By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
The role of the military in foreign policymaking in the Obama Administration
Introduction
The decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan under the Obama administration was the result of a highly contentious and intricate policymaking process. Within this process, a clear division emerged between five distinct groups: the Vice-President, the ‘inner circle’, ‘the outsiders’, the military camp, and the President himself. This article is dedicated to understanding the pivotal role of one of these groups—the military and its supporters—in the decision to surge troops. Through a detailed analysis of the contributions of General David Petraeus, Admiral Michael Mullen, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, this paper will demonstrate that their collective advocacy for a counterinsurgency strategy became the dominant voice in the debate. We will show how Petraeus’s proven success in Iraq provided the intellectual foundation for the strategy, while Mullen, Gates, and Clinton provided the crucial political and bureaucratic support necessary to make the surge an all but inevitable choice for the President. This examination ultimately reveals how a unified, powerful faction can shape national security policy and compel a President’s hand.
The article has four sections, each covering one of the four main members of the camp.
David Petraeus and his counterinsurgency strategy
Though Chairman of the Joint Child of staff Michael Mullen and Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates, as well as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, were superior to him in terms of their bureaucratic positions, in the Af-Pak review the Head of US Central Command General David Petraeus’s say counted the most since he was the expert on strategy and responsible for overseeing the war.
After the Vietnam War, especially since the beginning of the 1980s, a counterinsurgency strategy manual was neither published nor taught at West Point, as the US military determined never to engage in guerrilla fights. But it was, as Senior Advisor to the President David Axelrod privately called Petraeus, ‘Mr. Counterinsurgency’, who brought the counterinsurgency strategy into the Army curriculum.[1]
Petraeus himself was influenced by the French expert David Galula and, for referencing purposes, Petraeus always carried a copy of the former’s book entitled Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Galula had fought in several counter-insurgencies and believed that defeating ‘fleas requires draining the swamp that sustains them; defeating insurgencies requires protecting, then wooing or co-opting, the population that sustains the cause’.[2]
According to Galula, Mao Zedong, the successful Chinese insurgent leader, and numerous studies conducted by the RAND Corporation, the ‘clear, hold and build’ strategy mainly focused on the hearts and minds of the people.[3] The counter-insurgent ─ who was not just a soldier but also an engineer, a social worker, and a schoolteacher ─ needed to mingle with the population to give them a sense of security and to learn about them and their internal realties. It was then that informed choices could be made, making it possible for the counter-insurgent to win over the population.[4] Petraeus learned from these experts, and later became an expert himself when he wrote his PhD on the counterinsurgency strategy and successfully applied it in Mosul in Iraq in 2006 where none of the other officers had done so (because US Commander in Iraq, George W. Casey, was against it).
After producing considerable improvement in Iraq in 2007, Petraeus believed that bringing security to the Afghan population would bring the same outcome in Afghanistan. Petraeus used his Iraq experience to find solutions to the Afghanistan-related obstacles, at times referring to the former more than 24 times in a single hour.[5] US Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal similarly relied on his Iraq experience. In a testimony before the Senate, he made it clear that a simple answer to the conflict in Afghanistan was a holistic counterinsurgency strategy. The testimony took place before he carried out his assessment in Afghanistan.[6] One can therefore find it difficult to disagree with as Washington Post journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran, who claimed that, like the neoconservatives’ Jeffersonian democracy and free economy which led the US into expensive wars, the counterinsurgency strategy became the ideology (or belief system) of the military leaders, which equally required years of nation-building.[7]
Micheal Mullen and the counterinsurgency strategy
Petraeus’s case was reinforced when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Micheal Mullen vigorously embraced McChrystal’s assessment, as it offered both resources and the necessary strategy, two commodities that Afghanistan had been deprived of for years. Mullen defended the counterinsurgency strategy not only in the Situation Room, but also outside by using his Facebook page, website (entitled ‘Travels with Mullen: Conversations with the Country’), and Twitter account. Having been ‘emasculated by his two predecessors in the Donald Rumsfeld era’, Mullen wanted to re-establish the prominence of the chairman’s position. Mullen therefore actively tried to be more effective and bureaucratically prominent in policymaking compared to his predecessors from the Bush Junior Administration.[8] Perhaps he was more involved in policymaking because Gates was not Rumsfeld, and because Gates, too, supported the strategy.
