By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘Did I not make myself clear about how I wanted time to evaluate McChrystal’s assessment? Or does your building just have a basic lack of respect for me?… Is it because I’m young and didn’t serve in the military? Is it because they [the military leaders] don’t like my politics…?’[1] President Obama asks Gates and Mullen after the military leaders assumingly leak information to pressure Obama to accept McChrystal’s proposal for a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan
Introduction
In the tumultuous early years of his presidency, Barack Obama faced a formidable challenge: charting a new course for the war in Afghanistan. While he envisioned himself as the chief architect of his administration’s foreign policy, a deep rift within his own team forced him into the role of a ‘referee’. On one side stood the powerful military establishment, led by General David Petraeus, who championed a costly, long-term counterinsurgency modelled on the Iraq War. On the other was Vice President Joe Biden and his allies, who argued for a more contained, counterterrorism strategy. This article examines this intense bureaucratic struggle and its profound impact on President Obama. It highlights how the clash between these contrasting visions, combined with rising domestic concerns, a fragile economy, and a wary public, created an environment in which Obama’s own policy preferences were challenged at every turn, ultimately forcing him to make a decision fraught with risk and political peril.
President Obama and the bureaucratic war between the Biden and Petraeus Camps
Unlike the Bush Junior War Cabinet, the Obama team did not have a common understanding of how to deal with the world, since its members were not all Democrats (e.g. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, National Security Advisor James Jones, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan) and most of them had limited experience in foreign policy and national security issues (especially those with military backgrounds, as well as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and CIA Director Leon Panetta). Consequently, neither were there Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld with a century of experience (see my article on bureaucratic politics within the George W Bush Administration) nor a neoconservative-type movement with an already-made ideology. This, and his upbringing overseas, gave Obama the confidence to be the main strategist, ‘the Henry Kissinger’ of his administration. ‘It was Obama’s own ideas, sometimes changing over time, that have determined America’s role in the world during his presidency.’[2] But Obama found it difficult to make the surge decision the way he desired due to the impact of bureaucratic politics, contrasting belief systems and images, and a divided public opinion.
As seen in my other article entitled, the contrasting viewpoints were shared with Obama over and over again during the extensive Af-Pak review. The Biden camp used a counterinsurgency or COIN manual written by no one but Petraeus himself, and the military camp drew on the precedent from the Iraq War to justify their contrasting assumptions.
The views of the Biden camp, however, challenged Obama’s long-held beliefs (or belief system) and images of the Afghanistan War: a necessary war for US national security, which required a ‘comprehensive strategy’ and sufficient resources in order to ‘win’.[3] In 2009, however, the President developed genuine doubts about the Afghanistan War and the suitability of a counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan, seemingly finding compelling, if not convincing, the Biden camp’s arguments (covered in detail in my other article) of ‘Afghanistan-having-minimal-relevance-to-US-national-security-interests’, ‘the-Taliban-and-Al-Qaeda-not-connected-and-Al-Qaeda-would-not-return-if-the-Takiban-tookover-Afghanistan’, ‘no-Al-Qaeda-in-Afghanistan-and-the-Taliban-were-not-US-enemy-so-what-were-US-objectives-in-solving-a-civil-war’, ‘missing-prerequisites-of-counterinsurgency-stratgey-and-thus-the-wrong-strategy’, ‘geographical-concentration-of-the-counterinsurgency-having-a-balloon-effect’, ‘three-Pakistan-related-problems’, and, to a certain extent, ‘Afghanistan-another-graveyard-another-Vietnam’.[4]
Obama’s main concern, however, was the costs. He found McChrystal’s strategy financially, strategically, humanly, and politically very costly.
Financially, if the surge was authorised, US troop numbers in Afghanistan would stand at around 100,000, costing Obama between 2010 and 2020, the duration the counterinsurgency strategy required, roughly $1 trillion, approximately the same as his health care plan. Moreover, $55 billion was needed to establish the 400,000 Afghan National Security Force and another $8 billion every year for their salaries. For Obama, such huge spending did not match up with US national security interests and could not be sustained financially. ‘I’m not doing 10 years. I’m not doing a long-term nation-building effort. I’m not spending a trillion dollars’, Obama told the military leaders.[5]
He also had to take other considerations into account, including the dire economic conditions in America. In 2009, the American economy kept contracting by 6.3 per cent at an annual rate, unemployment kept moving up each month, the stock market had dropped from 7,949 to 6,443 points a few months before the review (early March 2009), and Chrysler and General Motors slipped into bankruptcy.[6] A year before, many other big organisations had declared bankruptcy and their gloomy impact still remained in 2009.
