By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
This article deals with public debate over the Afghanistan War during the President Obama made the decision in 2011 to withdraw the 30000 surge troops from Afghanistan, deployed just two years prior. To do so, the contributions of the actors/area experts from Congress, the press, think-tanks and other influential organisations are examined. In doing so, the section would also bring to life the milieu Obama was operating in for the decision to draw down in 2011.
Because of the public nature of the Af-Pak review in 2009 and the overwhelming interest in the Afghanistan War and its political implications for the 2012 presidential election, the decision of 2011 was awaited with bated breath by all those who had been involved in the decision to surge in 2009. Most of the actors ─ policymakers, members of Congress or pundits from the media/press, academia and think-tanks ─ again made attempts through speeches, publications and testimonies to influence the decision by trying to influence the public debate the way they believed it to be right for US national security interests. Before examining their output, however, it is important to shed light on some domestic factors, including US economic conditions (as well as some external factors). So, section one focuses on domestic (and some external factors), and section two covers the public debate over the Afghanistan War. The article ends with some concluding remarks.
Domestic Factors
Like the Head of US Central Command General David Petraeus (who became the Commander of the International Security Assistance in July 2010), who could not illustrate much progress in Afghanistan by 2011, President Barack Obama had not managed to show improvement in the American economy, forcing 70 percent of Americans in numerous polls to disapprove of Obama’s handling of the economy and to think that the country was on the wrong track.[1]
The high disapproval rating was not surprising because, ever since Obama took office, the unemployment rate had risen from 7.6 to 9 percent, the national debt from $10.6 to $14.6 trillion, budget deficit to $1580 billion for 2011-12, US citizens without health insurance to 49.9 million, Americans living below the official poverty line to 46.2 million, or one in six, and mortgages in negative equity to an all-time high.[2] By authors Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman’s estimates, the two wars had cost the US $5 trillion by 2011,[3] and 60 percent of participants believed in a June 2011 Pew poll that the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars were the leading cause of US indebtedness.[4]
Human costs equally concerned Americans. The American combat fatalities rose from 155 in 2008 to 317 in 2009, and 499 in 2010. 499 US soldiers represented an increase of 57 percent over 2009. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had to plead with Congress to be patient over the death tolls (and the economic costs). While the 9/11 attacks killed 2,976 Americans, US military had lost 6,234 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan by 2011.[5]
Because of the repetitive combat deployments to war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq in the past decade, the ground forces were nearly ‘broken’. The military families were under enormous stress and consequently ‘junior and midlevel officers [were] leaving the force in large numbers’.[6]
Due to the increasing financial and human costs, by summer 2011, opinion polls showed that the majority of Americans did not believe the Afghanistan War was worth fighting.[7] For example, only 21 percent in the Chicago Council on Global Affairs thought that the Afghanistan War was very important. 77 percent of Americans supported US withdrawal within two years.[8] According to American author Max Boot, the Afghanistan War had become increasingly sour because Americans believed the US was not winning. The American public was not against fighting a war, but against a war whose results was unclear. If the public saw results in Afghanistan, added Boot, there would have been a change in public opinion.[9]
Public opinion changed not only in America, but also in Afghanistan and in the countries of the allies. Although initially many Afghans welcomed US forces as ‘liberators’, the presence of so many international forces, the killing of innocent Afghans by US bombardments, the night raids/other human rights abuses by US forces, the length of war, the continuous insecurity, the presence of conspiracy theories, and the steady inflow of negative propaganda against the US and the allies by some neighbouring states (Pakistan in particular) had reduced the support for US troops in Afghanistan.[10] Even though the US spent hundreds of billions in the country, it was yet unable to win the hearts and minds of the Afghans, as Afghans’ attitude ranged from wary to hostile.[11]
In the UK, the war became increasingly unpopular and Prime Minister David Cameron had to announce that, following NATO’s Lisbon Summit in November 2010,[12] he would withdraw British forces by 2015, regardless of what the situation was on the ground. Some coalition partners, such as The Netherlands and Canada, even announced an end to their presence in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011, respectively.[13]
THE PUBLIC DEBATE
As seen above, the Afghanistan War did not turn around the way the military had assumed, so Congress had become more and more impatient. In June 2011, the House of Representatives came close to passing a resolution to ask the administration to produce a fixed timetable; the vote was 204 to 215, compared to 162 to 260 on a similar resolution the year before.[14] A month later it passed legislation to help raise the American debt ceiling, cutting the defence budget by $350 billion over ten years.[15]
The US Conference of Mayors in early June approved its second resolution after the Vietnam War, asking Congress to bring an early end to the Afghanistan War and redirect the money spent over constructions in Kandahar and Helmand towards constructions in America. It was predicted by the media that the argument whether the US should rebuild Kandahar or a US city would be likely to dominate the 2012 presidential election.[16] This was a clear political warning to all presidential candidates: whoever presented the Americans with policies to bring US engagement in Afghanistan to a quick though responsible end seemed, in 2011, to be winning more votes.
