By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
Although later decision-making in the George W Bush Administration was conducted in secrecy and without much deliberation, the decision to intervene in Afghanistan, which was part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), to a certain extent, was deliberate and open.
The National Security Council (NSC) held a number of meetings between 11 September to the day the US invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. However, it was the period between 11 September and 15 September when the Bush Administration developed the strategy for the GWOT, which began in Afghanistan, particularly in the meeting held at Camp David on Saturday, 15 September.
This is the second part (or Part II) of the essay, which examines the decision-making process leading to the intervention in Afghanistan. Like Part I, Part II is structured in light of the decision-making process that President Bush followed: the President listened to the viewpoints of his advisors before making the final decision.
As part of the requirements of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approach,[1] which considers both external and internal factors, Part II continues to attempt to understand ‘how’ the policy of the GWOT, which led to the invasion of Afghanistan, was formulated by focusing on the decision-making process for the GWOT policy that initiated in Afghanistan.
The first NSC meeting of 11 September 2001 and the morning NSC session of Camp David on 15 September 2001 have been covered in Part I. This essay (or Part II) covers the afternoon session of the Camp David NSC meeting (though references will be made to other NSC meetings where necessary). The following Monday, 17 September 2001, Bush came up with the GWOT strategy, with the first stage being Afghanistan.
Part II continues to address some bureaucratic considerations[2] related to the decision to intervene.
The afternoon NSC session of Camp David on 15 September 2001
In the afternoon session, Secretary of State Colin Powell advised that Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda should be the first target. An ultimatum should be issued, giving the Taliban forty-eight hours to hand over Al Qaeda leadership or else they would share Al Qaeda’s fate. Bush should avoid going after Iraq because America would lose the coalition they had signed up, the support at home and the support of the United Nations (UN) and some NATO countries. If they found the linkage to 9/11, then they could aim at Iraq, too, maybe Syria and Iran. However, Powell, unlike Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, doubted that such a linkage existed. But for the time being, Powell advised, they should set aside the option of Iraq; maybe later once the US was successful in Afghanistan. Powell, once a military man himself, doubted the ability of US Central Command (USCENTCOM) to engage in two or more fronts at the same time.
Finally, the Secretary of State suggested the US present to the world evidence of Al Qaeda being behind 9/11 to make a concrete case for war in Afghanistan. Favouring diplomacy, Powell was of the opinion that the goal from the outset should not be to change the regime but to get them to do the right things. Powell clearly wanted the Taliban to break away from Al Qaeda as he did not see the Taliban as a serious problem.[3]
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld opposed giving evidence to the world since the precedent would not be helpful to pre-emptive actions in the future against a threat to the US; in the future they might not have enough information to make the case for an action. He also recommended that the CIA should not give all importance to Osama bin Laden, as the war would start with the aim of destroying him and his network, but would not end after defeating Al Qaeda; mentioning Osama bin Laden a lot would risk elevating him and narrowing the base support for the anti-terrorist campaign.
Rumsfeld was of the opinion that the Taliban should not stay in power in any case, even if they accepted US conditions, since the US would risk sending a message to other nations that they could support terrorist groups and then negotiate a ‘grand bargain’ with the US.
