By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘I have a real concern that given our preoccupation in Iraq, we’ve not devoted sufficient troops and funding to Afghanistan to ensure success in that mission….Afghanistan has been the forgotten war.’ President George W Bush[1]
Introduction
As studied in my other article,[2] the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which the counterterrorism strategy was an arm of it, was based upon assumptions that convinced the principals that the strategy would successfully accomplish its overreaching objectives. While they are considered in my other articles in great detail, some of them are briefly touched upon here in order to ascertain whether they were false or true once they met reality in Afghanistan (and Iraq). Put differently, this article analyses whether these assumptions were accurate once they were implemented in Afghanistan (and Iraq). The central focus is on whether the Iraq War had any impact on the Afghanistan War and what were its consequences for the bureaucratic muscles of the neoconservatives and the ‘defense hawks’, namely Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the Bush Administration.
The effect of the Iraq War over the Afghanistan War
At the outset of the Iraq War, the Bush administration, including the President, defense hawks and the neoconservatives, believed the conflict would be swift, mirroring the early success in Afghanistan. They assumed that by 2002, the war in Afghanistan was over, with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda defeated. This perception led them to believe the US would only be fighting one short war in Iraq before moving on to other targets, such as those in the ‘axis of evil.’ [3]
In order to show the falsehood of some of the above assumptions, especially the effect of the Iraq War over the Afghanistan War, the preoccupation of the Bush Administration with the Iraq War (which turned the Afghanistan War into a ‘forgotten’ one)[4] is divided into two phases: from the making of the GWOT strategy up to the invasion of Iraq, and from the invasion to surge in 2007. Doing so would also bring to the surface the milieu in which the policymakers operated from its invasion of Iraq right towards the end of the administration. This would further shed some light on how and why the Bush Administration had to employ a counterinsurgency or COIN strategy in Iraq, thus leading the way for the strategy in Afghanistan, too.
The National Security Council’s (NSC) debate over the possibility of whether to include Iraq in the first phase of the GWOT was something that proved to be a distraction to the Afghanistan War, preventing the NSC from debating the Afghan strategy in detail. After the Afghanistan mission ended, the NSC, to prepare for the Iraq invasion and to produce in-depth plans for post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, had daily meetings throughout 2002 and early 2003, not just among themselves but with allies, to an extent that the policymakers’ phone lines were ‘burning’.[5] Afghanistan had already begun to slip down the priority list.
One issue in 2002 that divided the policymakers was whether to take the Iraq case to the United Nations (UN). While Secretary of State Colin Powell argued in favour, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argued against. France, Germany and Russia had warned that it would veto any resolution that authorised military action in Iraq. The defence hawks (Cheney and Rumsfeld) and the neocons bombarded France and Germany with criticism; Rumsfeld even introduced the construct of ‘Old and New Europe’. The media of the three countries inflamed the situation. There were even predictions by some analysts that NATO would split.[6] The opposition of those allied countries, which had shown overwhelming support for the intervention in Afghanistan, revealed the first blow to the assumption that the US would continue to receive the international support for its sustained anti-terrorism campaign. The US policymakers, with all their ‘soft power’, could not persuade their closest NATO allies, let alone others, such as Russia or China, to join the US in the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign to remove the Saddam Hussein regime, and therefore had to invade Iraq without a UN resolution. It must have been the first revelation to Bush that the world did not operate in the black and white frame (be with or against us) in which he had seen it in late-2001.
After the ousting of the Iraqi regime in spring 2003 up to early 2008, the Iraqi saga kept the administration preoccupied for three main developments: the WMD saga (2003-2004), the increasing sectarian violence/insurgency in Iraq (2004-2007), and the surge (2007 to early 2008). The US media attacked Bush and Cheney for lying and misleading the country into the Iraq War when WMD (used as a main justification for invasion) could not be found in Iraq. Eventually, Central Intelligence Agent (CIA) Director Geoge Tenet and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley had to take the blame for the wrong intelligence, and Rice issued a public apology.[7] This badly hurt the credibility of the Bush Administration. Thus, by 2004, not just international support, but also domestic support for the GWOT began to fade away. Bush, the defence hawks and the neoconservatives were no longer in their honeymoon period.
