The Neoconservatives, Their Neocon Ideas, and the Extent of Their Impact on Policymaking for the Afghanistan War

 

By Sharifullah Dorani*

 

 

Introduction

In the literature on US involvement in Afghanistan, little attention is given to the role of neoconservatism in the George W Bush Administration. Its role in relation to pushing the US into the Iraq War, however, is covered in great detail. As I explain in my book, America in Afghanistan,^[1] the Global War on Terror  (GWOT) had one strategy that applied first to Afghanistan and then (with some additional justifications) to Iraq. If there had been no 9/11, there would have been no GWOT and, most likely, no Iraq War.^[2] Surely, if the neocons had a part to play in relation to Iraq, they equally had a part to play in regard to Afghanistan. This article is written to study what neocon ideas are and the extent of their influence on the Afghanistan War. Incidentally, since the analysis inevitably includes policymaking towards Iraq, the article therefore is relevant to the Iraq War, too.

The article contains four sections. Section one introduces the neocons and their positions within the Bush Administration. Section two explains the neoconservative ideas. Section three states whether Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld backed up the neocons and their ideas, and if so, what was the impact on the Afghanistan War (and the Iraq War).  Section four explains if Bush supported the neocon viewpoints. The article ends with concluding remarks.

 

Who were the Neocons and what were their connections to the Bush Administration?

The neocons were present from the outset in the Bush Administration. Alongside Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, some of the neocons ─ Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis (Scooter) Libby, Stephen Hadley (who served as National Security Advisor during the second term of the Bush Junior Administration) ─ served as advisors during the 2000 pre-campaign period.^[3] Wolfowitz, as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was the leading and most influential neocon in the Bush Administration, and he did his best to ensure his (neocon) men, most of whom had previously worked for him and been his decades-old friends, took important positions in the administration: Libby as Cheney’s Chief of Staff; Zalmay Khalilzad in charge of Afghanistan and Iraq at the National Security Council (NSC); Douglas Feith as Under Secretary of Defense for policy; David Frum (who coined the phrase ‘Axis of evil’) as Bush’s speechwriter; and Richard Perle, one of ‘the leading neoconservative intellectuals’ of the neoconservative movement, as the Head of the Defense Policy Board, an independent advisory group to the Secretary of Defense.^[4]

Cheney and Wolfowitz had developed an enduring bond since the Bush Senior Administration when Wolfowitz had been Defense Secretary Cheney’s Under Secretary of Defense. Cheney saw Wolfowitz as one of those (Hadley and Libby) whom Cheney trusted the most.^[5] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz knew each other for years, and Rumsfeld liked and respected Wolfowitz. Though a domineering character, Rumsfeld often showed deference to Wolfowitz. In fact, Feith continues, due to his previous posts, namely, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Ronald Reagan Administration and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Bush Senior Administration, as well as his position as the Dean of Johns Hopkins’ University School of Advanced International Studies, Wolfowitz had become an expert on East Asia and the Pacific and the Middle East ─ especially in relation to Iraq, as far as Rumsfeld was concerned, Wolfowitz’s knowledge was ‘encyclopaedic’. Rumsfeld therefore relied on Wolfowitz for security advice. His closeness with Cheney and Rumsfeld and the fact that Wolfowitz was seen as an expert strengthened Wolfowitz’s bureaucratic muscles in decision-making and gave more weight to the policy suggestions of a Deputy Secretary of Defense whose typical job involved focusing on ‘budget, acquisition, personnel, and management tasks’.^[6]

According to Feith, the policy idea of using the Northern Alliance as ‘proxies’ for the GWOT and as peacekeepers for the counterterrorism strategy and the advantages of such policy (and, to a certain extent, the suggestion to make the GWOT global) came from Wolfowitz.^[7] Though it is debatable whether the idea to use the Northern Alliance as proxies was that of Wolfowitz, as similar advice was given by the CIA before Wolfowitz, it still shows the impact Wolfowitz and his neocons had on the decision to intervene in Afghanistan in October 2001, as well as the counterterrorism strategy, which I will cover in my future articles.

Wolfowitz, Libby and Hadley must have also contributed to the policymaking atmosphere within the pre-campaign environment. Since Wolfowitz served Bush as an advisor on national security issues and missiles during the 2000 presidential campaign, it is very possible he (and his men) provided his opinions to the President (and Cheney and Rice) on how to deal with terrorism, how relevant planting democracy in the Middle East was to US national security, and how Saddam was a threat to US national security. Bush, a novice on foreign policy, might have been influenced by these seeds of neocon ideas before 9/11 even materialised.