Obama writes in his memoir that ‘…men like Mullen were creatures of the system to which they’d devoted their entire lives― a U.S. military that prided itself on accomplishing a mission once started, without regard to cost, duration , or whether the mission was the right one to begin with….In Iraq, that had meant escalating need for more of everything: more troops, more bases…more aircraft…Now, with Afghanistan…the military leadership…wanted more there as well.’[9] But for Obama more was not the answer as more had not produced victory in the past.
Robert Gates and the counterinsurgency strategy
Gates ─ a former staffer on the NSC, Deputy National Security Advisor, and CIA Director with ‘a wealth of experience and knowledge’ in foreign policy and national security issues’[10] ─ held both Petraeus and McChrystal in high regard. As Obama confirm and Gates conform, the latter played a crucial part in Petraeus’s appointment as the Iraq Commander in 2006 and McChrystal’s installation in his Afghanistan post in 2009.[11] Gates told Obama, Dave McKiernan was ‘a fine soldier’, but he was a ‘manager’. ‘In an environment this challenging, we need someone with different skills. I couldn’t sleep at night. Mr. President, if I didn’t make sure our troops had the best possible commander leading them. And I’m convinced Stan McCrustal’s that person.’[12]
While Gates supported the military camp and most of its arguments, he equally tried to become the middleman by making efforts to keep the White House and the military relationship smooth. To do so, he had to make many concessions during the review: Gates agreed with Obama that the goal to defeat the indigenous Taliban was ambitious and impossible and should therefore be changed to degrade (though he believed that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were inseparable); offered the July 2011 timeline for US troops to begin to transfer security to the Afghan National Security Forces in order to begin to withdraw regardless of whether the counterinsurgency strategy was working or not; reduced McChrystal’s proposal for 40,000 to 30,000 troops; concurred that building a 400,000 Afghan National Security Force was unnecessary and undesirable ─ though Gates believed that the Afghan National Security Forces were the ticket out of Afghanistan for the US, and it was essential to spend the resources to build a strong force; admitted that a fully-resourced counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan sounded a lot like nation-building, and instead it should be a counterinsurgency strategy with a focus on places where population was most threatened by the Taliban ─ this seemed to have dropped the east of Afghanistan from McChrystal’s assessment as an area of operation; consented that nation-building was too expensive, and the administration should instead focus on capacity building (certain ministries and provincial governors with good record) ─ such focus, as far as Gates was concerned, would negate the good governance and effective Afghan National Security Force requirements of a counterinsurgency strategy; recognised that building good governance in Afghanistan was against the history of the country, so they needed to support and build those ministries, provincial governors, and existing traditional structures that were not corrupt and essential to enable them to achieve their objectives; concurred with Obama that they should not aim for a Western-style democracy in Afghanistan since it was neither necessary nor plausible, given Afghanistan’s history ─ as long as there was a government (or any existing traditional structures) that could provide basic services and manage to hold the Taliban at bay, Gates was content; and agreed that NATO should also increase its share of troops and resources in Afghanistan and take more responsibility for the north and west.[13]
As will be seen below, these concessions enabled Obama to narrow McChrystal’s original strategy, as Obama managed to apply limits on the number of troops, duration of their stay, and the goals they were to achieve. These compromises also gave Gates sway over decision-making, and, as will be seen in my other articles, the resulting strategy was consistent with Gates’s suggestions.