As of 2004, and especially in 2005 and 2006, the sectarian violence in Iraq started to get worse, turning the country into, as Bush put it, a ‘hell’. There were 1,000 attacks per week, 120 Iraqis died every day, 2500 US soldiers were killed, and another 19,000 were injured by 2006. The American media, Bush continues, not to say worldwide attention (at the cost of almost forgetting the Afghanistan War) focused on the sectarian violence in Iraq.[8] Journalist Sheryl Gay Stolberg remarks that, even though Bush in November 2006 was in Riga to focus on the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War dominated the President’s time, as on every journalist’s lips was the dire situation in Iraq.[9]
Due to the unpopularity of the Iraq War, the Bush Administration lost control of both Houses of Congress in the mid-term elections in late-2006. Unlike 2001 and 2002, many members of Congress, especially the Democrats, including Congressman John Murtha of Pennsylvania, Senator Joe Biden, and the new House Speaker Democrat Nancy Pelosi, asked for a rapid US withdrawal.[10] Some Democrats were considering ‘impeachment hearings’ against Bush.[11] Bush and Cheney’s popularity (not just at home but worldwide) was at its lowest, and two-thirds of Americans disapproved of the way Bush was handling Iraq, and a broad majority of Americans believed the US had ‘lost’ the war in Iraq.[12]
Rumsfeld was worried that in such a milieu the administration would not be able to sustain the effort.[13] Rumsfeld had experienced it first-hand, as, during his tenure as President Gerald Ford’s White House Chief of Staff, a combination of a negative media campaign, the rise of a divided and sceptical public, and the Senate’s refusal to approve funds for the Vietnam War succeeded in forcing the US Government to end the unpopular war. These three domestic factors were present in America in 2006. The US, with all its unmatched capabilities, was on the brink of losing its GWOT in Iraq (and, as will be seen below, in Afghanistan). Against what the administration had assumed, when the policy met the reality in Iraq (and to an extent in Afghanistan) democratisation, liberation and stabilisation gave way to a lengthy insurgency and civil war;[14] the US and Bush did not receive a hero’s welcome both at home and in the two invaded countries, even though he was rooting out terrorism (an enemy to all) and planting democracy (beneficial for every human being); the GWOT had cost so far thousands of US lives as well as hundreds of billions of US dollars, so it was no longer an economical war; US abilities, especially its technologically advanced weapons, had failed to substitute for ground forces; the US could not rid the world of terrorism if it could not do so in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the world (and the bureaucracy in Washington, D.C.) proved to be more complex than had been perceived by Bush. Congress, mainly the Democrats, had turned Washington itself into a ‘war zone’ for Bush.[15]
During 2006, the administration and the ‘deeply’ concerned President remained engaged with conducting numerous reviews on Iraq.[16] Bush himself met with scholars, generals and Iraqis to review the Iraq strategy. Luckily, General David Petraeus offered a new strategy to Bush named counterinsurgency, a strategy that Petraeus had successfully used in Mosul, a city in Iraq, early in the war. Petraeus told Bush that the strategy’s premise was that basic security was needed before political gains could follow, and once the US won over the general population, terrorists would lose support among the population and disappear of their own accord.[17] For Petraeus, what was required in Iraq and Afghanistan was a clue about the people and their cultures, as well as the motivations and politics of the insurgency, not ‘transformation’. By using highly technical weapons to hunt terrorists, the US would never win over the population ─ only reversing the feeling of security was the answer.[18]
It was the reverse of Rumsfeld’s counterterrorism strategy, which cared not about the general population and their security, but about hunting terrorists. For Rumsfeld, it was the task of the Afghans (and the Iraqis) to establish security for themselves. Rumsfeld was of the opinion that the US needed to help the Iraqis to help themselves, and if the US did not take its hands off the bicycle seat, the Afghans/Iraqis would never learn to ride. Bush disagreed, saying if the Iraqis ‘can’t do it, we will. If the bicycle teeters, we’re going to put the hand back on. We have to make damn sure we do not fail.’[19] Bush’s quotation was another way of saying to throw the ‘light footprint’ part of the strategy out of the window. It was another way of admitting that the light footprint aspect of the GWOT was based on a false assumption, as ordinary people could not be assumed, at least for the first few years, to establish security without US help. Bush’s quotation showed the initial thinking in the direction of a counterinsurgency or COIN strategy and when Rumsfeld showed opposition he was replaced by Robert Gates.
