By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
The role of the Vice-President Biden in foreign policy in the Obama Administration
‘Listen to me, boss…Maybe I’ve been around this town for too long, but one thing I know when these generals are trying to box in a new president…Don’t let them jam you.’[1] Vice-President Biden to President Obama in a private meeting
Introduction
President Barack Obama’s policymaking team for the decision to surge (and, in most cases, for the decision to withdraw) in Afghanistan could be divided into five: the Vice-President, ‘the inner circle’, ‘the outsiders’, the General David Petraeus camp, and the President himself. Each, and its influence on the decision to surge, are considered as part of my analysis.
This article covers Biden’s contribution to policy-making towards Afghanistan, especially in relation to the decision to surge in Afghanistan.
The Vice-President Biden
Like many previous presidents, Obama chose a vice-president who was an established Washington insider and well experienced in foreign policy: a six-term Senator from Delaware (serving as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations between 2001 and 2003, and again between 2007 and 2009), twice (unsuccessfully) seeking Democratic presidential nomination in 1988 and 2008, and considered the most trusted voice on foreign policy in the Democratic Party in 2001.[2]
Biden was a ‘leading liberal hawk’ who supported military interventions for ‘altruistic’ purposes, including nation-building, e.g. US involvement in the Balkans in the 1990s and Iraq invasion in 2002.[3] In 2008, as seen in one of my previous articles,[4] he asked for a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Afghanistan to make the country self-sustaining’, even though it would take up to a decade. Afghan President Hamid Karzai would perform better if the US provided more resources, troops, and a better strategy. The US should commit whatever it took, he maintained, or else history would judge the US harshly if it allowed the hopes of the liberated Afghans to evaporate. He was hopeful that the US would not experience the Soviet fate in Afghanistan since the former offered ‘a better choice’.[5]
His beliefs (or belief system) in 2008 and previously were consistent with the perspectives of the military camp during the Af-Pak review. But, as seen above, in 2009, during the Af-Pak review, Biden’s belief system and images of the Afghanistan War had shifted considerably. The sudden shift in his belief system is said to have been caused by his tour to Afghanistan as Vice-President-elect,[6] in which Biden discovered through US Commander in Afghanistan General David McKiernan and other US officials that there were no Al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan but in Pakistan, and US forces told him they did not know why they fought in Afghanistan. Biden himself was lost on what US objectives in the country were.
In the same tour, he seemed to have formed a view that it was not just the shortcomings in the George W Bush Administration’s Afghan policy to blame for the US failure in Afghanistan, but also the ‘incompetence’ and unreliability of President Karzai and his corrupt government.[7]
Back in Washington, he was constantly reminded by his former colleagues, particularly Senator Chuck Hagel, especially after the 21,000 troops had not produced any results and the military was asking for yet more, that the Afghanistan War was unwinnable and resembled President Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam War. If Obama approved the expensive surge, the President would repeat Lyndon Johnson’s footsteps: more casualties and beyond-US-capacity spending would force Congress to treat Obama the same way as it had done Johnson (bring a premature end to the war), and, like Johnson, Obama would take the blame for losing the war as most of the military leaders would not be in their positions in a couple of years’ time.[8]
Obama made sure Biden played the role of the ‘devil’s advocate’[9] (or what Obama called ‘contrarian’)[10] in the policy debate by allowing the Vice-President to present his opposing views to the military, ask as many questions regarding the proposed counterinsurgency strategy as he could, and be aggressive in his pursuit of counterterrorism-plus-strategy.
Like former Vice-President Dock Cheney, Biden formed a foreign policy team, which included a few former and current military generals, to discuss US Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal’s options and sharpen its questions ─ a team which, with the assistance of General James Cartwright, and without the prior knowledge of the Pentagon, produced an alternative military plan to that of McChrystal, recommending that the deployment of 10,000 fighting forces and another 10,000 enablers would suffice.
To weaken McChrystal’s assessment further, Biden successfully persuaded Eikenberry to put down his sceptical thoughts on the proposed counterinsurgency strategy in cables. His views in the cable were time and again used by Biden to imply that if the US Ambassador to Afghanistan claimed that a counterinsurgency strategy would not work, how on earth were the military still emphatic on their requests?[11] Eikenberry’s advice was not ordinary since he served in the country as US Ambassador.
Nor was retired General Douglas Lute’s advice ─ another member of Biden’s foreign policy team. Like McChrystal, he had done his research when he was in Afghanistan to write the 2008 report. Like McChrystal, he (with about 25 people working for him) still remained in contact with US commanders on the ground, even though this angered the military leaders, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates included.[12]
Biden also made sure he wrote a separate memo to the President before each meeting, outlining his thoughts, including: only counterterrorism-plus-strategy, no full counterinsurgency strategy, no nation-building, focus on Al-Qaeda, degrade not defeat the Taliban, occupy those places which could be transferred to the Afghans, and not to accept to build 400,000 ANSF. If not, Biden persistently warned Obama, the US would be ‘locked in Vietnam’.[13] As will be explained in one of my other articles, most of these policy suggestions were reflected in the final strategy Obama made.