While it is difficult to ascertain whether Wolfowitz (or the other neocons) had offered his opinion, and if in the affirmative, the extent of its influence, if any, upon Bush prior to 9/11. It is clear, however, that both Wolfowitz and Feith during the making of the GWOT strategy made it possible for the neoconservative ideas and principles to be applied to US foreign policy by inserting neoconservative ideas into the advice and recommendations they (especially Feith as part of his job) provided Rumsfeld with, many of which made their way to the NSC meetings headed by Bush. Libby and, to a certain extent, Hadley then were effective within the White House by providing additional support for these ideas.^[8] Perle was effective in supporting them when he independently advised the Pentagon civilian leadership.

 

What were the neoconservative ideas?

To ascertain the impact of neocons on the decision-making further, it is also important to understand what the neoconservatives’ ideas were, and whether they were different to those of the ‘defence hawks’, Cheney and Rumsfeld.

Two individuals played crucial parts in developing and championing neocon ideas: Irving Kristol, professor of social thought at New York University and later a (‘gifted’) journalist;[9] and Harvard University Professor of sociology and education Nathan Glazer, one of America’s ‘foremost urban sociologists’.[10] Both of them became fed-up with what they saw ‘as the dangerous folly of the New Left in the 1960s and 70s’ and thus moved from the left to the right.[11] They saw themselves as ‘disillusioned liberals’ later known as the neoconservatives.[12]

As far as foreign policy is concerned, neoconservatives’ ideas could be summed up as follows: go after ‘tyranny’ by engaging in a direct military war and therefore abandon the strategies of deterrence and containment in favour of offensive military actions ─ always be prepared to solve problems through military means; be precise and firm in one’s decision/belief and (like President Ronald Reagan) call a spade a spade; be prepared to pre-empt an attack involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons; be prepared to act unilaterally if critical US interests were in question and the American allies proved sluggish; preserve US main objectives in the Middle East and South Asia, namely, keeping US and Western access to the regions’ oil; the US is and should act like an empire; preserve US pre-eminence (used as the euphemism of ‘strategic depth’), partly by developing unmatched military strength and partly by preventing the emergence of a US competitor, especially a hostile one; and use the US pre-eminence (of which the neocons were very proud) to shape the future security environment by getting rid of dictators and authoritarian regimes, and instead spread American ideas, mainly democracy, to build a peaceful relationship among the great nations.

Neocons rejected peace through the balance of power in favour of peace through moral security. This was a position the Democrat President Woodrow Wilson took nearly a century back. However, many prominent US foreign policy makers (and thinkers), including former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, would disagree with such an approach as they supported peace through the balance of power.^[13]

 

Did Cheney and Rumsfeld support the neoconservatives and their ideas? If so, what was the impact of these ideas on the Afghanistan War (and the Iraq War)?

Many of the above neoconservative ideas and recommendations could be found in the reasoning of President Bush for developing his doctrines,[14] which were the key pillars for the GWOT. The Bush Doctrines equally stressed the importance of military power, adopted an offensive stance by going after the terrorists, allowed for pre-emption, and promoted democratic values, more eagerly when the Iraq War was not going in the right direction. Above all, like the neocon ideas, the doctrines were bold and aggressive in pursuit of terrorists, and called a spade a spade by calling terrorists ‘evil’.^[15]

However, to imply that Bush and his Doctrines were ‘influenced’ by the neocon ideas alone^[16] could be an overstatement, as it would take no notice of the role that Cheney and Rumsfeld played.^[17] Most importantly, it would disregard Bush as the President. The neocons only served as ‘junior ministers’,^[18] and indeed played a part in the policymaking environment, but they could hardly influence policymaking and resulting decisions if seniors ─ such as Cheney and Rumsfeld, and, most importantly, President Bush ─ did not agree with them. As a matter of fact, Cheney and Rumsfeld found themselves in agreement with the neocon ideas and supported them, or else Secretary of Defense Cheney would have not approved the Defense Planning Guidance by Libby in 1993, and Cheney and Rumsfeld would have not been signatories to the founding Statement of Principles of the Project for the New American Century in 1997 ─ set up by William Kristol, son of influential neoconservative Irving Kristol, the project was considered ‘the political arm’ of the neoconservative movement.

