By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
In June, 2011, President Barack Obama made the decision to withdraw the 30,000 US troops by the end of 2012, and the rest by 2014. The decision, in effect, marked the beginning of the end of the US’s longest war, the Afghanistan War, highlighting a major turning point in US Afghan policy. According to the decision, most, if not all, US forces would leave by the end of 2014. Through President Donald Trump would make some changes to it, the decision, for most parts, set out US long-term policy for the next decade and beyond: nobody then thought that the US would prematurely exit, causing the Afghan Government to collapse.
As seen in my other articles, the surge in 2009 had three components to it: military, civilian and diplomatic. There were numerous assumptions that each pillar of the strategy carried. Most of these assumptions, however, especially those made by the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force General David Petraeus group, were doubted by the Vice-President Joe Biden group in 2009. Biden and his group in turn made their own assumptions during the Af-Pak review. The accuracy or otherwise of those assumptions was directly linked to Obama’s decision to draw down.
This article focuses on the military pillar of the surge decision by examining which sides’ military assumptions proved mistaken, and why and how.
The Military Surge
Clearing insurgent strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar took longer than US Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal had expected. Though with high costs of US lives and treasures, US forces cleared these strongholds but they held and continued to hold them. There was no prospect of building and, most importantly, transferring them to the Afghans because, as the Biden camp had assumed, the Afghan Government did not provide enough Afghan National Security Forces (and civil governance); those provided were mostly incompetent and corrupt.
Though the military surge was successful in facilitating the conditions to train 79,000 additional Afghan National Security Forces in 2010, bringing the total to 305,000, the Afghan National Security Forces ‘continued’ to have numerous ‘shortcomings’ (including, as reported, illiteracy, pervasive drug addictions, lacking skills, lacking representation, dropping out, and the Taliban’s infiltration into the security forces, who turned their guns against their Western advisors before defecting to the Taliban),[1] and many doubted their ability to take over and sustain the newly liberated strongholds without US forces. So US forces had to be present for years to ensure the Afghans built the areas cleared.[2]
As US forces launched their military campaign to clear the Taliban strongholds in the south, the insurgents, against the military’s assumption, infiltrated previously calm parts of Afghanistan, such as the north, north-east, and provinces around south and south-east of Kabul,[3] posing a significant threat to the capital and to the highways connecting the capital to the latter provinces. It was insecurity, as opposed to security, that worked like ‘ink-blots’ and spread to all parts of Afghanistan.[4]
Obama’s ‘surge and drawdown’ strategy, which demonstrated a lack of resolve from the Obama Administration, was deemed to be another impediment to the establishment of McChrystal’s objectives, especially the provision of security. It negatively affected perceptions in Afghanistan and the region, making the Afghan officials and warlords steal as much as they could because they were unsure of the future, hurting the possibility of a peace deal with the Taliban since the latter believed the US was on the verge of leaving, harming economic confidence on the grounds that investors would hardly commit to long-term investments in a country whose future security was uncertain, and, most importantly, making friends, including US military leaders in Afghanistan nervous and confused about US long-term intentions, and foes, the Pakistani Army in particular, bold and aggressive by thinking that the US would leave in July, 2011. In short, it turned every problem into a crisis, proving detrimental to reversing the sense of doom among the Afghans.[5]
In summary, the military surge was unable to preserve the Afghans from the violence perpetrated by the Taliban and others, and Karzai continued to criticise the US for failing to provide security to the Afghans.[6]
Conclusion
The military pillar of the three-track strategy was not as disappointing as the Biden camp had predicted.
The military managed to clear, though it took longer than had been assumed, the areas they had identified in 2009, but found it difficult to build (because of the lack of governance), and, most importantly, transfer to the Afghan National Security Forces. Like the civil government, the Afghan National Security Forces suffered from ‘incompetence’, corruption, and an ‘addiction to drugs’. Even though many places were clear of insurgents in the south, the insurgency spread to all corners of Afghanistan, and US forces and the Afghan National Security Forces remained as engaged in fighting as they had ever been.
On the positive side, however, the military managed to increase the number of the Afghan National Security Forces and meet the goal it had set out during the Af-Pak review. Weak and inexperienced as the Afghan National Security Forces were, they still had managed to take responsibility for the security of many population centres, such as Kabul, and numerous other large cities. Though slow and frustrating, this aspect of the military surge was working, and the Afghan National Security Forces remained the only hope (and tangible accomplishment of the surge) that they would eventually shoulder all security responsibility and allow US forces to withdraw from Afghanistan responsibly.
References
Bernard Gwetzman Interviews Max Boot. ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, the Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2010; Kilcullen, David, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>.
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Blackwill, Robert D, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan>.