According to the study conducted by the London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, by the end of December 2010 the US had spent $5 trillion on the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.[7] By 2009, the spending might have stood at around $4 trillion in both countries. This was nearly half of the US’s overall deficit in 2009. For the 2009 fiscal year alone, the US budget deficit increased by a record number of $1.4 trillion.[8] US indebtedness to China had increased from $78 billion in 2001 to over $1.1 trillion in 2011.
While ‘U.S. financial strength and flexibility had been seriously eroded’ by 2009, China’s financial and military capabilities had grown, endangering US supremacy in East and South-East Asia.[9] Now the military was asking for an extra $1 trillion, more than what Obama had just received for his stimulus package ─ the sum of $787 billion, the largest in history ─ from Congress. One more trillion was self-destructive, further threatening to end the US current global pre-eminence.[10]
Strategically, the counterinsurgency strategy would have caused the US to be over involved in the Middle East and Afghanistan at the cost of other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific.[11]
He equally did not want a heavy involvement in Afghanistan at the cost of domestic interests such as his health care bill or the rebuilding of America, including the recovery of the fragile US economy and reducing higher unemployment.[12]
Humanly, the war could result, as admitted by McChrystal and Petraeus, in the loss of thousands of US lives in the first years of their counterinsurgency strategy.[13] August 2009 was already the deadliest month for American soldiers, and more troops meant that Obama would write letters of condolences to many more US families whose loved ones were going to be sacrificed in Afghanistan.[14] As a person, Obama would be ‘haunted’ by yet more human toll.[15]
And politically, losing more American lives and treasure in a war, which Obama did not think would end in the foreseeable future, would have serious political repercussions. It could cost him his presidency in the 2012 presidential election (more below).
Obama did not want the counterinsurgency strategy, which required more troops and nation-building, but rather a strategy that helped improve Afghan governance, increase and improve the Afghan National Security Forces to join the fight, and provide more developmental aid.[16] Obama preferred the mission to be more Afghanised.
Obama, however, could not act in accordance with his beliefs, even if he was the decider. As explained in my other article, his decision carried risks both ways. Obama, like Shakespeare’s Hamlet, had to think deep to decide to surge or not to surge. Unsure of what to do, the President began consulting those whom he trusted. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell advised the President that neither should he listen to the left to do nothing, nor to the right to do everything. The President should take his time to figure out what decision to make, a decision that would have consequences for his remaining time in office.[17] No nation-building and no counterinsurgency strategy were General George Casey’s, the Army Chief of Staff and Marine Commandant General James Conway’s short answers.[18]
While the high-profile military men (including General James Cartwright, and the retired Douglas Lute and Karl Eikenberry) did not support McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy,[19] and so how could Obama be hopeful it was the right strategy? So what Obama did was to continue to consult experts in order to find answers to some very ‘important’ questions. In doing so, the review lingered, becoming the most protracted and extensive since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. To many, it signalled fundamental uncertainty on the part of the President.[20] Those on the right viewed Obama as ‘weak, naive and feckless’, whereas those on the left perceived him as someone who showed a disheartened ‘buyer’s remorse’.[21]
His polling fell during the period he was conducting the Af-Pak review: 45 per cent of ordinary Americans compared to 63 per cent from the previous spring, and 22 per cent of Republicans compared to 51 per cent at its peak now approved of the President’s handling of the war. His ratings on Afghanistan had dropped much more than his ratings on handling other policies, due to the shift by the Republicans, who were disappointed in Obama’s handling of the war. They, including Cheney, believed that Obama was ‘dithering’ and delaying at a time when US forces were in danger and the military leaders asked for a sense of urgency.[22]
Obama seemingly felt under tremendous pressure, especially when he was accused of putting US forces in danger by delaying the decision, or else Obama might have not used a few sentences of his speech of December 1, 2009, to tell the American public that there was no delay of troops and resources to Afghanistan.