Those Republicans who had a greater stake in the election, including Mitt Romney and Jon M. Huntsman Jr, in early 2011, wanted to hand over security to the Afghans and bring home swiftly the surge troops regardless of the conditions on the ground. Moreover, they supported 2014 as the end withdrawal date set out by the Lisbon Summit.[17]
Compared to 2009, in 2011, to the surprise of Gates, there were more Republicans who began to worry about the rise in the costs of the Afghanistan War in a financially difficult time, and consequently supported the Democrats’ stance on the war.[18]
Most of the opposition, however, came from the Democrats, and the rationales the Democrats (and the anti-war Republicans) invoked for opposing the continuation of the current strategy in Afghanistan could be summed up as follows: the high costs ─ an annual spending of around $120 billion on 100,000 US soldiers or one out of every six to seven dollars the US spent on defence, $12 billion on training the Afghan National Security Forces, and $5 billion on civilian assistance at the expense of cutting civilian aid projects to other countries ─ were unjustifiable and irrational; given US fiscal peril, the US could no longer cut services/programmes, raise taxes, lift the debt ceiling, and disregard high US unemployment to rebuild Afghanistan; not enough durable progress had been made so far as the Afghan Government remained corrupt and its Afghan National Security Forces had numerous shortcomings; the US objective to establish a centralised government and to remake the political, security and economic culture of Afghanistan was against the history of Afghanistan and beyond US means and ability; Pakistan continued to play both a ‘firefighter and arsonist’, and without its cooperation success was impossible; Afghanistan did not have the presence of Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban was not an enemy; US focus on South Asia prevented it from paying enough attention to other countries, from whom a threat could emanate, such as Yemen, Somalia and North Africa; the allies were not fully committed and provided nothing compared to the US; and US geostrategic interests were threatened not only by terrorism, but also by many other forces including debt, economic competition, energy, and food prices.
They all wanted the Obama Administration to focus on specific goals in Afghanistan essential to US national security interests and avoid goals that could not be achieved in the first place, and, even if they were accomplished, remained fragile and reversible.
In terms of what sort of an Afghanistan Obama needed to leave, which was the core focus of public debate in 2011, they made it clear that an Afghan state capable of tackling the threat of the Taliban and the return of Al-Qaeda was acceptable to them. It did not matter if the state was corrupt and undemocratic, as, due to Pakistan’s support of insurgency, corrupt governance, insufficient Afghan National Security Forces, and Afghanistan’s inherent complexities, it was ‘unlikely’ for the US to establish ‘a self-sufficient, democratic nation that has no terrorists within its borders and whose government is secure from tribal competition’, extremist threats and corruption. They wanted a small US presence in Afghanistan to operate counterterrorism operations to put pressure on Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, while the Afghan National Security Forces fought the Taliban .[19]
Unlike most members of Congress, the area experts, most of whom were the same faces as those from 2009, remained as divided in 2011 as they had been in 2009, and their viewpoints had remained more or less the same as 2009. By hearing the testimonies of more than 20 experts, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was as involved in the Afghanistan War as it had been in 2009. Influential foreign policy organisations and journals, such as Foreign Affairs, had equally remained engaged in the Afghanistan War in 2011.
