By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
This article essentially offers a literature review of the Afghanistan War during the Barack Obama Administration by focusing on public opinion and policy debate on the Afghanistan War. It mainly covers the periods for the decision to ‘surge’ American troops in Afghanistan in 2009 and the decision to ‘draw down’ the surge troops in 2011. Arguably, the drawdown decision, however, set out the Obama Administration’s strategy for Afghanistan for the remainder of President Obama’s time in office. So, in effect, the article covers public opinion and policy debate during the entire presidency of President Obama.
There were several phases, or turning points, in US Afghan policy. The first two phases took place during the Bush Administration and are the focus of my other article.[1] This article focuses on the third and fourth phases and ends with some concluding remarks.
Phase 3: public opinion and policy debate on President Obama’s Afghan strategy
During phase 3, that is, in the first years of Obama’s presidency, a great deal of literature covered the Afghanistan War, especially the decision to surge in late 2009 (and the decision to withdraw in 2011). Unlike the Bush era, the literature was sharply split, offering opposing views on the Afghanistan War and whether to surge.
Those who argued against the expansion of the Afghanistan War (by demanding a counterinsurgency strategy) proposed by the military, especially US Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal and Commander of US Central Command General David Petraeus, had the following viewpoints.
The Taliban were said to be not ‘international terrorists’, had only internal aims, were only in conflict with the US because the latter interfered in the political and social order that the Taliban wanted for Afghanistan, and were separate from Al-Qaeda because neither did Al-Qaeda have resources and manpower to give to the Taliban, nor did the Taliban hold a substantial part of Afghanistan to provide a safe haven for Al-Qaeda.
Even if Afghanistan fell to the Taliban, US national security would not be in danger. Given the national security risk Al-Qaeda (ISIS did not exist then) posed to Afghanistan, the Taliban would not allow Al-Qaeda to establish bases there. Since the Taliban was not an enemy and Al-Qaeda would not return to Afghanistan, the country was not strategically important to warrant the employability of the expensive counter-insurgency strategy.
The Afghanistan War had already become very expensive, causing the Obama Administration to overlook other national and international interests. They feared that over the years, especially when Obama took office, the Afghanistan War gradually absorbed more and more US manpower and resources. The experience resembled the Vietnam War. In Vietnam the US (eventually) applied a counter-insurgency strategy, and in Afghanistan the applicability of the strategy meant around 100,000 US ground forces (for a duration of at least seven to ten years) were set to rebuild Afghanistan (nation-building).
Given the dire US economic conditions, neither could the Obama Administration afford such an expensive strategy, nor did the right conditions exist in Afghanistan for the strategy. The strategy required, among others, a competent national government, sufficient security forces, safe borders and helpful neighbours. The first two were a must in order to be able to hold and build areas cleared by US forces. In Afghanistan the government was corrupt; its leader (President Hamid Karzai) was ‘inept’ and ‘incompetent’; the security forces had numerous ‘shortcomings’ such as ‘illiteracy’ and ‘incompetency’; and Afghanistan’s neighbours (with some of whom Afghanistan shared thousands of miles of porous borders, such as Pakistan) competed for influence within the Afghan Government.
No matter how many troops or how many resources they applied, they would not succeed because areas cleared could not be held and built, and most importantly, transferred, due to the missing conditions ─ and the safe havens in Pakistan would remain untouched and Pakistan would continue to support insurgency in Afghanistan.
Instead of a counter-insurgency strategy, they proposed a counterterrorism strategy, as it matched US national security interests and did not go beyond its means. Incidentally, a counterterrorism strategy meant a small US presence in Afghanistan with more reliance on US advanced military capabilities, especially combat drones.
Those arguments are found in the works by American journalist Michael Crowley, American conservative columnist George Will, American historian Andrew J. Bacevich, Professor Thomas H. Johnson, American expert on the Middle East Steven Simon, American journalist Ann Tyson, British author and broadcaster Rory Stewart, American journalist David Ignatius, American political scientist John Mueller, and, to a lesser extent, American author and former CIA officer Milton Bearden and Pakistani diplomat and political scientist Maleeha Lodhi.[2]
On the other hand, there were several works that disagreed, arguing for a counter-insurgency strategy or an expansion of the Afghanistan War. Their views were as follows.
