CEPSAF

Centre for Peace & Security Afghanistan – CEPSAF: Greater Middle Eastern Research and Analysis

Bush in the “Bunker”: Afghanistan Invasion Decision-Making, Part I

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CEPSAF

By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*

Introduction

Although later decision-making in the George W Bush Administration was conducted in secrecy and with little deliberation, the decision to intervene in Afghanistan, to a certain extent, was deliberate and transparent.

The National Security Council (NSC) held a number of meetings between 11 September to the day the US invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. However, it was the period between 11 September and 15 September in which the Bush Administration made the strategy for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which started in Afghanistan, especially in the meeting held at Camp David on Saturday, 15 September. The following Monday, 17 September 2001, Bush came up with the GWOT strategy with the first stage being Afghanistan.

I have dedicated a two-part essay to covering decision-making for the decision to invade Afghanistan—a decision that was part of the GWOT strategy.

Both parts (of the essay) are structured in light of the decision-making process that President Bush followed: the President listened to the viewpoints of his advisors before making the final decision.

Using the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approach,[1] both parts attempt to ascertain ‘how’ the decision was formulated, that is, who said what, how and why. Both essays also touch upon some bureaucratic tensions.[2]

To find answers for the ‘how’ question, the focus is on two substantive and result-producing NSC meetings as far as policymaking was concerned: the first meeting in the Bunker of the White House on 11 September 2001 and, most importantly, the last or the Camp David meeting of 15 September 2001. However, references are made to other NSC meetings where necessary. 

This part of the essay, Part I, examines the first NSC meeting, as well as the morning session of the Camp David meeting. The next part, Part II, covers the afternoon session of the Camp David meeting.

The first NSC meeting in the Banker of the White House on the evening of 9 September 2001

In the first (the second if the brief afternoon meeting, which Bush called via a video conference, is counted) NSC meeting in the evening of 9/11 in the Bunker of the White House, the President, who seemed in ‘charge’, ‘determined’ and ‘direct’, repeated his declaration of war and the three doctrines,[3] making it clear that countries needed to choose between the United States (US) and the terrorists.[4]

Incidentally, in the abovementioned brief afternoon NSC meeting, CIA Director George Tenet had told the President that all the signs ─ known Al Qaeda members on the planes, Al Qaeda operatives being picked up by intelligence monitoring congratulating each other, and only Al Qaeda being capable of such sophisticated and coordinated attacks ─ linked the attacks to Al Qaeda based in Afghanistan.[5] 

After linking Al Qaeda to the 9/11 atrocities, the principals in the Banker meeting on the evening of 11 September declared the US at war with Al Qaeda based mainly in Afghanistan. In relation to Afghanistan (and Pakistan), Bush’s three doctrines[6] were going to be automatically applicable, that is, if the Taliban refused US proposals and continued to ‘harbour’ the perpetrators, Al Qaeda, the Taliban would blur the distinction, and the US urgently needed for its self-defence to take the war overseas in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda was based to defeat it (and its harbourers) before the latter attacked America again.[7] Bush stated that it was important to dismantle the Al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan. Tenet said that Al Qaeda had connections to about 60 countries. Bush’s reply was ‘simple’ and ‘decisive’: ‘Let’s pick them off one at a time’.[8]

It was clear that the principals were not debating the wisdom of the three doctrines. It was also clear that they were not debating whether to go to war against global terrorism, as it had already been decided by Bush minutes after the second plane hit the second tower,[9] but rather that the debate was shifting towards how to go to war and how broad the enemy – terrorism – was. This was the case throughout policymaking, including the Camp David meeting of 15 September 2001.

The Camp David meeting on Afghanistan on the morning of 15 September 2001

While the evening NSC meeting of 11 September was important in terms of showing that all the Bush Doctrines were already made up and the advisors did not hold them up to scrutiny, the Camp David meeting was vital because it discussed, in addition to designing a war plan, how broad the enemy was, whether to include Iraq in the first wave, whether to act unilaterally or multilaterally, the ‘Pakistan problem’, and whether to include the Northern Alliance as part of the war plan.

A couple of days before, Bush had told everyone to bring their policy ideas to the Camp David meeting for discussion. It was the following Monday (17 September) that Bush announced his decision. This long, rich-in-detail and result-producing meeting, therefore, is the focus of this and my next essay in order to discover answers to the ‘how’ question, as well as touch upon some bureaucratic tensions.