Rumsfeld was not bothered by the fear of losing the coalition: as the mission was to determine the coalition, the coalition ought not to determine the mission. Rumsfeld recommended to Bush that they first define their mission and then choose the partner that best suited it. Any country with conditions unacceptable to the US was not welcomed, and any argument that the coalition would not tolerate this or that argued for a different coalition. Rumsfeld advised against a large coalition to be tied to every activity or operation as the operation would not benefit being tied to a large coalition since many countries might have different views and internal and external concerns. As a former US Ambassador to NATO, Rumsfeld did not like the ‘tedious, laborious consultative process by which America and its European allies reached their decisions’.[4]
Bush, on the other hand, seemed to have been bothered by Powell using the coalition as a justification for the US not doing this or that. Bush did not want the coalition to be used as a reason for his advisors to abstain from certain actions, and he certainly did not want the coalition argument to dictate terms, adding, ‘we may be the only one left. That’s ok with me. We are America.’[5] When Powell insisted on diplomacy, Bush reportedly replied: ‘F**c diplomacy’.[6]
Vice President Dick Cheney, who agreed with Rumsfeld on the issue of coalition, made it clear as well that, if need be, America alone would shoulder the GWOT.[7]
It seemed that Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld believed that America’s powers would enable it to shoulder the responsibility alone. For Powell, nevertheless, the coalition was important and he persistently, and regardless of what Bush and Rumsfeld thought, warned that many countries, especially Muslim, would refuse to be part of the coalition if the option of Iraq was brought on the table.[8]
(However, it must be mentioned that, in the end, the Bush Administration built a worldwide coalition for the war against terrorism; something the administration, especially the State Department, saw as a great achievement.[9])
It is clear from Powell’s argument that the State Department advocated a traditional law enforcement approach, focusing on punishing only those who had harmed the US. In contrast, the Defense leadership sought a broader campaign: to disrupt and destroy all those who might be planning future attacks. The State Department did not get the simple fact that it was not Al Qaeda that constituted the enemy, but an ideology, argued Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. Radical Islam or ‘Islamic extremism’ must be confronted in its entirety. A strategic response would include all Islamic terrorist groups − from Al Qaeda to Jemaah Islamiyah in South-East Asia to Lebanese Hezbollah and many others − and states sponsoring terrorists − from Afghanistan to Iraq and many others. It was not important whether a state or organisation had a link to the 9/11 attacks, as the US objective was not to punish terrorists but to prevent further attacks in (pre-emptive) self-defence of the US. A ‘network of states, non-states entities, and organisations’ involved in supporting these terrorists jointly constituted a severe threat of further attacks to the US. To defeat such a broad enemy in almost every continent, maintained Feith, the GWOT needed to be long and sustained; Rumsfeld at Camp David explicitly talked about the importance of sustaining the war which would take ‘years’ rather than months.[10]
Powell, however, disagreed with the international characterisation of the enemy as well as the inclusion of Iraq, arguing that Americans wanted them to combat Al Qaeda and that was what they needed to focus on. For Powell, it was easier to rally the world against a specific enemy, Al Qaeda, as it was easy to pass a UN resolution, as well as gather a large number of coalitions.[11]
CIA Director George Tenet was in favour of a GWOT (or the broader campaign) but he, nevertheless, recommended starting only with Afghanistan. Bush said that Tenet advised him that hitting Iraq was a ‘mistake’.[12]
White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card in his turn agreed to go for Al Qaeda as it was the enemy. ‘An enemy’, Bush corrected him.[13]
Cheney supported the broader campaign, as this was not a war against certain individuals or cells responsible for 9/11, but rather a global war where the US wanted to go after the networks, organisations and states that supported and aided terrorists. He, however, stressed that the priority should be to prevent the next attack, especially one involving weapons of mass destruction or WMD,[14] and therefore it was important that the US did everything to prevent terrorists from accessing weapons of mass destruction, including the adoption and implementation of internal security measures. Cheney added that Afghanistan should be the first to be dealt with, because it was the place where the terrorists had plotted the 9/11 attacks and might plan the next attack. Iraq, he advised Bush, did pose a threat but it should be postponed until they had an effective plan to combat the threat posed by the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Cheney, like Powell, was also in favour of striking at Al Qaeda and persuading the Taliban to displace their leader, Mullah Omer, who had ‘betrayed’ them by inviting in the outsiders.[15]
Tenet, on the other hand, told them it was difficult to distinguish between the two, as, according to his intelligence, all the targets were intermixed.[16]
So everyone voiced their opinion to Bush, excluding National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. She had been told by Bush only to listen and voice her opinion later. According to the American Political Scientist and Professor James Pfiffner, Rice played the role of ‘honest broker’ by ensuring all the views reached the President in an orderly process.[17] Rice, however, shared the same view as Cheney, Powell, Tenet, and Card in opposing action in Iraq.[18]
Bush was yet to make a decision by the coming Monday as to which camp he would go with.