The views of those who supported the military camp could be summed up as follows. They did not want Obama to prematurely withdraw but make withdrawal conditions based on the situation on the ground, and calculate it with not only US interests in mind, but also those of Afghanistan.[20] Conditions on the ground were to be decided on the perceptions of the military leaders, who, as will be seen in my other article, believed that Obama should only withdraw a tiny number of the 30,000 troops because a rapid withdrawal would put in jeopardy the progress US civilian and military forces had made in the last 18 months. They wanted the continuation of the counterinsurgency strategy for a few more years conducted by more or less the same US number (approximately 100,000) present in Afghanistan.
Though slow compared to what Washington had expected, the current strategy was working. It was slow because the decision to increase troops and money was about two years old, but troops only completed their arrival eight months ago (around late summer 2010), and by the time they were deployed and got used to the environment, more time was taken, but they still managed to clear safe havens in the south. The experts urged Obama to give it time and patience and to provide a long-term programme, such as signing some kind of strategic partnership with Afghanistan to offer long-term support to the Afghan Government and its security forces beyond 2011 or 2014. They further urged Obama to aim for a fair and reasonably strong Afghan state (some even argued for a democratic Afghanistan)[21] capable of protecting its internal security.
Such an Afghanistan had numerous advantages (already discussed under the advantages of a centralised state in one of my articles). If not, if the US withdrew prematurely and thus accepted defeat, it would have disastrous consequences (already explained in one of my articles) for the US and allies. Obama would not be judged on how quickly he brought troops home, they warned Obama, but by how Afghanistan did once US troops left. They continued to believe in the arguments of ‘Afghanistan-having-compelling-relevance-to-US-national-security-interests’, ‘the Taliban -Al-Qaeda-being-connected’, ‘security-must-be-established-before-long-term-visions-materialised’, ‘US-must-show-resolve’, and ‘majority-of-Afghans-supported-US-presence’. Their rationales for the above arguments were essentially the same as those they had put down in 2009. I cover both the arguments and the rationales in great detail in one of my articles. They rejected counterterrorism strategy for the reasons discussed under the argument of ‘multiple-anti-counterterrorism -plus-rationales’, which again I cover in another article. These area (and foreign policy) experts, who continued to contribute to policymaking atmosphere, were Stephen Biddle, David Kilcullen, Ryan C. Crocker, Max Boot, Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, Ronald E. Neumann, Zainab Salbi, Scott Seward Smith, Michael O’Hanlon, John Podesta, Stephen Hadley, Seth Jones, Peter Bergen, Fotini Christia, and James Dobbins.[22]
Those who had supported the Biden camp in 2009 disagreed again in 2011 with the supporters of the military camp. Unlike the above camp, they were pessimistic about the future of Afghanistan, believing the war was unwinnable the way the military leaders desired. Numerous factors could be found in their reasoning to justify their disagreement and pessimism: the regional countries’, especially Pakistan, continuous interference in Afghanistan; weak governance and incompetent Afghan National Security Forces; Afghanistan’s dire financial conditions ─ Dodge and Redman concluded that without international support to Afghanistan, the state deficit would be half of its GDP in 2010, e.g. Afghanistan had exports of $2.63 billion but imports of $9.15 billion for the fiscal year 2009-10. It was the $6.17 billion donor inflows that covered the account deficit of 54 percent of GDP.[23] Taxation could not help the deficit either, as only 8 percent of Afghanistan’s budget was derived from it;[24] its ethnic, tribal and religious complexities ─ these complexities stood against a central government the US and coalitions had aimed for. Religious and ethnic conflicts (the Taliban being largely Pashtun, but the Kabul Government largely consisted of minorities) continued to be a major source of conflict (or in their opinion, the ‘civil war’) and continued to pose a threat to the progress the US had made in the last decade.
For all the above factors, Afghanistan would never have a fairly strong government capable of establishing security for all Afghans regardless of what strategy the Obama Administration applied. The future Afghanistan would continue to witness a weak, inept and corrupt government with insufficient Afghan National Security Forces , who would be in war with the Taliban (and therefore indirectly with Pakistan), and even themselves.
