By Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
This article deals with the dynamics of decision-making within the four US Administrations responsible for the Afghanistan War and how they operated. The first section focuses on the dynamics of the George W. Bush Administration. The second deals with the Barrack Obama Administration’s inner dealings. The third and fourth sections study how the Donald Trump and Joseph R. Biden Administrations operated.
As I was researching for my book America in Afghanistan[1]and my novel The Lone Leopard,[2] I discovered that, with three exceptions, literature covering the decision-making process about Afghanistan is non-existent. The exceptions are Bob Woodward’s three books ─ Bush at War, 2002, Obama’s Wars, 2010, and Fear: Trump in the White House, 2018. Additionally, literature concerning the dynamics of the four administrations in question and how they operated is very thin. One reason is the contemporary nature of the subject. Another reason seems to be the overwhelming focus on policy as an output, as opposed to policymaking process.
However, almost every work written on US Afghan foreign policy or US foreign policy in general touches on foreign policy dynamics within the four administrations. This article intends to solely concentrate on policymaking process within the four administrations in question.
The dynamics of decision-making within the Bush Administration
It could be discerned from numerous works, directly or indirectly, that, after the 9/11 terrorist acts, Vice-President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives exerted influence on decision-making in the Bush Administration, especially in the first term. These ‘trusted’ advisors managed to do so because their outlooks were compatible with that of President Bush; a president who centralised decision-making in the White House ─ a process apparently marked by ‘secrecy’ and ‘back-room dealing’ without the presence of close advisors and career diplomats.
Due to the inconsistency of his views and the awkward nature of his relationship with the President (unlike Rumsfeld and Cheney, who were close to Bush), the not-so-trusted Secretary of State Colin Powell was heard but not listened to.
Aware of the influence of the Rumsfeld-Cheney-neoconservatives triangle, the ‘trusted’ National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice aligned her views with those from the triangle and went ahead with their policy suggestions, or at least did not contradict them.
Numerous expert works, mainly those which give more attention to policymaking, could be cited for the above views, including James P. Pfiffner, James Mann, Bob Woodward, Robert Singh, David Mitchell, Stephen J. Wayne, Sean Wilentz, John Dumbrell, Ahmed Rashid, Michael C. Desch, Joseph S Nye, Philip H. Gordon, Joshua Micah Marshall, Ivo H Daalder, and I. M. Destler.[3]
The dynamics of policymaking within the Obama Administration
Regarding the inner dealings or policymaking within the Obama Administration, it is argued that Obama, like Bush, centralised decision-making. However, instead of secrecy, Obama followed a ‘multiple advocacy’ model whereby he heard all the opposing viewpoints from his secretaries and area experts before making a final decision.
Unlike Bush, who mostly acted on his ‘instincts’, Obama’s approach to decision-making was highly analytical and intellectual. Unlike Bush, who hardly compromised once his mind was made up, Obama tended to reach for consensus by attempting to keep both opposing sides happy ─ a characteristic he was criticised for.
However, like Bush, Obama was the ultimate decider. Like the triangle in the Bush Administration, certain individuals in the Obama Administration who held various positions within the White House and the National Security Council ─ most notably, Rahm I. Emanuel, David M. Axelrod, Mark W. Lippert, Denis McDonough, and Ben J. Rhodes, as well as Vice-President Joe Biden ─ were instrumental in assisting the President to reach a foreign policy decision.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, military leaders such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen and David Petraeus, and (especially) National Security Advisor Jim Jones were outside this influential group and consequently had little sway over the President.
For the same reason explained in the introduction, a large body of work has not been produced to cover the dynamics of policymaking within the Obama Administration. However, there are some expert works from which the above information could be derived. They include works by Bob Woodward, James Mann, James P. Pfiffner, Stephen J. Wayne, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Robert Singh, Michael C. Desch, Michael Hirsh, Fred Kaplan, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Brett McGurk.[4]
The dynamics of decision-making in the Trump Administration
Just as Trump’s beliefs were linked to numerous schools of thought,[5] so was his choice of advisors, which made the wealthiest cabinet ever in US history. The members of Trump’s foreign policy team came from Congress (Vice-President Mike Pence, White House Chiefs of Staff Reince Priebus, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo), the military establishment (Secretary of Defense James Mattis, National Security Advisor Herbert Raymond McMaster, White House Chief of Staff John Kelly), the business community (Secretary of State Rex Tillerson), the media (White House’s chief strategist Stephen Bannon), Trump’s family (senior advisors to the President’s daughter Ivanka Trump and her husband Jared Kushner) and, apparently, some friends from the outside.[6]
Their beliefs originated mainly from conservatism (Pence, Priebus, Pompeo and Trump), ideological populism (the intimates and Trump), pragmatism (generally speaking, the military leaders, Pence/Priebus, Tillerson and Trump) and lack-of-foreign-policy(ism) (almost all). Trump’s name was added to every school since he employed elements from all of them, and hence it proved hard to explain what Trumpism really was.