Whose policy ideas Bush approved – and some concluding remarks
On Monday, 17 September, Bush informed his War Cabinet that over the weekend he had made the decision. The general authority of the decision dealt with two fronts: home and Afghanistan. At home, the CIA, FBI, the Justice Department and other relevant departments were given more authority, including pre-emptive power, to protect America within from further attacks.
For Afghanistan, Powell was to issue an ultimatum to the Taliban, something that Bush later included in his Congress Speech.[19] If the Taliban did not comply ─ a prospect they assumed to be more likely ─[20] Bush was to use Shelton’s third option. Bush said his option was a clear change from former President Bill Clinton’s approach. The Pentagon, meanwhile, should develop a detailed plan to include the new and unconventional targets in Afghanistan, the timing for its execution, which allies to be included (Bush wanted the British to be given a role) how and when to be included, and how much cost the plan would incur. Bush wanted the plan ‘quick’, adding that he intended to hit Afghanistan so severely that other terrorist-supporting nations would take notice.
While it would take another six days for the Defense Department to produce a plan ─ named Operation Enduring Freedom with four stages: (1) to merge CIA operatives with Special Forces to clear the way for conventional forces; (2) air campaign; (3) ground forces from the US and coalition partners; (4) and finally to stabilise the country and help Afghans build a free society ─ and another three weeks, to the frustration of Bush and Rumsfeld, to put it into effect, Bush for Afghanistan authorised the CIA’s Blue Sky plan with all its steps. The CIA could operate freely and fully in Afghanistan with its paramilitary teams and operatives, as well as drones. It gave the CIA unprecedented authority to deal with terrorism, including eliminating, imprisoning, and sending terrorists to third countries for interrogation.
The second document he signed was military, intelligence, diplomatic and financial actions, and steps the War Cabinet needed to take in order to carry out the GWOT, actions regarding Afghanistan included.[21]
As for Iraq, Bush had allowed the debate on Iraq to take place in the morning session at Camp David so that he learned his advisors’ views. But the President was not in favour of going to Iraq and Afghanistan because he did not want to simultaneously commit America’s military forces to two wars. It would have created a lack of focus, which would have been a huge risk. It was true that he was committed to root out terror from the world, but he was to do so one at a time. Bush’s second worry over Iraq was that most of the NSC advisors ─ Cheney, Powell and Wolfowitz ─ were from the Gulf War 1991 and he did not want them to use 9/11 as an excuse ‘to settle an old score’ with the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.
Finally, there was no evidence to link 9/11 with Iraq ─ though Bush believed Saddam Hussein had been involved. [22] Writing in 2021, Bruce Riedel, who was Senior Director for the Near East at the NSC during the Bush Administration, claims that Bush strongly believed Iraq was behind the 9/11 attacks and he wanted to invade it. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Jordan’s King Abdullah, and Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, all advised against it.[23]
Bush, however, wanted the Pentagon to continue to work on a plan for Iraq.[24] The continuous developing of the Iraq plan for a possible action, as well as Bush’s order to the other US departments to take anti-terrorist measures against many terrorist organisations that had no clear link to 9/11, were clear indications that Bush approved the Defense Department’s advice to keep the campaign wide and sustained in order to destroy international terrorism from the world to prevent further attacks on the US, as opposed to punishing the 9/11 perpetrators, Al Qaeda and its backers. Bush had only differed with the Pentagon on the timing: the Defense Department wanted at least Iraq, Afghanistan and Al Qaeda in the first phase, but Bush decided to destroy one at a time.