The false assumptions seemed to have weakened the bureaucratic muscles of the defence hawks and the neoconservatives. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, those who advocated a light footprint, were long gone from the administration. Cheney’s Chief of Staff Scooter Libby had been indicted by the federal grand jury for having leaked the covert identity of a secret CIA agent, and the indictment had adversely affected Cheney’s foreign policy team. Moreover, Condoleezza Rice was the Secretary of State, and, unlike 2002, she had grown in confidence and was more protective of the State Department’s turf. Unlike Colin Powell, she was close to Bush and consequently much more influential in foreign policy. Unlike Rumsfeld, she got on well with the new Secretary of Defense Gates, who was more of a team player, and both did not tend to allow Cheney to interfere in their departments’ affairs.[20] In fact, the NSC excluded Cheney from certain foreign policy decision-making, particularly when it knew that Cheney had opposing ideas.[21]Cheney’s power over foreign policy had, therefore, diminished considerably, and it was no surprise that Rumsfeld was easily replaced, despite Cheney’s attempts to save him.[22] From this point on, one could see that Rice, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and Gates, with whom Bush agreed on virtually every issue,[23] as well as General Petraeus, began to influence Bush in handling the GWOT. Moreover, by now Bush was not so much in broadcasting mood as he had been in early 2002, so he did not seem to mind his instincts being questioned, especially by his National Security Advisor Hadley.[24]
As Bush approved the surge, the administration was once again engaged with the Iraq saga because of the unpopularity of the surge among the members of Congress, the media and influential actors. Senator Barack Obama, Democratic Majority Leader in the Senate Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, Senator Joe Biden, and former Secretary of State Powell, among many, expressed doubts, claiming it would not solve the sectarian violence.[25] Congress instead sent Bush a war-funding bill, mandating the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq ─ Bush vetoed the bill. The Washington Post and The New York Times’ outlooks were equally pessimistic, calling the Iraq War ‘lost’.[26] There was a lot of pressure upon the President and his team, to an extent that, six months into the surge, Bush and Hadley were considering withdrawing some of the surge troops.[27] The pressure, however, began to ease off after Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker testified before the Senate on 10 September 2007, saying that the surge was successful.[28]
At least in this instance Bush’s gamble paid off: the surge had worked. But by then it was too late for the forgotten war in Afghanistan, as a total of six years had been wasted! The Administration, Congress, the media and the public at large had little time for Afghanistan over these years. As the situation began to deteriorate in late-2003 in Iraq, Afghanistan followed suit, and by 2006 the violence was at its worst. Emboldened insurgents had managed to launch a ‘perfect storm’ (a sudden rise in insurgents’ terrorist activities)[29] with the aim of toppling the Hamid Karzai Government and force US and NATO forces out of Afghanistan, and by 2007 and 2008 it was at its worst.[30]
The administration’s reaction to the changing situation in Afghanistan varied over the six years. Between 2003 and 2005, the administration would use, especially for the 2004 presidential election, the ‘achievements’ in institution-building, human rights, education, telecommunications, construction, health care, and media the US had attained in Afghanistan as a ‘success story’, and well into 2005 the policymakers, US officials from Afghanistan, certain members of Congress, and the media to a certain extent believed that the US was winning in Afghanistan.[31] By 2006, however, the administration knew that there was resurgence on the rise in Afghanistan and that the US had not been winning.[32]
Though the administration initially tried to cover it,[33] some of its senior members began to admit that the administration could not provide sufficient resources, namely, enough boots on the ground, sufficient attention, and an appropriate level of financial aid, because all their attention was focused on Iraq.[34] On the contrary, key US capabilities ─ such as CIA specialists, surveillance assets, Special Forces units, helicopters and transport planes ─ and the most experienced and the best qualified US personnel from all relevant agencies, including the State and Defense Departments (e.g. the Afghan-American Zalmay Khalilzad, who knew Afghanistan ‘best’), as well as the CIA – were taken out of Afghanistan and shifted to Iraq. The US had 20,417 troops in Afghanistan but 141,100 in Iraq in 2006, and out of the overall funding allocated for the two wars, only 13 percent went to Afghanistan, the rest (87 percent) was directed to the Iraq War. In the same year, due to the Iraq pressure, US aid dropped by 38 percent for Afghanistan, and Rumsfeld wanted to withdraw 3000 US troops, but, due to the opposition from NATO and US officials in Afghanistan, he had to abandon the plan.[35]