According to Tenet, when it came to a strategy in relation to Afghanistan, the CIA had an upper hand compared to the Defense Department, because the CIA had contact with numerous parties involved in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance included, since the Soviet invasion. In the last few years up to 9/11, CIA teams had been deployed five times to the Panjshir Valley, the stronghold of the Northern Alliance led by the well-known military leader and politician Ahmad Shah Massoud, to bolster the Northern Alliance’s capability. Additionally, by 10 September 2001, the CIA had ‘hundreds of sources’, subsources, and relationships with ‘eight different tribes’ all around Afghanistan.[10]

Due to its extensive contacts, the CIA had managed to prepare a plan entitled ‘Blue Sky’ to weaken Al Qaeda in Afghanistan well before Bush came into power, but, due to the Bill Clinton Administration’s concerns for Pakistan’s internal instability, the command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, and the Bush Administration’s lack of interest in confronting Al Qaeda prior to 9/11, the Clinton and Bush Administrations had not shown much commitment. Now Bush wanted the CIA to present its plan, and so at Camp David, on 15 September, the CIA’s refined plan was entitled ‘Destroying International Terrorism’, and the ‘Initial Hook’ being the destruction of Al Qaeda and the ‘Closing [of] the Safe Haven’ in Afghanistan.[11]

The CIA plan required the deployment of CIA operatives inside Afghanistan to immediately assist and work with the Northern Alliance and other opposition groups (including some ‘six Taliban commanders’) against Al Qaeda and Taliban and provide a way for the introduction of US Special Forces. CIA operatives and Special Forces would then provide ‘an eye on the ground’ for US military bombing. Due to the CIA’s years of preparation, the mission could start immediately, and Al Qaeda and the Taliban would be defeated in a ‘matter of weeks’.

The plan also required the US to engage Afghanistan’s neighbours, namely, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, to stop all border crossings. To acquire Pakistan’s and ‘stans’ states’ cooperation, Tenet said, everyone’s help was appreciated to speak to their counterparts, including the President who was to speak to the Russian President Vladimir Putin who had influence in the ‘stans’ states.

The CIA’s covert work further pleased Bush when Tenet informed the latter that CIA drones had been operating out of Uzbekistan for a year on surveillance missions to provide real-time videos of Afghanistan. They could always be equipped with Hellfire missiles.[12]

American journalist and author Bob Woodward claims that after days of rhetoric by the President to bring the perpetrators of 9/11 to justice, Bush was presented with a real and quickly implemented strategy to take justice to them – a strategy which was quite impactful on the President[13] because the offensive plan was capable of going after the Al Qaeda leadership, shutting their safe haven in Afghanistan, and eventually pursuing them in ninety-two countries around the world.[14]

Tenet did not have to worry about the Pakistan problem either, as it had already declared its support of a possible US campaign in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, one of the very few countries that had recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the Taliban, was a strong supporter of the Taliban regime and had tremendous influence with the Taliban. While both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Tenet stressed the importance of Pakistan in relation to any strategy being made towards Afghanistan, they initially had been of the opinion that convincing Pakistan to give up the Taliban and be on the US’s side was not straightforward because relations with Pakistan were not cordial due to US sanctions on Pakistan following the latter’s nuclear tests in the 1990s, the Bush Senior Administration’s decision to abandon the region (and its only regional ally, Pakistan) following the Soviet disintegration, and the distrust of Pakistani officials towards US motives.[15] Any US policy towards Afghanistan was not going to be greeted with open arms but with a suspicious eye by the Pakistani officials. Nevertheless, Bush ordered the State Department in the evening NSC meeting of 11 September (or the Banker meeting covered above) to talk with the Pakistani leader General Musharraf whether he was with the US or the terrorists. To the pleasant surprise of Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Pakistan accepted all State Department demands made a day after 9/11.