On a preliminary reading of Trump’s phenomena, however, it seemed that candidate Trump utilised populist ideals (and some mercantilist views) to win the election. In the first weeks in the White House, Trump elevated his populist advisors and signed executive orders to turn many of their radical views into policies, making many believe that Trump would follow a nationalist agenda. Apparently, ‘Bannon’s baby’, the immigration executive that banned the citizens of seven (then six after dropping Iraq) predominantly Muslim countries, was not reviewed by the State Department, the Defense Department or the National Security Council’s lawyers.[7]
One could not miss noticing that the pragmatists, or ‘grownups’, worked hard to persuade Trump to lose the ‘sharp edges’ of his radical foreign policy viewpoints, which they held to have the potential to hurt both US interests and values.[8] To some extent, they seemed to succeed, as Trump towards the end of his 100 days in office appeared to be slowly moving away from his right-wing agenda to a more pragmatist approach, a more traditional way of viewing the world, at least in the realm of foreign policy. These policy choices included the importance of NATO, China and the Middle East.[9]
However, if one considers Trump’s four years in office, his foreign policy choices proved (confusingly) unpredictable as they were sometimes derived from one school of thought and other times from a different school of thought. As noted above and as Michael Anton writes in Foreign Policy, ‘A simpler―and more accurate―explanation for the confusion is that Trump’s foreign policy does not yet have a widely accepted name.’[10] However, it was clear that the President was the ultimate decider who did not seem to be a good boss in terms of listening to his close advisors.
The dynamics of policymaking in the Biden Administration
When broken down by race and gender, Biden’s initial Cabinet was 55 non-white and 45% female. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump’s initially confirmed Cabinet was 82% white and 82% male. Furthermore, most members of Biden’s cabinet had prior government experience compared to Trump’s cabinet because Trump saw the lack of experience in the government as an asset.[11]
Biden has evidently been the ultimate decider in his cabinet. For example, the military leaders ̶ including Gen. Frank McKenzie, commander of the United States Central Command ̶ advised him not to withdraw the entire US troops from Afghanistan and leave about 2500 troops because withdrawing all US forces ‘would inevitably lead to the collapse of the Afghan military forces and, eventually, the Afghan government’.[12] According to US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad,[13] NATO equally did not advise all foreign troops to be withdrawn. Biden still went ahead with the complete withdrawal of US troops.
Biden’s senior advisors ̶ such as Secretary of State Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan ̶ were ‘good friends’.[14] So, there was no Rumsfeld-Powell rivalry. Perhaps it has made it easier for Biden to be more in control. According to a new book by Alexander Ward,[15] there was extensive infighting over the withdrawal between the Departments of State and Defense. Biden reportedly favoured the State Department because he used to be chair of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and perhaps he knew better both the State Department and the man who led it. Indeed, Blinken has been by Biden’s side for some 20 years, including ‘as his top aide’ on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and later as his national security adviser during the Obama Administration when Biden was Vice-President. As a result, he is considered Biden’s ‘closest foreign policy adviser’.[16] Sullivan was equally influential because he had viewpoints similar to those of Biden’s and had the trust of the President.[17]
The Blinken-Sullivan duo may have also been influential because Biden was wary of the Pentagon because, as vice-president to Barack Obama, he saw how the military forced Obama to extend the inconclusive war;[18] a war that even then Biden firmly opposed to become as expansive as the military camp succeeded to make it.
Conclusion
In all four administrations, the presidents seemed to be the ultimate deciders. However, certain advisors were more influential in decision-making compared to others.
In the Bush Administration, Vice-President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives were the driving force in decision-making. Secretary of State Powell was not as influential as one would have expected him to be.
Likewise, Vice-President Joe Biden and certain close advisors had more sway over policymaking than the military camp and National Security Advisor Jones in the Obama Administration because Biden and the closer advisors had the President’s attention.
President Trump’s populist advisors seemed more in control of policymaking, but with time, his pragmatist advisors seemed to have more influence over the President and his decisions. Over the past years of his term in office, however, it was difficult to pinpoint who the driving force within the Trump Administration was. What was easy to ascertain was that Trump controlled the decision-making process, and perhaps owing to his lack of foreign policy expertise, some of his decisions were incompatible with accepted US national and international norms.
The Blinken-Sullivan duo seemed to have steered President Biden’s foreign policy because of their closeness to the President. However, the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan seemed to be consistent with President Biden’s beliefs regarding the Afghanistan War.
References
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Bertrand, Natasha, ‘The inexorable rise of Jake Sullivan’, Politico, 27 November 2020.
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig, ‘“People That Hates US”: What can Afghans expect from President Trump?’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 11 November 2016.
Daalder, Ivo H., and I. M. Destler, ‘In the Shadow of the Oval Office; The Next National Security Advisor’, The Brookings Institution, January/February, 2009.
Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Two theories about why Steve Bannon midwifed such a bad executive order’, Washington Post, 30 January 2017.
Desch, Michael C., ‘Bush and the Generals’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62616/michael-c-desch/bush-and-the-generals>.
Dorani, Sharifullah. 2022. The Lone Leopard. S&M Publishing House.