Obama respected Gates a great deal and gave ‘serious’ consideration to the views of his Defense Secretary. In Obama’s view, Gates held the National Security Council (NSC) together by trying to reduce the tension between the military and the White House. For Obama, Gates had a clear understanding of US national security interests, and, if need be, Gates was willing to take on the Pentagon bureaucracy.[14]
Gates managed to integrate the goals of the Pentagon into US ‘broader foreign policy agenda’,[15] and, unlike Rumsfeld, Gates refused to be turf-driven. On numerous occasions Gates would defend the turf of other departments, such as the State Department, if he believed it needed defending. This quality made him liked not just by Bush Junior and Obama, but also by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Clinton and many in Congress.[16]
Obama also liked Gates’s calm, low-key and balanced manner. Like Obama, Gates was ‘Mr. Cool’, and managed to keep his big ego in check while being simultaneously forceful. In NSC meetings, Gates gave importance to when and what to speak, and avoided being emotional or over-the-top. Both Gates and the President thought alike, as both were influenced by the ‘realist’ world views of former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft Scowcroft. Gates’s ‘mentor’, Scowcroft, who provided foreign policy advice to Obama during the presidential campaign in 2008, was admired by the President. All three were prudent, pragmatic and, at times, accommodationist. All three had similar outlooks in foreign policy to those of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush.[17] These numerous qualities or characteristics of Gates seemingly brought the Defense Secretary closer to Obama, even though Gates was not in the inner circle. Obama consistently urged Gates to stay longer in office because Obama needed him. When eventually he left in 2011, Obama bestowed upon him the Freedom Medal.
Having said this, Obama in his memoir states that ‘Gates would sometimes question my commitment to the war and the strategy I’d adopted back in March, no doubt attributing it to “politics” as well. It was hard for him to see that what he dismissed as politics was democracy as it was supposed to work―that out mission had to be defined not only by the need to defeat an enemy but by the need to make sure the country wasn’t bled dry in the process, that questions about spending hundreds of billions on missiles and forward operating bases rather than schools or healthcare for kids weren’t tangential to national security but central to it’.[18]
In sum, even though Gates supported McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, he did not agree with all the requests made by McChrystal. He seemed, as he himself agrees, to somehow partly agree with the Biden group, especially on costs and goals.[19] But he had supported a counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq and it had paid off, so he might have equally believed that it would do the same in Afghanistan which, in his view, had been deprived of a strategy and resources.[20]
Hilary Clinton and the counterinsurgency strategy
Clinton, on the other hand, did not appear to agree with the Biden camp on any aspects of their policy suggestions. Her unequivocal support of the Petraeus camp during the surge decision raised numerous questions, including whether she could be trusted, whether she could ever be on the Obama team, and whether she was not playing for her political future as US president.[21]
Distinguished American journalist Bob Woodward asked these questions because Clinton had been Obama’s rival in the Democratic primary campaign, in which she repeatedly called Obama inexperienced in foreign policy , and Obama, likewise, accused her of holding similar ideas about foreign policy that had led to the Iraq War. At times the attacks become personal. ‘Shame on you, Barack Obama’, Clinton told Obama, accusing him of lying. Samantha Power had to resign after the Obama campaign team after calling Clinton ‘a monster’ who was ‘stooping to anything’.[22]
Given all the tension (even animosity) between the Obama and Clinton camps during the campaign, and despite the inner circle’s discontent, Obama selected her as his Secretary of State because Obama, akin to former President Abraham Lincoln, wanted to bring rivals together in the Cabinet.[23] Obama believed she would be loyal if she became part of the team. Ultimately, she stood by her husband after the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and could stand by the President, too.
American journalist James Mann, however, believed that Obama’s underlying purpose was political, as the appointment made sure there was not another Robert Kennedy in the President Lyndon Johnson years, or Ted Kennedy in the President Jimmy Carter years; both Kennedys were considered a ‘magnet for ‘intraparty’ opposition to the president’, and both of the above presidents served only one term. Like Bobby Kennedy had done, a hypothetical speech by Clinton with a dovish message could equally have attracted many anti-war supporters against the Obama Administration.[24]
Whatever the reasons for her appointment might have been, the larger-than-life Clinton might not go down in history as one of the greatest, such as George Marshall or Henry Kissinger, because, upon her leaving, she had no signature achievement, no ‘world-historical Clinton Doctrine’, and no diplomatic achievement.[25] Unlike Henry Kissinger, Clinton did not seem to have the trust of the President and never developed ‘warm personal ties’ with him. Similar to Colin Powell and dissimilar to Kissinger, Clinton faced the presence of a powerful vice-president in the White House, who, like Dick Cheney, had a separate power centre on foreign policy and was deeply experienced in it. A combination of these two factors made it at times ‘as hard for her to persuade the White House to take her advice as it was to deal with foreign governments’.[26] She did not even have the power to remove the disobedient US ambassador in Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry because the ambassador was protected by Biden and Obama.[27] She never made a point of her voice being lost and her turf being encroached upon, not even in her memoir, and got along with her job.