During my research it became clear that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations between 2004 and early 2008 held a few hearings on Afghanistan compared to many dozens on Iraq, especially hearings on evaluating new strategies for the latter. Afghanistan, too, was in need of reviving the counterterrorism strategy, as its ‘bicycle’ by 2006 was equally ‘teetering’, but the administration (and Congress) did not have the necessary resources as well as time and attention to focus on Afghanistan, and therefore could not act in accordance with the changing situation in Afghanistan, allowing the ‘good war’ in Afghanistan to go ‘bad’.[36] In a frank admission before the House Armed Services Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen, with whom Gates would agree, said: ‘It is a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must.’[37]
It was not just a matter of ‘resources’, ‘capacity’, time and attention, but also a case of the Bush Administration being pressurised, nervous, worried, and even fearful between late-2003 and early 2008. It was a case of America losing another war and leaving another Vietnam behind; a war with worse consequences than the Vietnam War, because, as Bush thought, in Iraq Al Qaeda (with about 10,000 operatives, compared to a few hundred in Afghanistan) would be left in control of a country with vast oil reserves and pose a serious threat of further attacks on the US, and further embolden Iran in pursuit of nuclear weapons.[38] It was true that the situation had deteriorated in Afghanistan in 2006, but not to the extent it had done in Iraq. In Afghanistan the south and east were insecure, but the Afghan Government was strong enough to manage the insurgency. But the Iraqi Government could not, and therefore, as Rumsfeld and Bush as well as Gates admitted, the entire focus was on finding a solution to the Iraq War in 2006 and 2007.[39] With pressure from the media, Congress, especially when the Democrat-led Congress using the war as a political weapon to hurt the Republicans for the incoming presidential election in 2008, and with a deeply concerned state of mind, could the policymakers manage to focus on ‘the other war’, too? The answer was a qualified No because in Iraq the US credibility was at stake. It was simply a case of winning or losing. The whole world was watching the Bush Administration ‘losing’ in Iraq. Iraq was constantly on the news, whereas Afghanistan was not, and therefore, led the agenda in the NSC at the expense of the Afghanistan War.
While by 2008, many members of Congress, the media, former officials, and area experts were of the opinion that the administration had not achieved the goals in Afghanistan because the Iraq War ‘siphoned off’ most of the resources, attention and manpower that should have gone to Afghanistan,[40] Bush and Rumsfeld did not, however, believe that the Iraq War had any impact on the Afghanistan War. For Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld it was due to multiple causes, including Afghanistan’s inborn characteristics (geography, history, tribal society, and extreme poverty), production of heroin, failures in the multilateral approach, NATO states’ adoption of ‘caveats’, lack of resources by NATO states, lack of effective governance and corruption (for Rumsfeld, the failures by other US institutions, notably the State Department, to carry out their responsibilities), and finally, ‘and most importantly’, ‘a double game’ played by Pakistan.[41] All of the factors the policymakers cite are, nevertheless, the result of their own unthought-out policy that was based on mistaken assumptions. And due to the Iraq War, the Bush Administration could not do a great deal once it realised its assumptions were mistaken. As seen above, one of them was in relation to Pakistan.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the Bush Administration’s preoccupation with the Iraq War proved to be a decisive factor in the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. While policymakers initially claimed the two conflicts were separate, the reality was a stark and consequential diversion of resources, attention, and manpower. The intellectual and political energy of the White House, Congress, and the media was almost entirely consumed by the Iraq saga—from the fallout over the failure to find WMDs to the spiralling sectarian violence and the ultimate decision to execute the troop surge. As a result, the ‘good war’ in Afghanistan was neglected, and the administration failed to adapt its initial counterterrorism strategy to a new and complex insurgency.
