By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
‘Fear was widespread, not just in the days immediately after the [9/11] attacks, but throughout the fall of 2001. Most Americans said they were…worried about another attack.’ Pew Research Center[1]
Although later decision-making in the George W Bush Administration was conducted in secrecy and without much deliberation, the decision to intervene in Afghanistan to a certain extent was deliberate and open. President Bush listened to the viewpoints of his advisors before making the final decision. As part of the requirements of external and internal factors of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) Approach,[2] a number of my articles have made an attempt to find out answers to the ‘why’ question (why did the US intervene in Afghanistan?) by claiming that the personal characteristics of Bush and some of his advisors, especially the belief system and images of the President, as well as domestic factors, were two causal factors that shaped the resulting decision.[3] The tendency of President Bush to act upon his ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ and consequently make up doctrines without fully thinking about their vast consequences contributed greatly to the making of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) strategy, with Afghanistan being its first station.[4] Bush’s belief system to view the US as the saviour of those who were oppressed, or seeing the GWOT as good versus evil, and to confront terrorism offensively as opposed to defensively, was another causal factor that contributed to the decision to involve the United States (US) in such a broad anti-terrorism war.[5] The ‘public-media-Congress pressure’ upon the President to do something was yet another causal factor.[6]
This article tries to bring to attention the circumstances and the milieu in which President Bush and his War Cabinet made the decision for the GWOT, a period when the possibility of another wave of attacks, especially attacks involving some form of weapons of mass destruction, was real and imminent in their minds. The fear of another 9/11 was an important factor in shaping the intervention decision in Afghanistan – an intervention which was the first part of the GWOT strategy.
The ‘fear’ of another 9/11-like attack
‘Mr. President, Mr. President, the White House is under attack! Let’s go!’ A secret serviceman, heavily breathing, tells Bush to leave immediately and head towards the underground shelter. It was midnight and the President and the First Lady Laura Bush were asleep.[7]
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney claimed that on September 12 they saw a different America, where commercial aircraft were grounded, the New York Stock Exchange was closed, the Twin Towers had disappeared, tourism and insurance industries were all badly hit, and armed vehicles patrolled the streets of the ‘wartime capital’, Washington.[8] Bush was informed that many families from cities had escaped to the countryside in case the skyscrapers they lived in were the next targets, and similarly those who worked in them had feared to go to work in case the buildings were targeted by suicide bombers. Families had stocked up on basic necessities in case there were further attacks. As Bush saw it, ‘the psyche of the nation had been shaken’.[9]
Such was the psyche of the White House. For the whole day of September 11 Bush was kept away from the White House since there were intelligence reports that more planes were heading to crash into the White House. Bush, however, came back at 6:30 p.m. against the advice given by the CIA, but was abruptly awakened at midnight by a secret service agent and ushered into the bunker underneath the White House, together with his wife and their two dogs. They did not even have the time to change and Mrs Bush had to be guided by her husband since she did not have the time to put on her contact lenses. As Bush put it, they ‘must have made quite a sight’.[10] Indeed, ‘the most powerful man on the planet’ had to hide in the bunker in such a humiliating fashion only to find out minutes later that the plane was one of their own.