US presence in Afghanistan ensured Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region did not become destabilised by stopping the Taliban and Al-Qaeda taking over large parts in Afghanistan (and even in nuclear Pakistan) to secure safe bases from where attacks could be planned once again against the US and its allies. It was important to ‘defeat’ the Taliban (‘degrade’, which the opposite camp wanted, was insufficient for them) since Al-Qaeda’s survival was linked to the Taliban’s strength.
They argued that cheap strategies like counterterrorism or counterterrorism-plus or counter-insurgency-minus (they all required fewer US troops and money) would not work because they were unable to provide security to the Afghans. These low-cost strategies had been tried in Afghanistan (and Iraq before Petraeus successfully employed a counter-insurgency strategy in early 2007) since 2002, but caused nothing but the Taliban resurgence.
Basing their assumptions on the experience of the application of the counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq, they believed that once ordinary Afghans were provided with security, the US would then be able to improve governance, establish security forces, and minimise the role of safe havens in Pakistan, since the Afghans would stand by their government and report troublemakers among them. (But for the opposing camps, Iraq was the wrong template for Afghanistan ─ Iraq’s circumstances were different to those of Afghanistan.)
They flatly rebutted the comparison of the Afghanistan War with the Vietnam War because similar views had been present in relation to the Iraq War, but all proved baseless. Nor would the US experience the same fate as the Soviet Union, because the US was in Afghanistan to protect the Afghans but the Soviets were killing Afghans, and, unlike the Soviet Union, the US enjoyed the support of, as claimed by the proponent of the expansion of the Afghanistan War, the ‘majority’ of the Afghans. (But Stephan Tanner and Bearden disagreed, saying that the Obama Administration did not face anymore a ‘formally discredited Afghan religious movement’ but a population of Pashtunistan, which no previous empires had managed to defeat.[3])
A large volume of literature converged on these views. Among the contributors are American columnist Michael Gerson, American political scientist Seth Jones, the neoconservative writer William Kristol, Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, American counter-insurgency expert John Nagl, American lecturer and podcaster Erin M. Simpson, former US Army Staff Sergeant Clinton Douglas, American author Max Boot, American historian and policy analyst Stephen Biddle, Professor Barbara Elias, Journalist Kim Baker, military analysts Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, Professor of National Security Affairs Mark Mayor, political scientist Fotini Christia, Professor Michael Semple, who is an Irish expert on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Australian counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen.[4]
Numerous scholars wrote about the surge decision itself. British academic Robert Singh claimed that Obama’s surge showed a compromise on the President’s side when he announced the ‘surge and drawdown strategy’, trying to please those who wanted a counter-insurgency strategy (the military and some high-profile Republicans), but at the same time trying to satisfy those (Vice-President Joe Biden and other counterterrorism-plus advocates) who did not want the US to commit to an open-ended war in Afghanistan.[5]
In the views of Singh, American policy analyst Michael O’Hanlon, former American diplomat and foreign relations analyst Martin Indyk, former American diplomat Kenneth Lieberthal, and American journalist Bob Woodward, the decision showed a lack of decisiveness and resolve on the President’s part.[6]
Others argued that Obama’s decision was carefully calculated, as he did not want Afghanistan to become the US’s ‘quagmire’, and it also signalled to Kabul that the US commitment was not open-ended.[7]
(Incidentally, to have the opinion of ordinary Afghans on US intervention in Afghanistan, especially during the Obama Administration, read my novel The Lone Leopard.[8])
Phase 4: public opinion and policy debate on President Obama’s Afghan strategy
When Obama was considering to draw down the 30,000 (+3,000) troops in 2011, which marked the fourth turning point in US Afghan policy, similar views were expressed once again, thus even further enriching the literature on the Afghanistan War.