The demands were as follows:

  1. to stop Al Qaeda members crossing the border into Pakistan;
  2. to end logistical support to Al Qaeda;
  3. to grant overflights and landing rights and access to Pakistan’s naval and air bases, as well as borders;
  4. to provide the US with immediate intelligence and immigration information;
  5. to condemn the 9/11 attacks and curb internal support for them;
  6. to stop immediately shipments of fuels to the Taliban and to stop Pakistani fighters joining the Taliban;
  7. and for Pakistan to break off all diplomatic relationships with the Taliban regime.[16]

To put it simply, Powell had asked Pakistan to help destroy the Taliban regime that it, especially its intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had reportedly worked for years to create. Bush thought highly of the State Department’s work in relation to Pakistan.

Bush was then completely ‘engaged’ and was going ‘hundred miles per hour’, and if a member of his Cabinet could not keep up, he was not interested in that member. The Pentagon, as Tenet claims, seems to have been one of the slow riders, as the President was disappointed when he learned that the Pentagon had no contingency plan for Afghanistan,[17] and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton‘s war options were ‘simple’ and not interesting. The options were as follows:

  1. former President Bill Clinton’s option of using cruise missile strikes against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan;
  2. combined missile attacks with manned bomber attacks;
  3. or missiles and manned bombers with boots on the ground.

While the first two options did not require, the last option required time to be executed because the Defense Department needed bases and overflight rights, and, once they were acquired, time to deploy Search and Rescue Teams and Special Forces; not to mention the time needed to develop diplomacy with the ‘stans’ states.[18] Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were unimpressed, describing the options privately as ‘unimaginative’ and ‘unoriginal’.[19]

Bush was not interested in the first two options, as he was not going to ‘pound sand’ like the Clinton Administration. Bush chose the third option and wanted military forces to be on the ground as soon as an effective response could be prepared by the Defense Department. Shelton wanted months, but Rumsfeld reassured Bush that the Pentagon would work around the clock to develop an appropriate plan, and develop it soon, before there was another attack on the US homeland.[20]

The Defense Department would work diligently to alter Shelton’s unimaginative military options, but the advisors could do little to change Afghanistan’s forbidding geography and history as an ‘empire killer’, a reality that ‘nagged at the President’s advisors’. 

Bush wanted to know the worst that could happen. The reply was that, firstly, the situation could get really chaotic in Afghanistan and spread to Pakistan, unleashing a whole set of ‘demons’. Pakistan’s choice, said Cheney, of being a partner with the US could lead the extremists to try to bring down Musharraf’s Government and get access to its nuclear weapons. Bush saw this as a ‘nightmare scenario’, announcing quick medicine for it: the US needed to provide Pakistan with financial and humanitarian assistance because Musharraf was truly taking a tremendous risk.[21]

Another risk was that the US could become bogged down in Afghanistan. The risk was based on the nemesis of the British Empire in the 19th century and the Soviet Union a century later: between 1839 and 1919, the British fought three wars in Afghanistan and in each of them they could not achieve their objectives; the Soviets Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 proved disastrous for the Soviets as they lost thousands of their soldiers and billions of US dollars, and eventually the approximately 10-year long Afghan intervention contributed greatly to its downfall.[22]

However, the fact that the US was playing a ‘supportive role [emphasis added]’ in Afghanistan, thanks to the Blue Sky plan by the CIA, seemed to have decreased the level of concern among the principals. According to Tenet, the strategy had the effect of killing two birds with one stone: it presented the President with the option not to fight the same unsuccessful war the Russians had done, as the plan did not ask for a traditional army but a few CIA paramilitary teams with some Special Forces that would help the Afghans, mainly the Northern Alliance, to defeat Al Qaeda. It was an Afghan war fought by the Afghans, and the US would be by their side to support them to ‘liberate’ themselves from the Taliban and Al Qaeda.[23]

Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld did not see the Northern Alliance’s weaknesses, including accusations of serious abuses of human rights during the four years (1992-1996) of the civil war in Kabul,[24] and the Northern Alliance being on the payroll of Iran and Russia, as obstacles because they had to defeat an enemy who was planning to launch further attacks. The US was at war, and consequently warfare posed ‘excruciating moral trade-offs’. Given the circumstances, the US was prepared to use every means to defend its freedom and security, and as such, it was willing to ally with, in the words of Cheney,  ‘less than savoury characters’, those whom the US in ordinary circumstances would not have accepted as its allies.[25]

As it became apparent in later NSC meetings, however, the CIA did not seem to be unanimous on the Northern Alliance. The National Counterterrorism Center was in favour of immediate and substantial aid to the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban, whereas the CIA operatives from Islamabad thought that allying with the Northern Alliance meant allying with Russia, India and Iran. These countries, especially India, were Pakistan’s mortal enemies and they had nurtured the Northern Alliance to reduce Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan.[26] If the US assisted the Northern Alliance, it would anger Pakistani officials as well as the Pashtuns from the south and hence create a civil war. Therefore, some CIA operatives from Pakistan suggested a continuing role for the Taliban in post-war Afghanistan.