Like Wolfowitz and the other neoconservatives, Cheney and Rumsfeld, the ‘offensive realists’ or ‘conservative nationalists’,^[19] gave US military high priority/were in favour of a strong national defence/preferred to use military power to reshape the world according to their ‘own interests’, proud of US unmatched military strength, certain of victories if the US engaged in wars, wanted to go on the offensive, favoured unilateralism, disapproved of nation-building/using US forces for peacekeeping, showed strong opposition against Communism/détente/the opening to Beijing, disapproved of any treaty curtailing the use of arms including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, had a commitment to American exceptionalism, and acted as if they ran an empire.^[20]

Like the neoconservative views, their viewpoints could equally be traceable to the Bush Doctrines, and one could likewise claim that these views influenced the intervention in Afghanistan, and later the counterterrorism strategy, (both of which I will cover in my later articles). British Professor John Dumbrell claims that the neocons’ attitude during the pre-invasion (Iraq) period was one of ‘incautious optimism’,^[21] of failing to balance ideals with national capacities.^[22] The same could be said in relation to the attitude of Rumsfeld and Cheney: the former suggested a wide anti-terrorism campaign and the latter supported it without question. One can therefore find it difficult to measure the extent of the neocons’ influence over the GWOT or the counterterrorism strategy since their viewpoints were not incompatible with those of Cheney and Rumsfeld.

One thing, however, that distinguished Cheney/Rumsfeld from Bush (and the neocons) was their lack of enthusiasm in regards to the commitment to spread democracy, particularly in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld and Cheney always preferred a more practical and pragmatic approach; this was seen in Rumsfeld’s (somehow prophetic) advice to President Bush before intervening in Afghanistan:

‘Pakistan distrusted the Northern Alliance. India distrusted Pakistan and vice versa. Russia distrusted our relations with its neighbors. And nearly everyone distrusted the Russians. Each of the countries surrounding Afghanistan…[including Iran] seemed prepared to jockey for influence with whatever government arose and ready to use their longtime connections in that country as proxies. Stability―much less democracy―would be difficult to bring to an impoverished country that had for decades known little more than civil war, occupation, drought, drug trafficking, warlords, and religious extremism…” Afghanistan risks becoming a swamp for the United States,” I told Bush…“Everyone in Afghanistan has an agenda or two. We are not going to find a lot of straight shooters…It’s my view we need to limit our mission to getting the terrorists who find their way to Afghanistan…We ought not to make a career out of transforming Afghanistan.”’[23]

For Rumsfeld and Cheney, as long as a force was willing to take over from the US in those ‘liberated’ countries, they cared less about the characteristics of the force and whether they had the support of the local population. Hence they supported the Northern Alliance and other warlords in Afghanistan. Since Bush (and surprisingly the ‘realist’ Rice) was very enthusiastic (and according to Rumsfeld, optimistic)[24] about spreading democracy, Cheney and Rumsfeld seemed to have gone with the President and never let it become an obvious disagreement among the three.

It is equally the case in relation to the Iraq invasion, even though many experts blame the neocons for it.[25] As I discuss this in my book,[26] Rumsfeld and Cheney were as keen on invading Iraq, one of the main reasons the Bush Administration adopted the counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan. Syria’s interference forced the Ronald Reagan Administration to withdraw from Lebanon in a humiliating manner, and Rumsfeld vowed to himself that in future the US would defeat those small countries ─ such as Syria, Iran, North Korea, and, of course, Iraq ─ which opposed America’s national security interests.^[27] Accordingly, like the neocons, whose main objective was (arguably) to oust the Saddam regime in Baghdad, Rumsfeld, too, wanted to get rid of a rogue nation like Iraq that posed a security threat to the US. Iraq and Iran had a history of posing threats to America and thus were included in the ‘axis of evil’ list. Afghanistan was never on Rumsfeld’s list of rogue nations. He and Cheney therefore were not keen on leaving a large number of US troops for peacekeeping or rebuilding purposes. They wanted the GWOT to move to its next stage: Iraq. According to Dr Adam  Quinn,^[28] if there was anyone from the Bush Administration who had no regret about invading Iraq, it was the ‘conservative’ (‘I mean really conservative’)^[29] Cheney.