Those who supported a continuous expensive US commitment in Afghanistan were Stephen Biddle,[9] David Kilcullen,[10] former US ambassador in Iraq Ryan C. Crocker,[11] Max Boot,[12] Frederick and Kimberly Kagan,[13] former US ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann,[14] women’s rights activist Zainab Salbi,[15] novelist Scott Seward Smith,[16] Michael O’Hanlon,[17] Seth Jones,[18] CNN journalist Peter Bergen,[19] Professor Fotini Christia,[20] pro-women rights author and journalist Gayle Tzemach Lemmon,[21] former US ambassador to Afghanistan (who played a major role in the Bonn Agreement in late-2001) James Dobbins,[22] American journalist Karen DeYoung,[23] and, to some extent, Professor of International Relations Ivan Arreguín-Toft,[24] former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and American political consultant John Podesta.[25]
Their views could be summarised as follows: resist the flawed counterterrorism strategy; continue with the counter-insurgency strategy (which, for them, has shown good results) for a few more years until the Afghan Government and its national security forces develop the capacity to counter the insurgents; provide a long-term programme beyond 2011 and 2014 to support Afghanistan’s government and its security forces; aim for a fairly and reasonably ‘strong’ Afghan state (which was not the case in 2011, and the absence of which made the possibility of reconciliation with the Taliban not viable); and do not accept defeat (by withdrawing prematurely) because it would have disastrous consequences for the US and the allies. If all their suggestions were followed, success was possible.
On the other hand, those who advocated for a lighter US presence disagreed, arguing that keeping the same number of troops would not serve US national security interests. Though they supported a long-term US commitment to Afghanistan (albeit a modest one, which could be justified by US national security interests), they were pessimistic about the future of Afghanistan, and, regardless of what strategy the US applied, a future Afghanistan would continue to have a weak, ‘inept’ and ‘corrupt’ government with ‘insufficient’ Afghan National Security Forces, regional powers, especially Pakistan, would continue to ‘interfere’ in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan’s dire financial situation, as well as its ethnic, tribal and religious ‘complexities’, would continue to create obstacles.
Their implication was that the US would not be able to bring an end to Afghanistan’s civil war due to these complexities. So it made no sense to keep 100,000 US troops, spend a large amount of dollars, and sacrifice hundreds of American lives when they accomplished little and there was no end in sight.
They proposed that success in Afghanistan meant aiming for a ‘good enough’ Afghan Government (not a fairly ‘strong’ one that required years of large commitment) able to hold off the Taliban and Al-Qaeda with modest military and financial US support. This would allow the US to withdraw most of its troops and leave a small and sustainable number to conduct counterterrorism operations. It would also permit the US to take into account its other domestic and international interests.
These views were argued by president of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haass,[26] author and advocate for international peace and arms control Michael Krepon,[27] academic and former CIA analyst Paul R. Pillar,[28] Professor of American foreign policy Michael Mandelbaum,[29] former National Security Advisor and political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski,[30] General David Barno, researcher and foreign policy correspondent Linda Robinson,[31] retired US Army colonel Paul Yingling,[32] British academics Tim Bird and Alex Marshall,[33] author and foreign policy expert Jonah Blank,[34] American diplomat and author Robert Blackwill,[35] British political scientist Toby Dodge and author Nicholas Redman.[36]
CONCLUSION
Phase 3 occurred when General McChrystal asked for 40000 more troops to be deployed to Afghanistan. It was then that the Afghanistan war took centre stage in public debate. Like Obama’s War Cabinet, the American public and foreign policy experts found themselves divided on whether to surge. Those who backed up the military arguments supported the deployment of more US troops and other resources so that a strong Afghan government with strong security forces could be established to ensure Afghanistan would not become a platform for terrorist groups to attack the US and its allies. If the surge was refused by Obama, they warned, the Hamid Karzai Government would fall.
Those who opposed the military’s proposed surge argued, among other things, that the experience resembled US involvement in Vietnam and it would have similar consequences as Vietnam. Instead, they argued for a less expensive strategy, a form of counterterrorism, which was capable of preventing the Taliban from toppling the Afghan Government.
What is important to note during this phase was that for the first time there were lone voices who argued for a total US exit from Afghanistan.
Phase 4 in the Afghanistan War presented itself in 2011 when Obama considered withdrawing the surge troops. The pro-military experts supported a delay in bringing back the surge troops to America, but the opposing camp wanted the troops to return home as soon as possible; they supported a small number of US troops to remain in Afghanistan to conduct counterterrorism operations. As seen above, America was again divided on the Afghanistan War.