They proposed that success in Afghanistan meant having a ‘good enough’ Afghan Government capable of holding off the Taliban and Al-Qaeda with modest military and financial US support while some ‘messy stalemate’ continued to define Afghanistan’s future. A good enough Afghan state required a fast drawdown in July 2011, leaving between 10,000 and 25,000 troops to carry out counterterrorism operations and continue to train the Afghan National Security Forces.
A counterterrorism strategy would reduce worries on the Afghan side that the US was there to occupy the county, lessen some source of friction between Pakistan and the US, permit the US to go ‘long’ and sustainable not ‘big’ and unsustainable in light of the Afghanistan War being a ‘marathon not a sprint’,[25] make the US better prepared to react to contingencies/terrorist acts arising from the wider Middle East, Africa, the Korean Peninsula, and Iran, as well as allow the US to take into account its other domestic and international interests (e.g. those in the Asia Pacific), since in 2011 Afghanistan absorbed more US economic, political, diplomatic, military, and human resources of every sort than it warranted.
The Afghanistan War not just involved mission creep but also ‘mission multiplication’, as US objectives had ballooned out of proportion, turning the goal of containing terrorism into nation-building and the modernisation of Afghanistan.[26] Such expensive focus on Afghanistan posed a threat to US economic powers, and it was time Obama did something about it.
They also continued to believe in the arguments of ‘Afghanistan-having-minimal-relevance-to-US-national-security-interests’, ‘the Taliban -and-Al-Qaeda-being-disconnected-and-Al-Qaeda-would-not-return-if-the Taliban -took-over-large-parts-of-Afganistan’, ‘US-received-Al-Qaeda-threats-from-other-states-not-just-Afghanistan’, ‘Pakistan-being-more-important-to-US-interests-than-Afghanistan’, and ‘greater-US-presence-would-not-guarantee-a-negotiated-settlement-because-Pakistan-would-increase-its-support-for-the Taliban’. Richard Haass, Michael Krepon, Paul R. Pillar, Michael Mandelbaum, Zbigniew Brzezinski, General David Barno, journalist Linda Robinson, Paul Yingling, Toby Dodge, Nicholas Redman, Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, and numerous other foreign policy/area experts (and think-tanks) were among those who put forward the above viewpoints.[27]
The two camps, however, agreed on two policy suggestions. First, while a small number (named in one of my articles) wanted the US to get tough with Pakistan, most disagreed, asking for continued engagement with Pakistan at all levels, including the continuation of US military and civilian assistance. This was the best option to reduce threats emanating from Pakistan, or else Pakistan could make it worse for US efforts in Afghanistan explained in one of my articles).[28]
Second, almost all of the above pundits, no matter what views they held, stressed the importance of a peaceful solution to the Afghanistan conflict, be it a regional one or reconciliation with the Taliban. Continued engagement with neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan, they argued, could provide a better chance for peace talks, or at the very least, prevent Afghanistan from being destabilised.
One of my articles examines ‘what’ the end strategy became, as well as offering some concluding remarks on the impact of the false assumptions, bureaucratic politics, belief systems and images, as well as domestic influences upon the resulting policy (the drawdown strategy).
Conclusion
As this article has demonstrated, the public debate over the Afghanistan War in 2011 was as divided as it was in 2009. The debate was shaped by mounting domestic pressures, including a struggling economy and a war-weary public. Two distinct camps emerged: one, largely from the military and its supporters, argued for a condition-based withdrawal, believing the counterinsurgency strategy was beginning to yield results and deserved more time and patience. The opposing camp, championed by figures like Vice President Biden, pushed for a rapid reduction to a smaller counterterrorism force, arguing that the war was financially unsustainable and ultimately unwinnable in military terms. Despite their disagreements, both sides found common ground on the need to maintain engagement with Pakistan and pursue a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Ultimately, the question remained whether President Obama would choose a compromise or side with one of the two opposing visions. My forthcoming article will examine the outcome of this pivotal decision.