While she won praises for being a team member, loyal and not standing publicly against the White House, her tendency not to involve herself personally in conflicts prevented her from being an influential voice in decision-making. Perhaps her quietness, even in her memoir, was due to her alleged presidential plans. For the same reasons, it is claimed that she did not want to be seen to be failing. She charged Richard Holbrooke for the Af-Pak arena to bring about a solution to the conflict, and when there was not much progress, she was reluctant to step in.[28]
Finally, her inexperience in foreign policy was seemingly detrimental to her role in decision-making. During her husband’s era, she never sat in NSC meetings, never had a security clearance, never managed any part of the national security bureaucracy, never had her own national security staff, and never got involved with foreign governments. She only had a behind-the-scenes role in decisions. One domestic decision she was in charge of was to pass the universal health care bill that failed.[29]
While her undeniable support of the military case raised some questions, it is important to state that her belief systems or views during the Af-Pak review were consistent with her foreign policy outlooks during her primary campaign in 2008. As a future US president, if she won, she would commit more troops and resources to Afghanistan, support the capacity of the Afghan Government to stand on its own feet, increase the size and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces to a level so that they could establish basic security, press the allies to increase their support for the Afghanistan War and drop their caveats, and appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan who would develop a regional strategy and work with Pakistan to address the terrorist threat.[30]
McChrystal’s options were not dissimilar to what Clinton had wanted for Afghanistan, and thus her views were naturally hawkish like the military,[31] and consequently she agreed with the arguments made by the military camp. Clinton was willing to support the military’s side, even though her top foreign policy advisors, Jim Steinberg[32] and Holbrooke, advised her not to because the mission had an ‘open-endedness’ to it, the military had not made a good case, and like US generals in Vietnam, McChrystal might come back after a while and ask for yet more troops. They suggested Clinton support the 20,000 option by Biden.
She, on the other hand, believed that the 40,000 option would make a difference, and it was important that the US showed resolve.[33] Indeed, as is seen in one of my articles, when Clinton and Gates, the ‘independent power centre’, the ‘unfireable’,[34] showed resolve and supported the military, Obama was forced to surge. Obama states in his memoir, Clinton and Gates’s hawkish instincts and political backgrounds left them perpetually wary of opposing any recommendations that came from the Pentagon.’[35]
According to authors Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, both Clinton’s and Gates’s support of the military case significantly diminished Obama’s running room, leaving him with no choice but to decide on the surge since he could not disagree with the two main departments responsible for foreign policy .[36]
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Afghanistan troop surge of 2009 was largely a victory (as measured by the number of troops deployed) for the military camp within the Obama administration. The core argument for a counterinsurgency strategy gained decisive momentum through the efforts of four key figures: General David Petraeus, who provided the intellectual foundation; Admiral Michael Mullen, who re-established the military’s voice in policymaking; and Secretaries Robert Gates and Hillary Clinton, whose unwavering support created a formidable alliance. Together, they formed an unassailable bloc that forced the President’s hand, proving that their collective influence and expertise were paramount to shaping the final decision on a crucial matter of national security.
References
Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009.
Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
‘Generation Kill: A Conversation With Stanley McChrystal’, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill>.
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Clinton, Hillary, ‘Clinton’s Plan for Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, March 6, 2008.
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster.
Gates, Robert, Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead, ‘Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert.
Gates Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GatesTestimony091203a1.pdf>.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
‘Hillary Clinton’s a monster’: Obama aide blurts out attack in Scotsman interview’, The Scotsman, March 6, 2008.
Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>
Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>
James, Frank. ‘Won’t Measure Afghan Success By ‘Enemy Killed’: McChrystal’, npr, June 2, 2009.
Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking.