The lone voices from a couple of years ago that wanted a total withdrawal from Afghanistan now found more and more support among the American public and foreign policy experts (not to say some members of Obama’s War Cabinet). The Vietnam experience was now used more often than before: that is, all US blood and money would likely be wasted and, as the Communist Party of Vietnam came back into power once the US left, the Afghan Government would be toppled by the Taliban as and when the US decided to exit.
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*Dr Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.
[1] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Public Opinion and Policy Debate on the Afghanistan War during the Bush Administration’, CEPSAF, 22 March 2024, <https://cepsaf.com/public-opinion-and-policy-debate-on-the-afghanistan-war-during-the-bush-administration/>.
[2] Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>; Will, George. F., ‘Time to Get Out of Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, September 01, 2009; views of Andrew J. Bacevich and Thomas H. Johnson in ‘Topic A: Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fight?’ The Washington Post, August 31, 2009; Simon, Steven, ‘Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/can-right-war-won/p19765>; Tyson, Ann Scott., ‘Mullen: More Troops ‘Probably’ Needed’, The Washington Post, September 16, 2009; Stewart, Rory, ‘Testimony of Rory Stewart, Senate on Foreign Relations Committee Hearing’, September 16, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/StewartTestimony090916p1.pdf>; Ignatius, David, ‘A Middle Way on Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, September 2, 2009; Mueller, John, ‘How Dangerous Are the Taliban: Why Afghanistan is the Wrong War’, The Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/john-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the-taliban>; Bearden, Milton, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, October 1, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan>; Lodhi, Maleeha, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, October 1, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan>.
[3] Bearden, Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’; and, Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the Great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 345.
[4] Gerson, Michael, ‘In Afghanistan, No Choice but to Try’, The Washington Post, September 4, 2009; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co; Jones, Seth G., ‘It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2010, < http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-villages>; Kristol, William, ‘No Will, No Way’, The Washington Post, 2009, September 1, 2009; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: penguin; Nagl, John A., ‘“A ‘Better War’ in Afghanistan” Prepared Statement of Dr. John A. Nagl President, Center for a New American Security’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 16, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NaglTestimony090916p1.pdf>; views of Erin M. Simpson and Clinton Douglas in ‘Topic A: Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fight?’ The Washington Post, August 31, 2009; Boot, Max, ‘Anyone but Karzai?’, The Washington Post, February 13, 2009; Biddle, Stephen, ‘“Assessing the Case for War in Afghanistan” Statement by Dr. Stephen Biddle Senior Fellow for Defense Policy Council on Foreign Relations’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 16, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BiddleTestimony090916p.pdf>; Elias, Barbara, ‘Know Thine Enemy; Why the Taliban Cannot Be Flipped’, Foreign Affairs, November 2, 2009, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65639/barbara-elias/know-thine-enemy>; Baker, Kim, ‘Letter From Kabul: Solving Afghanistan’s Problems; What the United States Must Overcome in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 2009, November 30, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabul-solving-afghanistans-problems>; Kagan, Frederick, ‘We’re Not the Soviets in Afghanistan; and 2009 isn’t 1979’, Weekly Standard, August 21, 2009, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/854qadbb.asp>; Mayor, Mark, ‘The L-Word in Afghanistan; Can the United States Provide What Kabul Needs’, Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65681/mark-moyar/the-l-word-in-afghanistan>; Christia, Fotini, Michael Semple, ‘Flipping the Taliban; How to Win in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65151/fotini-christia-and-michael-semple/flipping-the-taliban>; David Kilcullen is quoted in Simon, Steven, ‘Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/can-right-war-won/p19765>
[5] Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, pp. 73-77.
[6] Woodward, Bob. ‘Key in Afghanistan: Economy, Not Military’, The Washington Post, July 1, 2009; Woodward, Bob. ‘McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure’, The Washington Post, September 21, 2009; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster; Singh, Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy, pp. 73-77; Indyk, Martin, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael E. O’Hanlon. 2012. Bending history: Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 86-98.