While he seemed unwilling to accept the demands of the two sides, he could not afford to say no to any of the sides, especially to the military. Refusing the military requests outright was unwise for numerous reasons. Colonel Tien’s advice to the President explains very well one of the reasons:
‘Mr. President, ‘I don’t see how you can defy your military chain here. We kind of are where we are. Because if you tell General McChrystal, I got all this, I got your assessment, got your resource constructs, but I’ve chosen to do something else, you’re going to probably have to replace him. You can’t tell him, just do it my way, thanks for your hard work, do it my way. And then where does that stop?’[23]
Tien had a point because it was Obama, who from the very start wanted to get the Afghanistan campaign right and, therefore, approved the appointment of McChrystal to carry out the assessment. Now if Obama refused to approve his plan, the possibility was that McChrystal would resign. Since Petraeus was the overall commander and his counterinsurgency strategy was being refused by the President, he might also resign. Surely their resignations would also force Gates to follow his two commanders. (According to Gates, some in the White House worried about the military leaders and Gates ‘quitting’.)[24] Gates had promised McChrystal that he would do his best in the Situation Room (where the policy was debated in the White House) to fight the military’s case.[25] As American journalist Bob Woodward put it, this would have been very difficult for Obama to weather.[26]
Most importantly, Petraeus was not an ordinary commander. He was a war hero, who had turned a losing war into a relatively successful outcome in Iraq. He had a lot of supporters not only in the military, but also in the media and, of course, Congress. The extraordinarily hard-working Petraeus was described as another General Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘the pre-eminent soldier-scholar-statesman of his generation’, who left America ‘transformed’, ‘The Legend of Iraq’, ‘simply among the very best military leaders of his generation’, ‘a modern exemplar of the soldier-scholar-statesman and who has exerted a profound influence on the American military establishment’, and a potential future Republican rival to Obama.[27] Such was the status of the ‘clear-thinking, competitive, and politically savvy’[28] Petraeus that the President faced.
The argument in favour of Petraeus (and McChrystal) in some sections of the media was that if Petraeus (and McChrystal), after carrying out the assessment in Afghanistan authorised by Washington, thought the proposed counterinsurgency strategy was the answer in Afghanistan, why were the civilian leaders second-guessing him?[29] Gates argued that McChrystal was the most successful counterterrorism strategy practitioner in the world, yet Biden and his camp acted as if they understood the counterterrorism strategy better than McChrystal.[30]
Another reason was the Gates-Clinton factor. The two ─ who had developed ‘a very strong relationship’, and agreed with each other ‘on almost every important issue’ ─[31] headed the two giant departments responsible for making US foreign policy, and refusing them would have been politically reckless. Saying no to them and to the military would have meant that if anything went wrong in Afghanistan and Pakistan then it would have been due to the President’s stubbornness not to surge: a President who had never served in the military.
According to an advisor, McChrystal told Obama this is the option: if you support it, you win; if not, you lose.[32] In the next two or three years (when Obama would be surely running for re-election), the war could go wrong for a variety of reasons, and most of the Biden group, including the inner circle, even Obama,[33] believed that it would go wrong (or at least not much be improved) regardless of what they did or did not do in Afghanistan, but most fingers would be pointed towards Obama for having refused to surge.
In the Af-Pak review, Petraeus implied that the achievements they had made politically, financially, and in terms of security, so far in Afghanistan, however problematic they might have been, would be gradually lost if they did not apply a counterinsurgency strategy. As far as the military camp was concerned, losing Afghanistan meant losing Pakistan.[34] The question for Petraeus was: could Obama take the risk?[35] No president with common sense could take such a risk. For years, Obama had been accusing the George W Bush Administration of making a mess of the Afghanistan War through neglect, lack of resources, and a lack of strategies. Obama would certainly try to avoid such an accusation against himself.
Furthermore, for Obama, the key for any eventual drawdown was reintegration of less zealous Taliban members within the Afghan Government. But Petraeus told him it was impossible without bringing security first, an assumption supported by the intelligence, notably by Peter L Lavoy and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Dennis Blair. The only way to bring security, stop the Afghan Government from being taken over by the Taliban, and make a peace settlement with the Taliban was to apply a counterinsurgency strategy.[36] The only person who could trigger the process for the counterinsurgency strategy was Obama. If not, if Obama did not want to approve McChrystal’s requests, Gates told Obama, the President should withdraw US forces altogether because ‘[s]tanding pat, middling options, muddling through’ were alternatives that would put ‘our kids at risk’.[37]
Penultimately, there was a part of Obama’s belief system (or beliefs) that seemed to agree with the military that the Afghanistan surge could produce similar effects like it did in Iraq (at least with regard to the establishment of the Afghan National Security Forces) and so could bring US involvement to a responsible end. The last point is explained in my other article.