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
DeYoung, Karen. ‘Without large U.S. force after 2014, Afghanistan is headed for civil war, opposition leader warns’, The Washington Post, November 17, 2011; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Feldman, Daniel, ‘Testimony Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Daniel Feldman U.S. Department of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection “Afghanistan: Right Sizing the Development Footprint”‘, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 8, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Feldman%20Testimony.pdf>.
Kagan, Frederick, Kimberly Kagan, ‘The Case for Continuing the Counterinsurgency Campaign In Afghanistan’, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, December 16, 2011, <http://www.criticalthreats.org/afghanistan/kagan-case-continuing-counterinsurgency-campaign-december-16-2011>.
Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>.
Karzai, Hamid, Full text of the Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the Russian Media. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 5, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/FulltextoftheInterviewbyPresidentHamidKarzaiwiththeRussianMedia1452012154150781553325325.pdf>.
Kerry, John F., Opening Statement, ‘Chairman Kerry Welcomes Progress In Afghanistan, Announce New Oversight Hearings,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 16, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-kerry-welcomes-progress-in-afghanistan-announces-new-oversight-hearings>.
Kerry, ‘Getting the transition right’, The Boston Globe, May 1, 2011.
Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking.
Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>.
Neumann, Ronald, Stephen Hadley and John D. Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame: How to Help Kabul Stand on Its Own’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138215/ronald-e-neumann-stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/afghan-endgame>.
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O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>.
‘One-year review is mixed on Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy’, The Washington Post, December 16, 2010.
‘One-year review is mixed on Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy’, The Washington Post, December 16, 2010.
Pentagon Says Afghan Forces Still Need Assistance’, The Washington Post, December 10, 2010.
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[1] Though Karzai and many Afghans, including the author, would disagree with most of the above descriptions of the Afghan National Security Forces : Karzai, Hamid, Full text of the Interview by President Hamid Karzai with the Russian Media. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. May 5, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/FulltextoftheInterviewbyPresidentHamidKarzaiwiththeRussianMedia1452012154150781553325325.pdf>.
[2] Obama, Barack. [2010]. Statement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review. [The White House]. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/statement-president-afghanistan-pakistan-annual-review>; Obama, ‘Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review’. [The White House]. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/overview-afghanistan-and-pakistan-annual-review>; ‘The Afghan War Review,’ The New York Times, December 16, 2010; ‘One-year review is mixed on Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy’, The Washington Post, December 16, 2010; ‘Pentagon Says Afghan Forces Still Need Assistance’, The Washington Post, December 10, 2010; Blackwill, Robert D, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan>; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 240; Kerry, John F., Opening Statement, ‘Chairman Kerry Welcomes Progress In Afghanistan, Announce New Oversight Hearings,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 16, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-kerry-welcomes-progress-in-afghanistan-announces-new-oversight-hearings>; Kerry, ‘Getting the transition right’, The Boston Globe, May 1, 2011; O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>; Feldman, Daniel, ‘Testimony Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Daniel Feldman U.S. Department of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection “Afghanistan: Right Sizing the Development Footprint”‘, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 8, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Feldman%20Testimony.pdf>; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 317; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 141-143, 246; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 340, 349; Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>; Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>.
[3] Transcript of the interview by Australian TV (SBS) with H.E. President Hamid Karzai. [Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. February 14, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/TranscriptoftheinterviewbyAustralianTVwithPresidentKarzai252201216391795553325325.pdf>; Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 22.
[4] Kagan, Frederick, Kimberly Kagan, ‘The Case for Continuing the Counterinsurgency Campaign In Afghanistan’, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, December 16, 2011, <http://www.criticalthreats.org/afghanistan/kagan-case-continuing-counterinsurgency-campaign-december-16-2011>; DeYoung, Karen. ‘Without large U.S. force after 2014, Afghanistan is headed for civil war, opposition leader warns’, The Washington Post, November 17, 2011; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 327.
[5] Neumann, Ronald E., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Bernard Gwetzman Interviews Max Boot. ‘The Road to Negotiation in Afghanistan’, the Council on Foreign Relations, October 18, 2010; Kilcullen, David, ‘Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2010, July 27, 2010, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-reconciliation-options-in-afghanistan>; Neumann, Ronald, Stephen Hadley and John D. Podesta, ‘Afghan Endgame: How to Help Kabul Stand on Its Own’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138215/ronald-e-neumann-stephen-hadley-and-john-d-podesta/afghan-endgame>;O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon> ; Biddle, Stephen, ‘Q&A with Stephen Biddle on Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, August 11, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-stephen-biddle-on-afghanistan>; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 129; Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 62; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 75; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 236.
[6] Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with CBS Correspondent Lara Logan. [Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. September 4, 2012. <http://president.gov.af/en/documents/category/interviews?page=2>.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.