Bush was not alone in going through personal fear and humiliation. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was not able to go to her apartment because of the threat. For the first few nights after 9/11 she stayed at the White House.[11]
On the morning of 9/11, Cheney, too, was rushed through by secret agents to the basement because an inbound, unidentified plane was heading for the White House. The plane then hit the Pentagon. Soon Cheney left for an unidentified and secure location. It was the first of many more times that he was evacuated to unidentified locations just to make sure the next terrorist attacks did not get both him and the President, as it would have decapitated the government.[12]
Bush and his Cabinet could not go through such fear forever; in their view, they had to do something. They had to do something, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, and according to Bush, Cheney in particular were fearful of further attacks, especially those involving some form of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.[13] They were suddenly fearful because, after the 9/11 terrorist acts, their assumptions about US security and the capability of Al Qaeda were fundamentally changed once Al Qaeda demonstrated that they could deliver such a hard blow to the heart of America’s economic and military power.[14]
Moreover, relying on intelligence sources, Tenet told the War Cabinet that certain Pakistani scientists had provided Al Qaeda, which had been acquiring chemical, biological and radiological nuclear weapons since 1993, with information on how to make nuclear weapons. To make matters worse, some of Russia’s nuclear materials had been smuggled, and Russian President Vladimir Putin could only account for materials on his watch as President. Had these materials found their way into the hands of Al Qaeda? The CIA did not know. In short, Tenet could not reassure them a hundred percent that Al Qaeda did not possess weapons of mass destruction, was not developing them, and had not smuggled some into the US.[15]
Cheney’s reply was that if the policymakers had even a one percent doubt about it, they should treat it as if Al Qaeda had nuclear weapons, as the conventional risk assessment did not apply when it came to weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists, who would not hesitate to utilise them against the US.[16] The Soviets, just like the US, wanted to live and use the nuclear weapons as a deterrent, but Al Qaeda would embrace the moment when the US feared death. An Al Qaeda equipped with some forms of weapons of mass destruction, thought the policymakers, would change history since it would turn Al Qaeda into a superpower and bring death into every American household and drastically alter the free nature of US society.[17] In such a scenario neither the FBI nor the Defense Department nor the CIA could help.
The threat of weapons of mass destruction was not the only idea within the advisors’ minds, however, as Bush received CIA intelligence in his morning briefings that warned him about other threats, at times a hundred of them, some imminent, to US facilities around the world and targets inside the country.[18] For example, on Saturday, 22 September 2001, the FBI told Bush they had 331 people on their watch list, some of whom were assumed to be capable of carrying out another 9/11 attack. ‘It floored’, Bush talked of his reaction to the dreadful news to American journalist Bob Woodward in a later interview.[19] Being disturbed by this ‘incredible number’, Bush asked Tenet to make a list of targets Al Qaeda was most likely to hit within the US, but Tenet replied that there were simply too many targets in the US to protect. Rumsfeld’s Beirut experience taught him that it was physically impossible for the US to protect its every corner day and night. For him, the terrorist had to be lucky once to carry out a terrorist attack, but the US always to prevent terrorist attacks.[20]
However, the principals did everything at home to defend America and its way of life, including holding NSC deputies meetings to focus on threats to homeland security; shifting priority from bringing those responsible to justice to preventing further attacks; heightening security at home (especially airports and ports); and giving unprecedented powers to the security services including the CIA, the FBI and other relevant departments.[21] But whatever they did internally, ‘the grim reality remained unchanged’: the US homeland was still open and vulnerable since Al Qaeda was freely operating in Afghanistan, representing a major strategic danger to the US[22] ─ and its liberal nature.