Ostensibly, one might think that Bush was acting on Powell’s advice to focus on a specific enemy, Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but in reality he had been strongly influenced by the Defense Department, especially by Cheney. Bush and Cheney do not mention in their memoirs whether they met each other between the Camp David meeting on Saturday, 15 September, and the following Monday, a period in which Bush made the decision, but Bush’s decision was in line with Cheney’s view of Camp David, namely, that the GWOT was international, but for the time being should be limited to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Cheney tended to tell Bush his ideas privately, especially during their private lunches, so it is not far from reality that Cheney had met Bush between the Camp David meeting and the following Monday to elaborate on his ideas and to ensure Bush followed them. According to American journalist and author Bob Woodward, Bush tended to listen to Cheney’s ideas without testing them.[25]
By the NSC meeting on 6 October 2001, the CIA’s part of the strategy for Afghanistan was done, as its paramilitary group, the Jawbreaker, had already entered Afghanistan on 27 September with plenty of US dollars. They had since been active. The State Department had worked hard and managed to sign up a strong coalition, Pakistan, Russia and the ‘stans’ in particular, and had spoken to Zahir Shah, the former Afghan King, about a political process after the Taliban defeat. Rumsfeld, who had been frustrated with his military leadership for the delay in producing the war plan, also confirmed that its war plan was almost effective.
In short, after 26 days following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the military, diplomatic, and political (though this aspect was still at its crawling stage due to the lack of attention) aspects of Afghan strategy had almost come to shape, and the secretaries told Bush they were ready. Bush, backed by an angry and united American people, gave the go-ahead for Operation Enduring Freedom on Sunday, 7 October. It was the first step in the GWOT.
References
‘American Manhunt: Osama bin Laden’, Netflix, 14 May 2025.
Bearden, Milton, ‘Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-empires>.
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers.
Bush, George W. (2001). Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. [The White House]. <http://georgewbushwhite.accessed,archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.
Bush, George W, ‘President’s Message for Ramadan’, 15 November 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011115-14.html>.
Bush, George W, ‘President Rallies Troops at Travis Air Force Base’, The White House, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-20.html>.
Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: Its Application, Its Limitations, and Its Strengths’, 2018, Political Reflection Magazine, 4(5): 36-46.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Foreign Policy Decision Making Approaches and Their Applications: Case Study: Bush, Obama and Trump’s Decision Making towards Afghanistan and the Region, The Rest: Journal of Politics and development, summer 2019, <https://www.academia.edu/39978817/The_Foreign_Policy_Decision_Making_Approaches_and_Their_Applications_Case_Study_Bush_Obama_and_Trump_s_Decision_Making_towards_Afghanistan_and_the_Region>.
Dorani, Sharifullah. 2022. The Lone Leopard. S&M Publishing House.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The milieu in which the Bush Administration made the decision to intervene in Afghanistan: the ‘fear’ of another 9/11’, CEPSAF, 23 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-milieu-in-which-the-bush-administration-made-the-decision-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-the-fear-of-another-9-11/>.
Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper.
Gall, Sandy. 2022. Afghan Napoleon. Haus Publishing.
Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>.
Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub.
Jalalzai, Freshta, ‘The Complex Legacy of Ahmad Shah Massoud’, The Diplomate, 9 September 2024.
Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-pleffler/september-11-in-retrospect>.
Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking.
Obama, Barack, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
O’Hanlon, Michael E., ‘Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58022/michael-e-ohanlon/a-flawed-masterpiece>.
Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster.
Riedel, Bruce, ‘9/11 and Iraq: ‘The making of a tragedy’, Brookings, 17 September 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/9-11-and-iraq-the-making-of-a-tragedy/>.
Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel.
Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.
Snyder, C. Richard, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. 1962. Foreign policy decision-making. The Free Press of Glencoe.
Stewart, Rory, Afghanistan: The Great Games, BBC, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_m7uL4Q44ws>.
Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher.
‘The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days’, The White House, 11 September 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html#:~:text=%2D%2DPresident%20George%20W.,-Bush%2C%2011/15&text=The%20United%20States%20is%20a,and%20called%20for%20national%20reconciliation.>.
‘The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days’, US Department of State, 11 December 2001, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm#:~:text=The%20world%20has%20responded%20with,driving%20the%20Taliban%20from%20power.>.
Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York: Simon & Schuster.