British academic Steven Hurst claimed that to hold exclusively the neocons responsible for the Iraq invasion would reduce the US intervention of Iraq ‘to a kind of historical accident – a consequence of the unforeseeable conjuncture of 11 September and “neoconservative” influence in Washington.’ For Hurst, the invasion was:

‘a product of a long-established American determination to maintain the position of the United States as the dominant power in the Gulf and of the socio-economic and political transformation of the United States that brought the long-marginalised right wing of the Republican Party [the Bush Junior Administration] to a position of national power for the first time since the 1920s’.^[30]

It is therefore right to claim that the Bush Administration consisted of an alliance between the ‘defence hawks’ and the neocons, and 9/11 only ‘solidified’ the alliance.^[31] 9/11 provided the defence hawks and the neoconservatives the chance to turn their (consistent) views into policy,^[32] thereby, forming the GWOT strategy.[33]

 

Did President Bush support the neocon ideas?

Bush as President was ‘an eager enabler’, not an ‘active architect’ in the making of the GWOT. His gut feeling or instinct was to be tough and aggressive towards terrorism. So Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives’ belligerence fitted very well with the President’s own inclinations.^[34] Cheney and Rumsfeld, together with the neocons, might have been unable to launch America into such a broad war had President Bush not agreed with them. The Afghanistan and Iraq invasions reflected the temperament of the President himself. ‘George W. Bush considered himself a visionary, comfortable with big ‘strategic plays’ and scornful of piecemeal, incremental policymaking unworthy of America’s greatness’.^[35]

The ‘top-down, no-nonsense, decisive, macho leader’ wanted, like Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt, to be seen as a ‘transformational’ president, someone who was in the process of changing the direction of history by making terrorism ‘obsolete’ on the face of the earth and instead spreading democracy.^[36] Since the goal to root out terrorism was so wide and lengthy,^[37] Bush accepted the Pentagon’s reasoning, which was compatible with the neoconservatives’ viewpoints,  to employ a narrow counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan.

Needless to say, these neocon views proved to be a ‘costly failure’ for the US once they were implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet some two decades later, the neocons, many of whom then worked in influential conservative think tanks, persistently urged President Joe Biden (whom they supported against President Donald Trump) to deploy more troops to stabilise Afghanistan. But Biden was no Bush, and he did the opposite. It is important to note that the neoconservatives no longer refer to themselves as ‘neoconservative’ because the word has ‘fallen away from popular use’ as, according to American author and neocon Max Boot, it had a meaning back in the 1970s but that ‘label has now become meaningless’.[38]  

 

Conclusion

The GWOT strategy that resulted in the intervention decision in Afghanistan (and the decision to employ the counterterrorism strategy) was consistent with the belief systems or viewpoints of the neoconservatives. Likewise, the defensive hawks Cheney and Rumsfeld, found themselves naturally supportive of the neocon beliefs. Bush, who was very angry-and-emotional-by-the-9/11-acts, found those beliefs/ideas persuasive and believed that invasion was the right answer. Overwhelming domestic support for revenge against Al-Qaeda held responsible for 9/11 gave more weight to the arguments of the neoconservatives. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the impact of the neocon ideas as the Secretary of Defense, Vice-President and, importantly, the President had similar beliefs. What is clear is that the neoconservatives and their ideas did play an important part in influencing the decision to launch the GWOT, with Afghanistan and Iraq being its first and second stops. 

 

References

Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bush, George W, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001,

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.

Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001,

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.

Bush, George W, Department of Defense Service of Remembrance at the Pentagon, October 11, 2001,

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.

Bush, George W, West Point Commencement, June 1, 2002,

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.

Cheney, Richard B. and Liz Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011).

Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. 2003. America unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Defense Planning Guidance 1992 by Zalmay Khalilzad.

Defense Planning Guidance 1993 by Libby.

Dorani, Sharifullah. 2019. America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making Approaches from Bush to Obama to Trump. I.B. Tauris/Bloomsbury Publishing House.

Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press.

Feith, Douglas J. 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper.

Gewen, Barry, ‘Nathan Glazer, Urban Sociologist and Outspoken Intellectual. Dies at 95’, The New York Times, 19 January 2019.

Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won?’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won.

Hodgson, Godfrey, ‘Irving Kristol obituary’, The Guardian, 20 September 2009.

Hurst, Steven. 2009. The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10391778.

Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan, ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 1996, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52239/william-kristol-and-robert-kagan/toward-a-neo-reaganite-foreign-policy>.

Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-p-leffler/september-11-in-retrospect.

Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking.

Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>.

Mendoza, Alan, ‘“We should be prepared to intervene”: Richard Perle on Georg W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Arab Spring’, Fathom Journal, Summer 2013.