America’s good life ─ the financial conditions, the chance to better oneself, individual freedom, public safety and many other values ─ was the result of the liberal and democratic nature of America. America is not ‘so much a land and a people as it is a way of life that embodies an idea ─ the idea of individual freedom’.[23] The terrorists were threatening the very liberal nature of America.[24]
So the US had ‘a choice’: either to change the free nature of its society by taking more severe measures, or to change the way terrorists lived by going after the places where they grew. The US opted for the latter option; it was terrorism which had created the situation and ‘the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows’.[25] Defeating and destroying terrorism meant closing their safe haven in Afghanistan before Al Qaeda developed other plans.[26] Destroying Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan would reduce the level of threat, but it would not entirely eliminate the threat of further attacks, since Al Qaeda could ‘shift’ to other countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and many other countries with safe havens. Furthermore, the issue of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states would have been left untouched.[27] Thus a global campaign was argued for by the Defense Department and approved by Bush.[28]
Hopefully, this article has managed to highlight the circumstances and the milieu in which the policymakers made the decision for the GWOT, a period when the possibility of another wave of attacks, especially attacks involving some form of weapons of mass destruction, was real and imminent in their minds.[29]
The neoconservative scholar and a leading advocate of liberal internationalism Robert Kagan writes: ‘Today, one reads that Americans went to war “almost gleefully”; that in launching the intervention, President George W. Bush was filled with “optimism” based on the belief that “democracy would flourish when given the opportunity”; that “imperial hubris” led Americans to believe “that we could shape the world in our image using our guns and our money”. Today, we read that…there was a sense among America’s warrior and diplomatic class that history was starting anew for the people of Afghanistan and much of the Muslim world…This is a myth…. For better or for worse, it was fear that drove the United States into Afghanistan — fear of another attack by al-Qaeda, which was then firmly ensconced in the Taliban-controlled country; fear of possible attacks by other groups using chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons; fear of other sleeper cells already hiding in the United States. Experts warned that it was just a matter of time before the next big attack. And these fears persisted.’[30]
Christopher Meyer, the British Ambassador to Washington, declared: ‘Unless you were living in America at the time it is not easy to imagine the impact on Bush himself. He was responsible for the security of nearly 300 million American lives. The fear of further atrocity was overwhelming.’[31]
Bush (and his advisors) thought that another wave of strikes on America would have brought America to a halt, both economically and security-wise, and his administration to an immature political death. After all, it was bad enough that 9/11 happened under his presidency. Another one and his character would have come across as too incompetent to protect America.[32] For many weeks after 9/11, according to Laura Bush in an interview with Woodward, Bush had troubling and sleepless nights.[33]
Tenet equally spent sleepless nights shaken by how this could have happened under his leadership at the CIA, and another attack would have further damaged the CIA’s standing.
Thus Bush and his principals, feeling guilty about 9/11 taking place on their watch, were under tremendous pressure to defuse the threat, especially the threat of weapons of mass destruction, as soon as possible and get the country and the administration back to normal in the short term. The purpose of terrorists was to terrorise the US to alter its behaviour and its values, and to try to make the US live in fear. But for the administration it was important to keep and defend Americans and all those values that were dear to them, and to turn around the trend by forcing the terrorists to live in fear.[34]
Concluding remarks
A number of my articles attempt to find answers to the ‘why’ question, that is, why the Bush Administration intervened in Afghanistan. Put differently, they study the independent variables or causal factors that possibly influenced the making of the GWOT strategy, with Afghanistan being its first station. The various causal factors include: the conflicting objectives put forward by realists, liberalists and conspiracy theorists;[35] the personal characteristics of Bush and some of his advisors, especially the belief system and images of the President;[36] Bush’s ‘freedom agenda’;[37] the tendency of Bush to act upon his ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ and consequently make up doctrines without thinking about their vast consequences;[38] Bush’s belief system to view the US as the saviour of those who were oppressed, or seeing the GWOT as good versus evil, and to confront terrorism offensively as opposed to defensively;[39] and the ‘public-media-Congress pressure’ upon Bush and his War Cabinet to do something.[40]
This article has covered (from the perspectives of the policymakers) the milieu in which the policymakers operated during the decision-making period to intervene in Afghanistan, and concludes that the milieu was evidently one of the most important independent variables or causal factors; a constant fear of further attacks by terrorists, attacks involving weapons of mass destruction in particular, and the constant pressure upon the President to do something to defuse the threat greatly impacted the resulting GWOT decision. And that ‘something’ in relation to Afghanistan was to invade the country in order to defeat Al Qaeda and its harbourers, the Taliban.
References
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 10 November 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html>
Bush, George W, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. [The White House], 20 September 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>
Bush, George W, Address at the Citadel, 11 December 2001, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
Bush, George W, State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress, 29 January 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers.