[1] For the Foreign Policy Decision Making Approach, see Snyder, C. Richard, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. 1962. Foreign policy decision-making. The Free Press of Glencoe; Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press; Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Foreign Policy Decision Making Approaches and Their Applications: Case Study: Bush, Obama and Trump’s Decision Making towards Afghanistan and the Region, The Rest: Journal of Politics and development, summer 2019, <https://www.academia.edu/39978817/The_Foreign_Policy_Decision_Making_Approaches_and_Their_Applications_Case_Study_Bush_Obama_and_Trump_s_Decision_Making_towards_Afghanistan_and_the_Region>.
[2] For the bureaucratic politics model, see Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: Its Application, Its Limitations, and Its Strengths’, 2018, Political Reflection Magazine, 4(5): 36-46.
[3] For Powell’s views, see Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, p. 126; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 87-88, 122-124; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 189; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 65.
[4] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 54, 363; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 354-355, 368; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 88, 105, 176.
[5] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 81.
[6] See First Episode of ‘American Manhunt: Osama bin Laden’, Netflix, 14 May 2025.
[7] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 81; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 231.
[8] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 84.
[9] The State Department spells out the following to show the support the administration managed to attract for its GWOT: ‘President Bush has met with leaders from at least 51 different countries to help build support for the war against terrorism; 136 countries offered a range of military assistance; the U.S. received 46 multilateral declarations of support from organizations; the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council condemned the attacks on September 12; NATO, OAS and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.) quickly invoked their treaty obligations to support the United States. The NATO allies assisted directly in the defense of American territory; 142 countries issued orders freezing the assets of suspected terrorists and organizations; 89 countries granted over-flight authority for US military aircraft; 76 countries granted landing rights for US military aircraft; 23 countries agreed to host U.S. forces involved in offensive operations; with US ‘leadership’ and with international support, Afghans put aside long-standing ethnic and political differences to form a new interim government, naming a president and 29 ministers with portfolio. The new government also included women, who had been oppressed by the Taliban regime. And the United States and several other allies have reopened embassies in Kabul’ (‘The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days’, US Department of State, 11 December 2001, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm#:~:text=The%20world%20has%20responded%20with,driving%20the%20Taliban%20from%20power.>).
[10] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 49-51, 59; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 88; ‘The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days’, US Department of State, 11 December 2001, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm#:~:text=The%20world%20has%20responded%20with,driving%20the%20Taliban%20from%20power.>.
[11] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 48-49.
[12] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 189.
[13] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 90.
[14] For how the Bush Administration feared more attacks after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, see Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The milieu in which the Bush Administration made the decision to intervene in Afghanistan: the ‘fear’ of another 9/11’, CEPSAF, 23 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-milieu-in-which-the-bush-administration-made-the-decision-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-the-fear-of-another-9-11/>.
[15] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 9, 332-334; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 190; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 91, 122-128.
[16] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 91, 122-128.
[17] Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/10/31-bush-pfiffner>.
[18] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 91.
[19] Bush, George W. (2001). Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. [The White House]. <http://georgewbushwhite.accessed,archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.
[20] According to Bush, the Taliban did not comply.Bush stated: ‘I said to the Taliban, turn them over, destroy the camps, free people you’re unjustly holding. I said, you’ve got time to do it. But they didn’t listen. They didn’t respond, and now they’re paying a price. They are learning that anyone who strikes America will hear from our military, and they’re not going to like what they hear. In choosing their enemy, the evildoers and those who harbor them have chosen their fate’ (Bush, George W, President Rallies Troops at Travis Air Force Base, The White House, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-20.html>). President Barack Obama also claimed that the Taliban were given a choice, but they refused (Obama, Barack, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>).
[21] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, p. 316; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 194; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 337; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 63, 98, 101; Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, p. 16.
[22] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 81, 85, 99.
[23] Riedel, Bruce, ‘9/11 and Iraq: ‘The making of a tragedy’, Brookings, 17 September 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/9-11-and-iraq-the-making-of-a-tragedy/>.
[24] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 81, 85, 99.
[25] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 169.
*Dr Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.