By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
This article focuses on the role of domestic factors as a causal factor in the making of the George W Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) strategy that started in Afghanistan. As such, the impact of the American public, American media and Congress on policymaking for the GWOT in Afghanistan is studied. The article ends with a short conclusion.
The impact of the American Public, media and Congress on policymaking for the decision to invade Afghanistan
‘George, find the bastards who did this and kill them.’Looking square into his eyes, a firefighter at Ground Zero, who lost many of his colleagues, pleaded with President Bush.[1]Calling him by his first name, asserted Bush, was a personal message from an electorate to its president. As he shook hands with others at Ground Zero, where he had gone to visit a few days after 9/11, he started to hear more pleadings: ‘Do not let me down!’; ‘Whatever it takes!’[2] There was understandably a ‘bloodlust for revenge’.[3]
That day had a profound impact on Bush as he went through a variety of emotions: seeing the piles of the Twin Towers, he was totally shocked; incredibly proud when seeing firefighters and other volunteer citizens assisting their fellow countrymen around the clock; overwhelmed by the warmth he received from the New Yorkers; stunned when he witnessed how the crowd was hungry for revenge; and emotional when he met the families of those who had lost their loved ones.[4]
In response to someone from the crowd at the back that they could not hear the President, Bush declared that he could hear them, the world heard them and soon those responsible for 9/11 would hear of all American people. The crowd exploded with a roar, striking up a chant of USA, USA, USA. The unrehearsed response by Bush, coming out on the spur of the moment, made Bush feel incredible: ‘It was a release of energy I had never felt before’.[5] For Bush, ‘If it was possible to live a whole life in a single day, this was a day’.[6] This was the day he saw how determined the Americans were to carry out justice, and how clearly they wanted him to share their determination.[7]
The encounter with the ordinary Americans at Ground Zero, who wanted their commander-in-chief to do something, further emboldened Bush’s resolve.[8] It also dramatically increased the pressure on Bush and his War Cabinet to bring the perpetrators to justice ‘whatever it took’.[9] So did the 24-hour cycle of the media.
The 24-hour media made 9/11 ― the most photographed and filmed ‘violent assault in history’, and in many ways, including the loss of American lives, surpassing Pearl Harbor ―[10] much more impactful by playing over and over again the images of the plane crashing into the South Tower, desperate people jumping from the upper floors to their deaths to escape the unbearable heat inside, and most importantly, the towers collapsing one after the other.[11]
The more the broadcasters played the images, the more obliged Bush felt to act with tenacity. When the war plan was delayed by the Defense Department,[12] Bush pushed for urgency, reasoning with his War Cabinet that the entire world was watching America’s response, and most importantly, Americans had been through a shocking experience, and their patience would run out if they soon did not hear from their commander-in-chief about a war plan with a starting date to go after Al Qaeda.[13] The demands of those people he had met at Ground Zero were still on his mind, those who wanted him to bring the perpetrators to justice, when he pushed for an urgent war plan.[14]
Bush refused to accept he had been hasty; he was decisive. Bush relied on his instincts,[15] and his instincts had been telling him that soon the American people would ask: ‘What are you doing? Where’s your leadership? Where is the United States? You’re all-powerful, do something.’[16] Bush evidently had a point as in ‘a late September 2001 survey, nearly half the public (49%) said their larger concern was that the Bush administration would not strike quickly enough against the terrorists’.[17]
Bush was further forced into doing ‘something’ by his job approval rating, which jumped from 55 per cent before 9/11 to 91 per cent.[18] Bush was made aware by the White House Chief of Staff Karl Rove, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Head of Fox News, Roger Ailes, that if history was the guide, including his own father’s polling after the Gulf War, his polling support would not remain for long if the public did not see Bush act decisively and at the earliest opportunity.[19] Rumsfeld was aware of the essence of time, as, after the massacre of Americans in Beirut, American support for action against terrorists quickly waned.[20] Bush was also aware that when the approval rating dissipated with the general public, Congress would follow suit.