Dorani, Sharifullah. 2019. America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump. London: I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
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Khalilzad, Zalmay, ‘WATCH LIVE: Former ambassador testifies on Afghanistan withdrawal’, https://www.youtube.com/live/zdZkliuEkQ4?si=D2HtNi0BuxZNImJc.
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McGurk, Brett, ‘Agreeing on Afghanistan: Why the Obama Administration Chose Consensus This Time’, CNN, June 22, 2011, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/22/agreeing-on-afghanistan/>.
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*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.
[1] Dorani, Sharifullah. 2019. American in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump. London: I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
[2] Dorani, Sharifullah. 2022. The Lone Leopard. S&M Publishing House.
[3] Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2(June), 2011, pp. 244-262; Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October 2008; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barrack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury Academic; Mitchell, David. 2005. Making foreign policy: presidential management of the decision-making process. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate; Wayne, Stephen J., ‘Presidential Character and Judgment: Obama’s Afghanistan and Health Care Decisions’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41: 2 (June), 2011; Wilentz, Sean. 2008. The Age Of Reagan. A History 1974-2008, New York: Harper Collins; Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Pfiffner, James P., and Mark Phythian. 2008. Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives. Collage station: Texas A & M university Press; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin; Desch, Michael C., ‘Bush and the Generals’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62616/michael-c-desch/bush-and-the-generals>; Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-s-nye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>; Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007,<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>; Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003,<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>; Daalder, Ivo H., and I. M. Destler, ‘In the Shadow of the Oval Office; The Next National Security Advisor’, The Brookings Institution, January/February 2009.
[4] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking; Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2(June), 2011; Wayne, Stephen J., ‘Presidential Character and Judgment: Obama’s Afghanistan and Health Care Decisions’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41: 2 (June), 2011; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barrack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic; Desch, Michael C, ‘Obama and His General; Should McChrystal Solute and Obey?’ Foreign Affairs, October 27, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general>; Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>; O’Hanlon, Michael E.’ State and Stateswoman: How Hillary Clinton Reshaped U.S. Foreign Policy — But Not the World’, The Brookings Institution, January 29, 2013; Indyk, Martin, Kenneth Liebberthal, and Michael E. O’Hanlon. 2012. Bending history: Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press; McGurk, Brett, ‘Agreeing on Afghanistan: Why the Obama Administration Chose Consensus This Time’, CNN, June 22, 2011, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/22/agreeing-on-afghanistan/>.
[5] Dorani, Sharifullah. 2019. America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump. London: I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, see chapter 12.
[6] Rucker, Philip, and Robert Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington, rival powers and whispers in the president’s ear’, Washington Post, 16 November 2016; Seales, Rebecca, ‘Eight Ways President Donald Trump will make history’, BBC, 21 January 2017.
[7] Michael D. Shear and Maggie Haberman, ‘Critics See Stephen Bannon, Trump’s Pick for Strategist, as Voice of Racism’, New York Times, 14 November 2016; Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Two theories about why Steve Bannon midwifed such a bad executive order’, Washington Post, 30 January 2017; Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, ‘In Trump’s Washington, rival powers and whispers in the president’s ear’, Washington Post, 16 November 2016; Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig, ‘“People That Hates US”: What can Afghans expect from President Trump?’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 11 November 2016.
[8] Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Trump’s Luck Year’, Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2018; Mark Landler, ‘Trump Foreign Policy Quickly Loses its Sharp Edge’, New York Times, 10 February 2017.
[9] Dorani, Sharifullah. 2019. America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making from Bush to Obama to Trump. London: I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, see chapters 12 and 13.
[10] Anton, Michael, The Trump Doctrine: An insider explains the president’s foreign policy’, Foreign Policy, 20 April 2019.
[11] Wise, Alana, ‘Biden Pledged Historic Cabinet Diversity. Here’s How His Nominees Stack Up’, NPR, 5 February 2021.
[12] Seligman, Lara, ‘Top generals contradict Biden, say they urged him not to withdraw from Afghanistan’, Politico, 28 September 2021.
[13] Khalilzad, Zalmay, ‘WATCH LIVE: Former ambassador testifies on Afghanistan withdrawal’, https://www.youtube.com/live/zdZkliuEkQ4?si=D2HtNi0BuxZNImJc.
[14] Jakes, Lara, Michael Crowley and David E. Sanger, ‘Biden Chooses Antony Blinken, Defender of Global Alliances, as Secretary of State’, New York Times, 20 November 2020.
[15] 2024. The Internationalists: The Fight to Restore Foreign Policy After Trum. Penguin Publishing Group, New York.
[16] Jakes, Lara, Michael Crowley and David E. Sanger, ‘Biden Chooses Antony Blinken, Defender of Global Alliances, as Secretary of State’, New York Times, 20 November 2020.
[17] Bertrand, Natasha, ‘The inexorable rise of Jake Sullivan’, Politico, 27 November 2020.
[18] Pengelly, Martin, ‘Biden’ privately defiant’ over chaotic 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, book says’, The Guardian, 16 February 2024.