Byman, Daniel, ‘Should Hezbollah Be Next?’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59366/daniel-byman/should-hezbollah-be-next>
Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Why did the US intervene in Afghanistan?’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2024, <https://cepsaf.com/what-was-the-us-motive-in-afghanistan/>
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, CEPSAF, 27 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/>
Dorani, Sharifullah, The role of President Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars’, CEPSAF, 7 April, 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-president-bushs-freedom-agenda-in-the-afghanistan-and-iraq-wars/>
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of domestic factors in the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Afghanistan’, CEPSAF, 17 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-domestic-factors-in-the-bush-administrations-decision-to-invade-afghanistan/>
Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper.
Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>
Hartig, Hannah and Carroll Doherty, ‘Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11’, Pew Research Center, 2 September 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>
Kagan, Robert, ‘It wasn’t hubris that drove America into Afghanistan. It was fear’, The Washington Post, 26 August 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/26/robert-kagan-afghanistan-americans-forget/>
Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/september-11-retrospect>
Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>
Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster.
Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.
Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher.
Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster.
[1] Hartig, Hannah and Carroll Doherty, ‘Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11’, Pew Research Center, 2 September 2021.
[2] Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press, pp.377-87.
[3] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, CEPSAF, 27 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of domestic factors in the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Afghanistan’, CEPSAF, 17 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-domestic-factors-in-the-bush-administrations-decision-to-invade-afghanistan/>
[4] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>
[5] Dorani, Sharifullah, The role of President Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars’, CEPSAF, 7 April, 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-president-bushs-freedom-agenda-in-the-afghanistan-and-iraq-wars/>
[6] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of domestic factors in the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Afghanistan’, CEPSAF, 17 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-domestic-factors-in-the-bush-administrations-decision-to-invade-afghanistan/>
[7] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 139.
[8] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 134; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 329-330, 339.
[9] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 139.
[10] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 139.
[11] Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster, pp. 80, 88.
[12] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 1, 10, 337.
[13] Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/september-11-retrospect>; Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 355-356; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 10, 218, 318; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 160, 218; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 393-396; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p.189; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 93.
[14] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 10.
[15] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 261, 393-96, 399, 402, 408, 412-414.
[16] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 402-404.
[17] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 425-427; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 355-56; Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>; Bush>; George W, Address at the Citadel, December 11, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
[18] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 164; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 105-106.
[19] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 117.
[20] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 33.
[21] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, pp. 43, 151; Bush, George W, State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress, January 29, 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
[22] Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster, pp. 80, 88; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 355-356.
[23] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, p. 69.
[24] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 69-71; Leffler, op. cit.
[25] Bush, George W, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. [The White House], 20 September 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>
[26] Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>
[27] Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>
[28] Byman, Daniel, ‘Should Hezbollah Be Next?’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59366/daniel-byman/should-hezbollah-be-next>; Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 56; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 218; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 355-56.
[29] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 93; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 55; Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/september-11-retrospect>; Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>
[30] Kagan, Robert, ‘It wasn’t hubris that drove America into Afghanistan. It was fear’, The Washington Post, 26 August 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/26/robert-kagan-afghanistan-americans-forget/>
[31] Meyer is quoted in Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 55.
[32] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 330, 339; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 171.
[33] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 171.
[34] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher p. 26; Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/september-11-retrospect>
[35] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Why did the US intervene in Afghanistan?’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2024, <https://cepsaf.com/what-was-the-us-motive-in-afghanistan/>
[36] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, CEPSAF, 27 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/>
[37] Dorani, Sharifullah, The role of President Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars’, CEPSAF, 7 April, 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-president-bushs-freedom-agenda-in-the-afghanistan-and-iraq-wars/>
[38] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2025, https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/
[39] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, CEPSAF, 27 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/>
[40] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of domestic factors in the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Afghanistan’, CEPSAF, 17 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-domestic-factors-in-the-bush-administrations-decision-to-invade-afghanistan/>
*Dr Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.
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