war-won/p19765>.
Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo.
‘The Good War, Still to Be Won’, The New York Times, August 20, 2007.
Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Newsweek. [Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. January 3, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithNewsweek1012012201158906553325325.pdf>.
Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan.[Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan].September 4, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>.
Ware, John. (2011). Afghanistan: War without an End [the BBC].
[1] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 683.
[2] As had been promised by Bush: Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
[3] Simon, Steven. ‘Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/can-right-war-won/p19765>; Gannon, Kathy, ‘Afghanistan Unbound’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/afghanistan-unbound>;Dobbins, James, Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 08, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DobbinsTestimony070308.pdf>; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 134-136; Maley, William. 2006. Rescuing Afghanistan, Hurst and Company, London, p. 65; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 115-122, 204; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo,p. 323; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, pp. 74, 134, 177 182- 187, 195-205; ‘The Good War, Still to Be Won’, The New York Times, August 20, 2007; Loyn, David. 2008. Butcher and Bolt. London: Hutchinson, p. xxxviii; Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007; Khalilzad, Zalmay, ‘Statement Ambassador and Special Presidential Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2005, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KhalilzadTestimony050607.pdf>; Jawad, Said T., ‘Hunting Al Qaeda’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, Jones, Seth G, ‘It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2010; Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan.[Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. September 4, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>
[4]Rubin, Barnett R., ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62270/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan> ; The Good War, Still to Be Won’, The New York Times, August 20, 2007; Loyn, David. 2008. Butcher and Bolt. London: Hutchinson, p. 271; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, p. 208; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. 323; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 320.
[5] Gannon, Kathy, ‘Afghanistan Unbound’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59891/kathy-gannon/afghanistan-unbound>
[6] Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with Newsweek. [Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. January 3, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptofInterviewbyPresidentKarzaiwithNewsweek1012012201158906553325325.pdf>
[7] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 207; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 433; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 115-116; Ware, John. (2011). Afghanistan: War without an End [the BBC] ; ambassadors’ views in Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, p. 204.
[8] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 207.
[9] Dobbins, James, Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 08, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DobbinsTestimony070308.pdf>.
[10] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The impact of the Iraq War on the Afghanistan War and its consequences for the Bush War Cabinet’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-impact-of-the-iraq-war-on-the-afghanistan-war-and-its-consequences-for-the-bush-war-cabinet/>.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.