Moody, Chris, ‘Decades after 9/11, what became of the US’s neoconservatives?’, Aljazeera, 10 September, 2021.

Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-s-nye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>.

Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/10/31-bush-pfiffner>.

Quinn, A., ‘“A House Divided”, Extended review article’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April 2013.

Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: penguin.

Rumsfeld, Donald, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011).

Statement of Principles, Project for the New American Century, June 3, 1997, <http://cf.linnbenton.edu/artcom/social_science/clarkd/upload/PNAC—statement%20of%20principles.pdf>.

*Dr Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.

 

---

[1] Dorani, Sharifullah. 2019. America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making Approaches from Bush to Obama to Trump. I.B. Tauris/Bloomsbury Publishing House, chapters 1-5.

[2] Steven Hurst claims that the invasion of Iraq is impossible to imagine without the terrorist attacks of the 9/11, in Hurst, Steven. 2009. The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10391778, p.1.

[3] Cheney, Richard B. and Liz Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011), p. 252; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 251.

[4] Mendoza, Alan, ‘“We should be prepared to intervene”: Richard Perle on Georg W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Arab Spring’, Fathom Journal, Summer 2013; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 22, 112-13, 251, 273; Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 24-28, 34, 42; Moody, Chris, ‘Decades after 9/11, what became of the US’s neoconservatives?’, Aljazeera, 10 September, 2021.

[5] Cheney, In My Time, p. 278.

[6] Feith, War and decision, pp. 71, 75; Rumsfeld, Donald, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), p. 347.

[7] Feith, War and decision, pp. 65, 75-84.

[8] Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>.

[9] Hodgson, Godfrey, ‘Irving Kristol obituary’, The Guardian, 20 September 2009.

[10] Gewen, Barry, ‘Nathan Glazer, Urban Sociologist and Outspoken Intellectual. Dies at 95’, The New York Times, 19 January 2019.

[11]  Hodgson, ‘Irving Kristol obituary’.

[12] Gewen, ‘Nathan Glazer, Urban Sociologist and Outspoken Intellectual. Dies at 95’.

[13] Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press, pp. 26-27, 32- 34; Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan, ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 1996, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52239/william-kristol-and-robert-kagan/toward-a-neo-reaganite-foreign-policy>; Defense Planning Guidance 1992 by Zalmay Khalilzad; Defense Planning Guidance 1993 by Libby; Statement of Principles, Project for the New American Century, June 3, 1997, <http://cf.linnbenton.edu/artcom/social_science/clarkd/upload/PNAC—statement%20of%20principles.pdf>; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, pp. 52, 76, 200, 210- 213.

[14] Dorani, American in Afghanistan, see chapter 1.

[15] Bush, George W, West Point Commencement, June 1, 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>

[16] Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. LII; Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. 2003. America unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp. 1-18; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 199.

[17] Gordon, ‘Can the War’; Marshall,‘Remaking the World’.

[18] Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots’, p. 29.

[19] Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots’, p. 35.

[20] Rumsfeld, Donald, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011),pp. 33-34, 205, 231-232; Cheney, In My Time, pp. 333, 374-377; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. XLVI-XLVII; Mann, Rise of the Vulcans,  pp. 115, 231, 238, 256; Quinn, A., ‘“A House Divided”, Extended review article’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April 2013, p. 269; Hurst, The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war, p. 7; Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-p-leffler/september-11-in-retrospect>.

[21] Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots’, p. 33.

[22] Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-s-nye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>.

[23] Rumsfeld, Known Unknown, p.398.

[24] Rumsfeld, Known Unknown, p.398.

[25] See Hurst, The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war, p. 1.

[26] Dorani, America in Afghanistan, see chapter 3.

[27] Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, p. 24.

[28] Quinn, ‘A House Divided’, pp. 283-284.

[29] Cheney, In My Time, p. 264.

[30] Hurst, The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war, p. 1.

[31] Dumbrell, ‘The Neoconservative Roots’, pp. 29, 31-32.

[32] Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 364.

[33] Dorani, America in Afghanistan, see chapters 2 and 3.

[34] Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/10/31-bush-pfiffner>.

[35] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 48.

[36] Nye, ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’; Bush, George W, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001,

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>; Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.

[37] Bush, George W, Department of Defense Service of Remembrance at the Pentagon, October 11, 2011, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.

[38] Moody, ‘Decades after 9/11, what became of the US’s neoconservatives?’.