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[1]Cooper, Helene, ‘Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels’, The New York Times, June 21, 2011; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, pp. 2, 12-13; Zeleny, Jeff, Jim Rutenberg. ‘Obama Finds Praise, Even From Republicans’, The New York Times, May 2, 2011.
[2] Cooper, Helene, ‘Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels’, The New York Times, June 21, 2011; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 2.
[3] Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 49.
[4] Barno, David W., Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp, ‘How To Cut the Defense Budget Responsibly’, Foreign Affairs, 2011, November 2, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136639/david-w-barno-nora-bensahel-and-travis-sharp/how-to-cut-the-defense-budget-responsibly>
[5]Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 66; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 67; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. 217, 223.
[6] Moten, Matthew, ‘Out of Order: Strengthening the Political-Military Relationship’, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October, 2010, < http://www.cfr.org/polls-and-opinion-analysis/out-order/p22914>; Desch, Michael C., ‘Bush and the Generals’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62616/michael-c-desch/bush-and-the-generals>.
[7] Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 321; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, pp. 12-13, 75-76; Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 64-66.
[8] Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. 12-13, 75-76.
[9] Bernard Gwetzman Interviews Max Boot. ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, the Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2010.
[10] O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 321.
[11] Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 75.
[12] Which had made the decision that US and NATO troops would begin to hand security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces in 2011 and end their combat mission by the end of 2014.
[13] O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>.
[14] Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 65.
[15]Mandelbaum, Michael, ‘America’s Coming Retrenchment; How Budget Cuts Will Limit the United States’ Global Role,’ Foreign Affairs, August 9, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael-mandelbaum/americas-coming-retrenchment>; Barno, David W., Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp, ‘How To Cut the Defense Budget Responsibly’, Foreign Affairs, 2011, November 2, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136639/david-w-barno-nora-bensahel-and-travis-sharp/how-to-cut-the-defense-budget-responsibly>.
[16] Cooper, Helene, ‘Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels’, The New York Times, June 21, 2011.
[17] ‘Transcript of ‘Vice-Presidential Debate: Joe Biden and Paul Ryan Tackle’, The Council on Foreign Relations, October 12, 2012; Cooper, Helene, ‘Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels’, The New York Times, June 21, 2011; Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 66-66; Landler, Mark and Helene Cooper, ‘Obama Will Speed Pullout From War in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, 22 June 2011.
[18] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 561; Cooper, Helene, ‘Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels’, The New York Times, June 21, 2011. However, hawkish Republicans, like John McCain, continued to ask for the preservation of the current US military spending, Cooper, Helene, ‘Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels’, The New York Times, June 21, 2011.
[19] Kerry, John F., ‘Chairman Kerry Opening Statement At Nomination Hearing For Ambassador To Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-kerry-opening-statement-at-nomination-hearing-for-ambassador-to-afghanistan>; Kerry, ‘Getting the transition right’, The Boston Globe, May 1, 2011; O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>;Kerry, John, ‘Kerry Opening Statement At Hearing Titled “Al Qaeda, The Taliban, And Other Extremist Groups In Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-opening-statement-at-hearing-titled-al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>; Lugar, Dick, Opening Statement, ‘Lugar Says Obama Lacks Vision of Success in Afghanistan Strategic Value of Long-Term Engagement and Cost No Longer Justified’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/lugar-says-obama-lacks-vision-of-success-in-afghanistan-strategic-value-of-long-term-engagement-and-cost-no-longer-justified>; Lugar, ‘Opening Statement’, Lugar Tells Afghan Nominee U.S. Must Focus Strategy, Defending Vital Security Interests at Less Cost’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/lugar-tells-afghan-nominee-us-must-focus-strategy-defending-vital-security-interests-at-less-cost>; Bernard Gwetzman Interviews Max Boot. ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, the Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2010; Landler, Mark and Helene Cooper, ‘Obama Will Speed Pullout From War in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, 22 June 2011; Cooper, Helene, ‘Cost of Wars a Rising Issue as Obama Weighs Troop Levels’, The New York Times, June 21, 2011; Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 65-66.