The Defense leadership, particularly Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, whenever this concern was raised by the CIA, would fight against it. Rumsfeld was worried that this view by the intelligence officials from Pakistan seemed coloured by Pakistani interests, which were not necessarily identical to US ones. Rumsfeld believed that there were ways to avoid the civil war, but they could not afford to lose some 20,000 seasoned fighters of the Northern Alliance, the only advantage in an otherwise challenging fight in Afghanistan. The risk of the Pashtuns was manageable, in Rumsfeld’s opinion, as they could reach those Pashtuns in the south who were against the Taliban.[27]

In Cheney’s view, the entire argument of siding with the Northern Alliance would alienate Pakistan was ‘misguided’.[28]

Thus it was becoming clear that the Northern Alliance was becoming a core part of US strategy in the GWOT on the Afghan stage. The Taliban and many ordinary Afghans believed that the Taliban would soon ‘finish’ the Northern Alliance following the assassination of its leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud,[29] two days before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But America’s backing of the Northern Alliance was about to prove the other way around: the Northern Alliance would ‘finish’ the Taliban.      

It is worth mentioning at this point that the inclusion of the Northern Alliance also played (according to Tenet) a ‘significant role in public diplomacy’, or, in simpler terms, the propaganda aspect of the strategy for Afghanistan, as well as the broader Global War on Terror. This aspect of the strategy was again proposed by the CIA. In a later NSC meeting, held on Sunday, 23 September chaired by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice without the President, Tenet recommended that the Afghan war be cast not as Westerners against Afghans, or Westerners against Islam,[30] but as Afghans against foreigners, the Arabs, who had returned to Afghanistan and established bases. Efforts should be made to make it clear to the Afghans that the US was not in Afghanistan to establish bases there, and it was important to push the Afghan tribes to fight. The CIA experts had been aware of the ten years of failed Soviet attempts, so the general rule was to study what the Soviets had done and do the opposite.[31] 

Bush later approved Tenet’s recommendation and the war was cast as Afghans (with the support of America) against foreigners, ‘the Arabs’, who used Afghanistan as ‘a terrorist base’.[32]

It is equally vital to mention that Tenet proposed a political plan for Afghanistan in the same NSC meeting of 23 September, and Bush later approved it by giving the task to the State Department to execute it, which it did, resulting in the 2001 Bonn Conference that chose Hamid Karzai as the Chairman of the Interim Administration, which also included women. The plan asked for bringing in the former Afghan King, Zahir Shah, in the process, as it would strengthen America’s campaign and provide for a future political process.[33] 

The risk of America being bogged down in Afghanistan, however, facilitated the discussion for the Defense Department in the Camp David meeting to argue its famous ‘Iraq argument’: in case the US was bogged down in Afghanistan, should they go for other terrorist-sponsored states, such as Iraq, which were more achievable.[34] This way, success was more possible and it would maintain national and international support. Moreover, Afghanistan did not have many valuable targets, whereas Iraq had the kind of targets upon which the US could inflict ‘the costly damage’ that would cause other terrorist-supporting nations to change their behaviour.[35]

The Iraq inclusion would have put the Defense Department in the centre of policymaking, as, previous to the 9/11 attacks, the Pentagon had been working for months on developing a plan for Iraq (as the CIA had been doing for Afghanistan), which the administration believed to have been bent on ‘acquiring and using [weapons of mass destruction]’ on America. Every one of the NSC advisors knew the enemy was terrorism and states that harboured terrorism, but the question for the Defense Department was which states to include, and, most importantly, how to define terrorism. Rumsfeld, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Wolfowitz, Cheney, and, according to Feith, Rice believed terrorism was not just Al Qaeda and its operatives in Afghanistan, nor could terrorism be defeated if the US eliminated Osama Bin Laden and shut his safe haven in Afghanistan, as his men would shift to other countries. Thus the enemy in the eyes of Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith was worldwide, compromising of both terrorists, especially Al Qaeda and Islamist jihadists, and other groups and states that supported them to inflict serious harm against US interests – including those rogue states that were involved one way or another in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as Libya, Iraq and Iran. Striking a blow against terrorism meant striking a blow against those countries that sponsored terrorism. Iraq was one of them. Rumsfeld, like Wolfowitz, was specifically in favour of including Iraq with Afghanistan in the first stage of the campaign.[36]