[7] They are quoted in Bird, Tim, and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 236; and, Indyk, Liebberthal, and O’Hanlon, Bending history, pp. 86-98.
[8] Dorani, Sharifullah. 2022. The Lone Leopard. S&M Publishing House, https://www.amazon.co.uk/Lone-Leopard-Sharifullah-Dorani/dp/1739606922.
[9] Biddle, Stephen, ‘Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/steps-needed-for-a-successful-2014-transition-in-afghanistan>; and Biddle, Stephen, ‘Running out of time for Afghan Governance Reform; How Little Can We Live With?’ Foreign Affairs, 2011, December 15, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136875/stephen-biddle/running-out-of-time-for-afghan-governance-reform>.
[10] Kilcullen, David, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>.
[11] Crocker, Ryan C., ‘Countering the Threat of Failure in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 17, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/countering-the-threat-of-failure-in-afghanistan>.
[12] Bernard Gwetzman Interviews Max Boot. ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, the Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2010.
[13] Kagan, Frederick, Kimberly Kagan, ‘The Case for Continuing the Counterinsurgency Campaign In Afghanistan’, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, December 16, 2011, <http://www.criticalthreats.org/afghanistan/kagan-case-continuing-counterinsurgency-campaign-december-16-2011>.
[14] Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>.
[15] Salbi, Zainab, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>.
[16] Smith, Scott Seward, ‘Making Withdrawal Work; A Smaller U.S. Footprint Will Make Afghanistan More Stable’, Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68015/scott-seward-smith/making-withdrawal-work>.
[17] O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>.
[18] Jones, ‘It Takes the Villages’.
[19] Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.
[20] Christia and Semple, ‘Flipping the Taliban’.
[21] Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach, ‘What Leaving Afghanistan Will Cost; Parsing the President’s War Promises’ Foreign Affairs, May 9, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137621/gayle-tzemach-lemmon/what-leaving-afghanistan-will-cost>.
[22] Dobbins, James, ‘Your COIN Is NO Good Here: How “Counterinsurgency” Became a Dirty Word’, Foreign Affairs, October 26, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66949/james-dobbins/your-coin-is-no-good-here>.
[23] DeYoung, Karen. ‘Without large U.S. force after 2014, Afghanistan is headed for civil war, opposition leader warns’, The Washington Post, Nov 17, 2011.
[24] Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, ‘Washington Colonial Conundrum in Afghanistan; Why the United States Cannot Stay Forever?’ Foreign Affairs, 2011, December 15, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136881/ivan-arreguin-toft/washingtons-colonial-conundrum-in-afghanistan>.
[25] Neumann, Ronald, Stephen Hadley and John D. Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame: How to Help Kabul Stand on Its Own’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138215/ronald-e-neumann-stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/afghan-endgame>.
[26] Haass, Richard N., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>.
[27] Krepon, Michael, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-us-policy-and-its-limits-in-pakistan>.
[28] Pillar, Paul R., ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.
[29] Mandelbaum, Michael, ‘America’s Coming Retrenchment; How Budget Cuts Will Limit the United States’ Global Role,’ Foreign Affairs, August 9, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael-mandelbaum/americas-coming-retrenchment>.
[30] Brzezinski, Zbigniew. ‘From Hope to Audacity; Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-to-audacity>.
[31] David Barno and Linda Robinson are quoted in Kagan, Frederick, Kimberly Kagan, ‘The Case for Continuing the Counterinsurgency Campaign In Afghanistan’.
[32] Yingling, Paul L., ‘An Absence of Strategic Think: On the Multitude of Lessons Not Learned in Afghanistan’, Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, December 15, 2011, <http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/2011/12/15/paul-l-yingling-an-absence-of-strategic-thinking-on-the-multitude-of-lessons-not-learned-in-afghanistan/>.
[33] Bird, Tim, and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 230-234, 245.
[34] Blank, Jonah, ‘Q&A With Jonah Blank on Afghanistan; The ‘Best-Case Scenario’ for the United States’, Foreign Affairs, 2011, September 7, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-jonah-blank-on-afghanistan>.
[35] Blackwill, Robert D, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2011, <2011,http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan>.
[36] Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 101, 165.