[20] Karzai believed that the US was not mindful of Afghan interests. Karzai wanted the relationship to be between two sovereign states, and Afghanistan interests should be clearly recognised, ‘Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Voice of America, English Service. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. July 14, 2014. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews>; ‘Full Transcript of President Karzai’s Interview with Times Now-Indian News Channel’. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 27, 2014; Transcript of the speech delivered by President Hamid Karzai in the Traditional Loya Jirga. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. November 17, 2011.
[21] Salbi, Zainab, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>.
[22] Christia, Fotini, ‘Letter From Kabul; Fear and Abandonment in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, June 26, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabul>;Neumann, Ronald, Stephen Hadley and John D. Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame: How to Help Kabul Stand on Its Own’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138215/ronald-e-neumann-stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/afghan-endgame>; Kilcullen, David, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>;Crocker, Ryan C., ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Salbi, Zainab, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Neumann, Ronald, Stephen Hadley and John D. Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame: How to Help Kabul Stand on Its Own’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138215/ronald-e-neumann-stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/afghan-endgame>;Bergen, Peter, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan> ; Jones, Seth G., ‘It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-villages>; O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>; O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>; Kagan, Frederick, Kimberly Kagan, ‘The Case for Continuing the Counterinsurgency Campaign In Afghanistan’, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, December 16, 2011, <http://www.criticalthreats.org/afghanistan/kagan-case-continuing-counterinsurgency-campaign-december-16-2011>; Smith, Scott Seward, ‘Making Withdrawal Work; A Smaller U.S. Footprint Will Make Afghanistan More Stable’, Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68015/scott-seward-smith/making-withdrawal-work>;DeYoung, Karen. ‘Without large U.S. force after 2014, Afghanistan is headed for civil war, opposition leader warns’, The Washington Post, November 17, 2011;Bernard Gwetzman Interviews Max Boot. ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, the Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2010 ; Dobbins, James, ‘Your COIN Is NO Good Here: How “Counterinsurgency” Became a Dirty Word’, Foreign Affairs, October 26, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66949/james-dobbins/your-coin-is-no-good-here>.
[23] Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 101.
[24] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 251.
[25] Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 330.
[26] Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 165; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 221, 245; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 86.
[27] Haass, Richard N., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Haass, Richard N, ‘The Irony of American Strategy: Putting the Middle East in Proper Perspective’, Council on Foreign Relations, May/June, 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/irony-americanstrategy/p30534?cid=rss-fullfeed-the_irony_of_american_strategy-042313>; Krepon, Michael, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-us-policy-and-its-limits-in-pakistan>; Pillar, Paul R., ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>; Barno and Robinson, op. cit.; Mandelbaum, Michael, ‘America’s Coming Retrenchment; How Budget Cuts Will Limit the United States’ Global Role,’ Foreign Affairs, August 9, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael-mandelbaum/americas-coming-retrenchment>; Brzezinski, Zbigniew. ‘From Hope to Audacity; Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-toaudacity>;Yingling, Paul L. ‘An Absence of Strategic Think: On the Multitude of Lessons Not Learned in Afghanistan’, Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, December 15, 2011; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 221, 245; think tanks and numerous other experts are mentioned in Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 86; and, Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 492.
[28] Yusuf, Moeed, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limits in Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-us-policy-and-its-limits-in-pakistan>; Nawaz, Shuja, ‘The Pakistan dilemma; What the Military’s Recent Behavior Says About U.S.-Pakistan Ties’, Foreign Affair, May 2, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67817/shuja-nawaz/the-pakistan-dilemma>; Ahmed, Samina, ‘Assessing U.S. Policy and Its Limit in Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-us-policy-and-and-its-limits-in-pakistan> ; Fair, C. Christine, ‘Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/al-qaeda-the-taliban-and-other-extremist-groups-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>; Blank, Jonah, ‘Invading Afghanistan, Then and Now’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68214/jonah-blank/invading-afghanistan-then-and-now>; Kerry, John F., ‘Chairman Kerry Opening Statement At Hearing With Secretary Clinton On Afghanistan And Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-kerry-opening-statement-at-hearing-with-secretary-clinton-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan>; Brzezinski, Zbigniew. ‘From Hope to Audacity; Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-toaudacity>.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.