At Camp David, however, Rumsfeld himself did not ask for the inclusion of Iraq, but his influential deputy, Wolfowitz, did. His request was so ‘persistent’ and ‘distracting’ that Bush had to quieten him, adding that Bush only wanted to hear the principals’ views, not their deputies.[37]

Bush said to his advisors that there was enough discussion on Iraq in the morning session, so in the afternoon session he wanted to hear the views of his principals on Afghanistan only.

Conclusion

So far, we have heard the views of President Bush’s top advisors on the scope of the enemy, whether to include Iraq in the initial wave, whether it was a wise decision to intervene in Afghanistan known as the ‘graveyard of empires’, whether to act unilaterally or multilaterally, the ‘Pakistan problem’, and whether to incorporate the Northern Alliance as part of the war plan. We have also seen which department’s war plan captured the President’s attention. In Part II, the discussion is primarily focused on Afghanistan, including whether the US to act unilaterally or multilaterally.

References

‘American Manhunt: Osama bin Laden’, Netflix, 14 May 2025.

Bearden, Milton, ‘Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-empires>.

Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers.

Bush, George W. (2001). Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. [The White House]. <http://georgewbushwhite.accessed,archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

Bush, George W, ‘President’s Message for Ramadan’, 15 November 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011115-14.html>.

Bush, George W, ‘President Rallies Troops at Travis Air Force Base’, The White House, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-20.html>.

Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition.

Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: Its Application, Its Limitations, and Its Strengths’, 2018, Political Reflection Magazine, 4(5): 36-46.

Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Foreign Policy Decision Making Approaches and Their Applications: Case Study: Bush, Obama and Trump’s Decision Making towards Afghanistan and the Region, The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development, summer 2019, <https://www.academia.edu/39978817/The_Foreign_Policy_Decision_Making_Approaches_and_Their_Applications_Case_Study_Bush_Obama_and_Trump_s_Decision_Making_towards_Afghanistan_and_the_Region>.

Dorani, Sharifullah. 2022.  The Lone Leopard. S&M Publishing House.

Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>.

Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The milieu in which the Bush Administration made the decision to intervene in Afghanistan: the ‘fear’ of another 9/11’, CEPSAF, 23 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-milieu-in-which-the-bush-administration-made-the-decision-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-the-fear-of-another-9-11/>.

Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper.

Gall, Sandy. 2022. Afghan Napoleon. Haus Publishing.

Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>.

Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub.

Jalalzai, Freshta, ‘The Complex Legacy of Ahmad Shah Massoud’, The Diplomate, 9 September 2024.

Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-pleffler/september-11-in-retrospect>.

Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking.

Obama, Barack, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001,

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.

O’Hanlon, Michael E., ‘Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58022/michael-e-ohanlon/a-flawed-masterpiece>.

Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster.

Riedel, Bruce, ‘9/11 and Iraq: ‘The making of a tragedy’, Brookings, 17 September 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/9-11-and-iraq-the-making-of-a-tragedy/>.

Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel.

Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press.

Snyder, C. Richard, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. 1962. Foreign policy decision-making. The Free Press of Glencoe.

Stewart, Rory, Afghanistan: The Great Games, BBC, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_m7uL4Q44ws>.

Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher.

‘The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days’, The White House, 11 September 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html#:~:text=%2D%2DPresident%20George%20W.,-Bush%2C%2011/15&text=The%20United%20States%20is%20a,and%20called%20for%20national%20reconciliation.>.

‘The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days’, US Department of State, 11 December 2001, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm#:~:text=The%20world%20has%20responded%20with,driving%20the%20Taliban%20from%20power.>.

Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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[1] For the Foreign Policy Decision Making Approach, see Snyder, C. Richard, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. 1962. Foreign policy decision-making. The Free Press of Glencoe; Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press; Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Pub; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Foreign Policy Decision Making Approaches and Their Applications: Case Study: Bush, Obama and Trump’s Decision Making towards Afghanistan and the Region, The Rest: Journal of Politics and development, summer 2019, <https://www.academia.edu/39978817/The_Foreign_Policy_Decision_Making_Approaches_and_Their_Applications_Case_Study_Bush_Obama_and_Trump_s_Decision_Making_towards_Afghanistan_and_the_Region>.

[2] For the bureaucratic politics model, see Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: Its Application, Its Limitations, and Its Strengths’, 2018, Political Reflection Magazine, 4(5): 36-46.

[3] For the doctrines and declaration of war, see Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/.>.

[4] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 346; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, p. 261; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 41.

[5] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>;Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 26-27; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 255-256, 259.

[6] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>;Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 26-27; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 255-256, 259.

[7] Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 262-263; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 346; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 32.

[8] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[9] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>;Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 26-27; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 255-256, 259.

[10] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, p. 315.

[11] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 213, 261, 268-271; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, 48, 76-77.

[12] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 269-272; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 51, 76-77.

[13] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 53.

[14] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 273-274; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 66-67; Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>.

[15] Bearden, Milton, ‘Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-empires>; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 397; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 59; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 212, 262-263.

[16] Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 88-89; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 63.

[17] Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, p. 270.

[18] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, pp. 188-189; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 79-80.

[19] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 332; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 359; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 84.

[20] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 359.

[21] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 189; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 82.

[22] Stewart, Rory, Afghanistan: The Great Games, BBC, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_m7uL4Q44ws>; O’Hanlon, Michael E., ‘Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58022/michael-e-ohanlon/a-flawed-masterpiece>; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 187; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 371-377, 683; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 347; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 53.

[23] O’Hanlon, Michael E., ‘Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58022/michael-e-ohanlon/a-flawed-masterpiece>; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 187; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 371-377, 683; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 347; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 53.

[24] Dorani, Sharifullah. 2022. The Lone Leopard. S&M Publishing House. The novel covers the recent history of Afghanistan, including the Civil War of the 1999s. 

[25] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 35, 343; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 372; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 187; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 53.

[26] Bearden, Milton, ‘Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-empires>; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 213-214.

[27] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 371, 376.

[28] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 340.

[29] For a biography of Ahmad Shah Massoud, see Gall, Sandy. 2022. Afghan Napoleon. Haus Publishing; Jalalzai, Freshta, ‘The Complex Legacy of Ahmad Shah Massoud’, The Diplomate, 9 September 2024.

[30] The Bush Administration made efforts to ensure its GWOT strategy was not interpreted as a war against the religion of Islam. In his message for Ramadan, Bush said,  “The Islam that we know is a faith devoted to the worship of one God, as revealed through The Holy Qu’ran. It teaches the value and importance of charity, mercy, and peace’ (Bush, George W, ‘President’s Message for Ramadan’, 15 November 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011115-14.html>). In another message, the President stated: ‘The United States is a nation of religious freedom, and the President has acted to ensure that the world’s Muslims — from Dearborn, Michigan to Kabul, Afghanistan — know that America appreciates and celebrates the rich traditions of Islam’ (‘The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days’, The White House, 11 September 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html#:~:text=%2D%2DPresident%20George%20W.,-Bush%2C%2011/15&text=The%20United%20States%20is%20a,and%20called%20for%20national%20reconciliation.>).

[31] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 115, 122, 128; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 92.

[32] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 115, 122, 128; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 92.

[33] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 122, 128.

[34] Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster, p. 86; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, p. 126.

[35] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 4, 15, 18-21, 66-67; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 332; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 57-58, 65; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 48-49, 83, 88; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 346; Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-pleffler/september-11-in-retrospect>; Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster, p. 86; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 189; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 189.

[36] Feith, Douglas J., 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 4, 15, 18-21, 66-67; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 332; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 57-58, 65; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 48-49, 83, 88; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 346; Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-pleffler/september-11-in-retrospect>; Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster, p. 86; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 189; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 189.

[37] Rice, Condoleezza. 2011. No higher honour: a memoir of my years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster, p. 86; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 85; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 65.

*Dr Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.

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