For Obama, Biden served an ‘enormously useful function’ in the decision-making. Biden argued that he took all these steps (persistently questioning the military plan and its assumptions) to ensure the military did not ‘push’ an inexperienced President.[14]
It is important to mention, however, that during his 35 years in the Senate the ‘experienced’ Biden had made many ‘poor’ judgments (e.g. supporting the Iraq invasion in 2003 or opposing US involvement in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 on the grounds that no ‘vital’ US interests were at stake), and the pro-military lobbyists were quick to highlight them, adding that there was no basis for Biden to regard himself as ‘a combination of Henry Kissinger and Carl von Clausewitz’. They urged Obama not to listen to Biden and accept McChrystal’s request for a counterinsurgency strategy to revive the ‘losing war’ in Afghanistan.[15]
Conclusion
In conclusion, while President Obama’s final decision to approve a troop surge in Afghanistan was a victory for the military camp, Vice-President Joe Biden’s role was far from limited. His significant contribution lay not in preventing the surge, but in fundamentally shaping its outcome. By serving as the administration’s persistent ‘devil’s advocate’, Biden successfully challenged the military’s assumptions, forced a critical examination of its strategy, and advocated for a more cautious, counterterrorism-focused approach. This persistent internal pressure ultimately led to the crucial compromise, which included a definitive withdrawal timeline, a condition that distinguished the Obama surge from previous military commitments. Therefore, Biden’s influence was not in defeating the opposing view, but in ensuring that the final policy was a hybrid strategy that reflected his core belief that the US mission must have a clear and achievable end.
References
‘A Conversation with Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service]’, The Council on Foreign Relations, February 25, 2008.
Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009.
Biden Joe, ‘Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten’, The New York Times, March 2, 2008; Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>.
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Public Debate of the Bush Administration’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Congress, the media and other influential actors’ evaluation of the counterterrorism strategy- and the tilt towards a counterinsurgency strategy’, CEPSAF, 25 October 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/public-debate-of-the-bush-administrations-counterterrorism-strategy-congress-the-media-and-other-influential-actors-evaluation-of-the-counterterrorism-strategy-and-the-tilt/>.
Freedman, Lawrence D, ‘Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflict’, Foreign Affairs, September/December, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65308/christopher-gelpi-peter-d-feaver-and-jason-reifler/paying-the-human-costs-of-war-american-public-opinion-and-casu>.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Gerson, Michael, ‘Decision Time for Obama’, The Washington Post, September 30, 2009.
Goldberg, Jeffery, ‘Letter From Washington: The Unbending; Can the Democrats Make Themselves Look Tough?’, The New Yorker, March 21, 2005.
Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking.
Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking.
Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster.
[1] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, pp. 318-19.
[2] Goldberg, Jeffery, ‘Letter From Washington: The Unbending; Can the Democrats Make Themselves Look Tough?’, The New Yorker, March 21, 2005; Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 63.
[3] Goldberg, Jeffery, ‘Letter From Washington: The Unbending; Can the Democrats Make Themselves Look Tough?’, The New Yorker, March 21, 2005; Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 63.
[4] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Public Debate of the Bush Administration’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Congress, the media and other influential actors’ evaluation of the counterterrorism strategy- and the tilt towards a counterinsurgency strategy’, CEPSAF, 25 October 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/public-debate-of-the-bush-administrations-counterterrorism-strategy-congress-the-media-and-other-influential-actors-evaluation-of-the-counterterrorism-strategy-and-the-tilt/>.
[5]‘A Conversation with Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service]’, The Council on Foreign Relations, February 25, 2008; Biden Joe, ‘Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten’, The New York Times, March 2, 2008; Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>.
[6] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 336-337; Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>
[7] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, pp. 318-19.
[8] Freedman, Lawrence D, ‘Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflict’, Foreign Affairs, September/December, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65308/christopher-gelpi-peter-d-feaver-and-jason-reifler/paying-the-human-costs-of-war-american-public-opinion-and-casu>; Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 37, 71-72, 102, 159-160, 188-189, 319.
[9] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 166.
[10] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 319.
[11]Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 160, 235-238, 254-255; Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p.126; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 379; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. xxi 143, 211, 225.
[12] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 482.
[13] Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 166, 310, 324; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 126.
[14] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 319; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 159-160.
[15] Gerson, Michael, ‘Decision Time for Obama’, The Washington Post, September 30, 2009 ; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 288; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 97.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.