The Bush Administration’s later explanations, which blamed a host of external factors such as Pakistan’s duplicity and Afghanistan’s internal challenges, fail to account for the central argument of this analysis: that the Iraq War created a crippling environment that prevented a timely and effective response. The diversion was not a simple matter of logistics; it created a political and psychological constraint that rendered the US unable to address the growing crisis in Afghanistan, especially the rising corruption in the Afghan Government and the Taliban regrouping and launching a formidable insurgency. By the time the administration had ‘stabilised’ the situation in Iraq with the 2007 surge, the opportunity to prevent a full-scale insurgency in Afghanistan had been lost. In this sense, the Iraq War’s effect on the Afghanistan War was not marginal but perhaps ‘a strategic self-inflicted wound’ that fundamentally shaped the course of both the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars for years to come.
The impact of bureaucratic positions of policymakers, personal beliefs and experiences, as well as domestic influences, has also been seen on decision-making. By the end of Bush’s first term and increasingly into his second, it became undeniably clear that the GWOT and its core counterterrorism strategy were fundamentally flawed. The strategy was built on false assumptions and failed spectacularly during its implementation and evaluation[42] phases. This failure had severe political repercussions, directly undermining the very architects of the strategy: Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the neoconservatives. Their bureaucratic influence was severely diminished, their core belief systems were exposed as mistaken, and the tide of domestic opinion—including that of Congress, the media, experts, and the American people—turned against them.
As their political capital evaporated, so did their influence over the President. They could no longer shape key decisions, such as the critical Iraq troop surge. Instead, a new group of advisors—including Rice, Gates, Hadley and Petraeus—emerged as the key influencers during the final years of the second term. It was their advice that led to Bush’s strategic decision to employ a counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.
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[1] The view of Democratic Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri , in Shanker, Thom and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, The New York Times, December 16, 2007.
[2] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Policy assumptions of the George W Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror’’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
[3] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 115; Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 322; Bush, George W, State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress, January 29, 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
[4] Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007.
[5] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 223- 271; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 370-401; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 429, 457.
[6] Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, p. 246; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. 349; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 115-116.
[7] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 402-405, 413; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 262, 268.
[8] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 361-364, 367; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 679-680, 691-692.
[9] Stolberg, Sheryl Hay, ‘Bush Declines to Call Situation in Iraq Civil War’, The New York Times, November 29, 2006.
[10] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 355, 371-72.
[11] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 706.
[12] Baker, Peter, Jon Cohen, ‘Americans Say U.S. Is Losing War’, The Washington Post, December 13, 2006; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 367.
[13] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 695.
[14] Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>.
[15] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 14.
[16] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 361-372.
[17] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 361-372; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 44.
[18] ‘Generation Kill: A Conversation With Stanley McChrystal’, Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill>; Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 56.
[19]Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 667; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 371; Bush, George W, Address to the Nation on Iraq, January 10, 2007,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
[20] Quinn. A., ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April, 2013, p. 11; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 84-87, 91-92, 98-100;Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: The struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 97.
[21] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 460.
[22] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 442-443.
[23] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 584.
[24] Daalder, Ivo H., and I. M. Destler, ‘In the Shadow of the Oval Office; The Next National Security Advisor’, The Brookings Institution, January/February, 2009, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2008/12/01-national-security-adviser-daalder>.