But in the first days of 9/11, Congress showed its extraordinary support. It was not surprising, as, according to Pew Research Centre, ‘[i]n late September 2001, ‘nearly all Republicans (96%) and a sizable majority of Democrats (78%)…approved of the way Bush was handling his job as president.’[21] Bush’s Congress Speech of 20 September, 2001, was received extremely well. The members of the Joint Houses stood and clapped almost after every sentence Bush uttered. A few days before the speech, Congress had passed a unanimous war resolution, authorising, in effect, all three Bush Doctrines and his declaration of war.[22]
Both Republicans and the Democrats as well as Congress certainly demonstrated the national mood. Ordinary Americans suddenly found their president as their saviour and hero. The abovementioned speech by Bush was watched by eighty million Americans. Sports matches were stopped in order to hear what the commander-in-chief had to say.
The overwhelming support from Congress, the general public and the media made Bush even more buoyed up, vowing to himself that from 9/11 onwards his focus would be on protecting America from terrorism and, most importantly, rooting out terror worldwide no matter how long it took (though Bush and his policymakers wanted to act soon before Bush’s approval rating was dissipated). He vowed he would change the direction of history and become a ‘transformational’ president.[23] The majority of the American public (76 per cent) was confident in the success of his mission to militarily defeat terrorism worldwide.[24]
Conclusion
In summary, a mixture of public-media-Congress pressure increasingly forced Bush to deliver justice, and to do so as soon as possible. The overwhelming public-media-Congress support, seen partly in Bush’s high approval rating, was an important variable in building up confidence levels among the policymakers, Bush in particular, to launch such a broad war on terrorism with the objective to wipe out terrorist networks from all continents of the world.
References
Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>
Dorani, Sharifullah. 2019. America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making Approaches from Bush to Obama to Trump. I.B. Tauris/Bloomsbury Publishing House,
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press,
Hartig, Hannah and Carroll Doherty, ‘Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11’, Pew Research Centre, 2 September 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>
Kellner, Douglas, ‘9/11, spectacles of terror, and media manipulation: A critique of Jihadist and Bush media politics’, Critical Discourse Studies, 15 August 2006, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17405900410001674515#:~:text=The%20September%2011%20terror%20attacks,the%20attack%20and%20its%20aftermath>
Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-s-nye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>
‘Post-ABC poll: terrorist Attacks’, 13 September 2001, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data091401.htm> ,also <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/vault.htm>
Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo,
U.S. Congress, a Joint Resolution, Authorization for Use of Military Force, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, September 14 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107sjres23cps/pdf/BILLS-107sjres23cps.pdf>
Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster.
[1] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 148.
[2] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 148.
[3] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 148.
[4] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 69.
[5] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 149.
[6] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 72.
[7] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crown publishers, p. 148; Bush, George W, National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service, 14 September 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
[8] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 55.
[9] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster p. 96.
[10] The (air) attack of Pearl Harbor was a surprise military attack by Japan on the US fleet at its naval base at Pearl Habor on Oahu, Hawaii during World War II. The attack killed thousands of Americans and damaged or destroyed a large number of US military equipment. The attack resulted in the US abandoning its neutral status and entering the war against the Axis powers: Japan, Italy and Germany.
[11] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 53; Kellner, Douglas, ‘9/11, spectacles of terror, and media manipulation: A critique of Jihadist and Bush media politics’, Critical Discourse Studies, 15 August 2006, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17405900410001674515#:~:text=The%20September%2011%20terror%20attacks,the%20attack%20and%20its%20aftermath>; Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 94.
[12] Dorani, Sharifullah. 2019. America in Afghanistan: Foreign Policy and Decision Making Approaches from Bush to Obama to Trump. I.B. Tauris/Bloomsbury Publishing House, chapter 2.
[13] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 96, 145, 150.
[14] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 145.
[15] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>
[16] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 168.
[17] Hartig, Hannah and Carroll Doherty, ‘Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11’, Pew Research Centre, 2 September 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>
[18] ‘Post-ABC poll: terrorist Attacks’, 13 September 2001, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data091401.htm> , also <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/vault.htm>
[19] Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at war. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 207.
[20] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 343.
[21] Hartig, Hannah and Carroll Doherty, ‘Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11’, Pew Research Centre, 2 September 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>
[22] Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 29; U.S. Congress, a Joint Resolution, Authorization for Use of Military Force, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, 14 September 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107sjres23cps/pdf/BILLS-107sjres23cps.pdf>; Hartig, Hannah and Carroll Doherty, ‘Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11’, Pew Research Centre, 2 September 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF, 21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>
[23] Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61740/joseph-s-nye-jr/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>
[24] Hartig, Hannah and Carroll Doherty, ‘Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11’, Pew Research Centre, 2 September 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/>
*Dr Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.
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