McChrystal, Stanley, Commander’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, <http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140>.
Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking.
O’Hanlon, Michael E. ‘State and Stateswoman: How Hillary Clinton Reshaped U.S. Foreign Policy — But Not the World’, The Brookings Institution, January 29, 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/01/29-hillary-clinton-state-ohanlon>.
‘Opening Statement’, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-on-president-obamas-national-security-team-nominations>.
‘Opening Statement’, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-on-president-obamas-national-security-team-nominations>.
Petraeus, David H., ‘Statement of General David H. Petraeus to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, December 9, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PetraeusTestimony091209a1.pdf>.
Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic.
Spiegel, Peter and Yochi Dreazen, ‘Obama Receives New Afghan Option; ‘Hybrid’ Compromise Would Combine Troops, Trainers to Hold Back Taliban and Boost Local Military’, The Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2009.
Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster.
[1] Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 121; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 191; Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>
[2] Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>
[3] Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & C, pp. 151-162.
[4] ‘Generation Kill: A Conversation With Stanley McChrystal’, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill>; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 75; McChrystal, Stanley, Commander’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, <http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140>, pp. 1-2, 2-4, 2-5; Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>
[5] Petraeus, David H., ‘Statement of General David H. Petraeus to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, December 9, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PetraeusTestimony091209a1.pdf>; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 221; Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>; Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 134; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 80, 190, 217-218.
[6] James, Frank. ‘Won’t Measure Afghan Success By ‘Enemy Killed’: McChrystal’, npr, June 2, 2009.
[7] Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 118. Incidentally, due to its military nature, the strategy was capable of keeping the Defense Department central to policymaking.
[8] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 87, 100-101; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 101, 173.
[9] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, pp. 319-20.
[10] Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 7.
[11] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 41, 44; Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, pp. 321-22.
[12] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 322.
[13] Spiegel, Peter and Yochi Dreazen, ‘Obama Receives New Afghan Option; ‘Hybrid’ Compromise Would Combine Troops, Trainers to Hold Back Taliban and Boost Local Military’, The Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2009; Gates, Robert, Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead, ‘Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GatesTestimony091203a1.pdf>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 337, 366, 373- 375, 365-366;Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 108-110, 165, 219, 251-253; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 135; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 128; Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, pp. 442-43.
[14] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 23, 289-290.
[15] ‘Opening Statement’, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-on-president-obamas-national-security-team-nominations>.
[16] Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, pp. 24-25; ‘Opening Statement’, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-on-president-obamas-national-security-team-nominations>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 92.
[17] Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 6; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 21-23, 138, 290; Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009,; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 6, 80, 297-298; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. 8, 165.
[18] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p.436.
[19] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 44, 384-385.
[20] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 44, 384-385.
[21] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 254.
[22] ‘Hillary Clinton’s a monster’: Obama aide blurts out attack in Scotsman interview’, The Scotsman, March 6, 2008; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 89; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 27.
[23] Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p.13; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 225; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. 3-5.
[24] Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 6.
[25] Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>; O’Hanlon, Michael E. ‘State and Stateswoman: How Hillary Clinton Reshaped U.S. Foreign Policy — But Not the World’, The Brookings Institution, January 29, 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/01/29-hillary-clinton-state-ohanlon>
[26] Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>; O’Hanlon, Michael E. ‘State and Stateswoman: How Hillary Clinton Reshaped U.S. Foreign Policy — But Not the World’, The Brookings Institution, January 29, 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/01/29-hillary-clinton-state-ohanlon>.
[27] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 371. Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 438.
[28] Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>; O’Hanlon, Michael E. ‘State and Stateswoman: How Hillary Clinton Reshaped U.S. Foreign Policy — But Not the World’, The Brookings Institution, January 29, 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/01/29-hillary-clinton-stateohanlon>.
[29] Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking,, pp. 43-44.
[30] Clinton, Hillary, ‘Clinton’s Plan for Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, March 6, 2008.
[31] Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 376, 382.
[32] Who was unprecedentedly given a seat in the Principle Committee and at NSC meetings, giving the State Department two voices, Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 289.
[33] Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 140; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 250, 292.
[34] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 289.
[35]Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 318.
[36]Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 61.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.