[25] Biden, Joseph R., ‘United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Opening Statement in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing “Iraq: An Update From the Field” Witness: The Honorable Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 19, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BidenStatement070719.pdf >; Lugar, Richard G., ‘Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Senator Richard G. Lugar Opening Statement for Hearing on Iraq’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 19, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement070719.pdf>; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 378, 382.
[26] Sussman, Dalia Poll Shows View of Iraq War Is Most Negative Since Start, The New York Times, May 25, 2007; Cohen, Jon, and Dan Balz, ‘Poll: Most Americans Opposed to Bush’s Iraq Plan’, The Washington Post, January 11, 2007; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 378, 384-385.
[27] Sanger, David, ‘Iraq Pullback’: In White House, Debate Is Rising on Iraq Pullback’, The New York Times, July 9, 2007.
[28] Petraeus, David H., ‘Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq by General David H. Petraeus Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq’, Hearing Before Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, September 11, 2007,<http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PetraeusTestimony070911a.pdf>; Bush, George W, Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Iraq, September 13, 2007,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
[29] Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co,, pp. 204, 231.
[30] Shanker, Thom and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, The New York Times, December 16, 2007; Shanker, Thom, ‘2 Commanders Picked to Lead War Efforts Beyond 2008’, The New York Times, April 24, 2008; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co,, pp. 204, 231.
[31] Khalilzad, Zalmay, ‘Statement Ambassador and Special Presidential Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2005, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KhalilzadTestimony050607.pdf>; Rice, Condoleezza, ‘Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 18, 2005, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/secretary-of-state-nomination-part-i>; Luger, Richard, ‘Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman Richard G. Lugar Opening Statement for Nomination Hearing for Zalmay Khalilzad to be Ambassador to Iraq’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2005, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement050607.pdf>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 198; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 309; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 412, 419; Yingling, Paul L. ‘An Absence of Strategic Think: On the Multitude of Lessons Not Learned in Afghanistan’, Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, December 15, 2011, <http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/2011/12/15/paul-l-yingling-an-absence-of-strategic-thinking-on-the-multitude-of-lessons-not-learned-in-afghanistan/>; Bush, George W, State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress, Second Session, January 20, 2004,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>; Bush, George W, Address to the Republican National Convention, September 2, 2004,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
[32] Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. LVI; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 208-10; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 211; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 198.
[33] Yingling, Paul L. ‘An Absence of Strategic Think: On the Multitude of Lessons Not Learned in Afghanistan’, Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, December 15, 2011, <http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/2011/12/15/paul-l-yingling-an-absence-of-strategic-thinking-on-the-multitude-of-lessons-not-learned-in-afghanistan/> ; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 150.
[34] Shanker, Thom and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, The New York Times, December 16, 2007.
[35] ‘Troops Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues’, Congressional Research Services, July 2, 2009, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf>; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 9, 94, 156-157; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, pp. 327, 333; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin,p. 182 ; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 128, 245; Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007.
[36] ‘The Good War, Still to Be Won’, The New York Times, August 20, 2007; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 200.
[37] Shanker, Thom and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, The New York Times, December 16, 2007; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 200, 202-203.
[38] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 359, 367; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 444; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 694; Bush, George W, Address to the Nation on Iraq, January 10, 2007,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
[39] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 691; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 363-64; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 25, 444.
[40] Rubin, Barnett R., and Ahmed Rashid, ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64604/barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashid/from-great-game-to-grand-bargain>; Rubin, Barnett R. ‘Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/RubinTestimony060921.pdf>;
Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 220-221; Dobbins, James, Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, March 08, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DobbinsTestimony070308.pdf>; McGurk, Christopher, ‘Testimony of Christopher McGurk’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 23, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McGurkTestimony090423a1.pdf>; Eggen, Dan, ‘Focus Is on Afghanistan As Bush Lays Out Plans’, The Washington Post, September 10, 2008; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo,p. 333; Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007; Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 131; Shanker, Thom and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, The New York Times, December 16, 2007.
[41] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, pp. 211-213; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 499; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 682, 685-688.
[42] See my article on the evaluation phase of the GWOT strategy on this website.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.