Finally, refusing the military and listening to the Democratic Party or the Biden group or his aides meant opening himself to the known and familiar Republican criticism that Democrats were not as aggressive about confronting US enemies as Republicans were and therefore would not deploy troops even if it was necessary.[38] CIA Director Leon Panetta privately was of the opinion that ‘[n]o Democratic President can go against military advice, especially if he asked for it’. According to him, Obama should have made the decision within a week. ‘Just do it. Do what they say’ was his recommendation if Obama asked him, but he never did.[39]
On the other hand, Obama could not equally disregard the advice he received from his political advisors and ignore the public opposition of the Democratic Party to the surge. Biden, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and Senior Advisor to the President David Axelrod constantly reminded him whether losing his base in the Democratic Party was worth it.[40] Soon he was going to launch his health care reform in Congress, which he viewed as ‘the make-or-break legislation for his administration’, and for which he required the support of ‘moderate to centrist Democrats’.[41] (For that reason, to make matters more complicated, he also needed the support of the Republican Party and could not say no to the surge.) Moreover, in three years’ time he had another presidential election that required the support of the Democratic Party. Finally, as seen in one of my other articles, he genuinely developed doubts about the counterinsurgency strategy and its suitability for Afghanistan.
This was the milieu ─ a divided America ─ Obama found himself in during the Af-Pak review!
Conclusion
Obama found himself in a Hamlet-like position, pulled between two competing camps and a divided nation. In essence, President Obama’s dilemma over the Afghanistan surge was not a simple choice between two clear strategies, but rather a complex negotiation between two powerful and conflicting belief systems within his administration. This article has shown that while Obama initially sought to be the primary architect of his foreign policy, the immense political pressure, the financial strain of the war, and the human cost made it impossible to ignore the divisions among his advisors. Faced with the risk of losing his political base, facing a defiant military establishment, or jeopardising his domestic agenda, Obama was trapped between a hard-line counterinsurgency approach and a more limited counterterrorism strategy. The result was a compromise that satisfied no one. Ultimately, the decision he made, which is explored in one of my articles, was a direct product of this bureaucratic war and the need to reconcile his own doubts with the overwhelming forces evidently arrayed against him.
References
Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009.
Balz, Dan and Jon Cohen, ‘U.S. deeply split on troop increase for Afghanistan war’, The Washington Post, October 21, 2009.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ‘From Hope to Audacity; Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-to-audacity>.
Clinton, Hillary R., Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead, ‘Secretary Of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton Testimony Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ClintonTestimony091203a1.pdf>.
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Gerson, Michael, ‘In Afghanistan, No Choice but to Try’, The Washington Post, September 4, 2009.
Graham, Lindsey, Joseph I. Lieberman and John McCain, ‘Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan’, The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2009.
Haass, Richard N., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>.
Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>.
James, Frank. ‘Won’t Measure Afghan Success By ‘Enemy Killed’: McChrystal’, npr, June 2, 2009.
Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry opening statement at hearing on Strategy For Afghanistan, September 16, 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement090916p.pdf>.
Kerry, ‘Excerpts From Senator John Kerry’s Speech on Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/excerpts-from-senator-john-kerrys-speech-on-afghanistan>.
Langer, Gary, ‘Exclusive: Obama’s Numbers Plummet on Afghanistan War Worries’, ABC News, 2009, October 21, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Politics/afghanistan-abc-news-washington-post-poll/story?id=8872471>.
Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-p-leffler/september-11-in-retrospect>.
Mackubin, Thomas Owens, ‘All in: the education of General David Petraeus’ by Broadwell, Paula, Bernon Loeb, reviewed by Mackubin Thomas Owens, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137553/paula-broadwellvernon-loeb/all-in-the-education-of-general-david-petraeus>.
Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking.
Obama, Barack, Obama’s Speech at Woodrow Wilson Center, The Council on Foreign Relations, August 1, 2007, <http://www.cfr.org/elections/obamas-speech-woodrow-wilson-center/p13974>.
Obama, Barack, (2009).REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON A NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. [The White House] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan>.
Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [The White House], 1 December 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address>.
Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking.
O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>.
‘Opening Statement’, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-on-president-obamas-national-security-team-nominations>.
Petraeus, David H., ‘Statement of General David H. Petraeus to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, December 9, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PetraeusTestimony091209a1.pdf>.
Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic.
‘Topic A: Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fight?’ The Washington Post, August 31, 2009.
‘U.S. Budget Deficit Hit Record $1.4 Trillion in 2009’, Fox News, October 07, 2009.
Woodward, Bob. ‘McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure’, The Washington Post, September 21, 2009.
Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster.
[1] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 434.
[2] Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. xx, 43; Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>
[3] Obama, Barack, Obama’s Speech at Woodrow Wilson Center, The Council on Foreign Relations, August 1, 2007, <http://www.cfr.org/elections/obamas-speech-woodrow-wilson-center/p13974>
Obama, Barack, (2009).REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON A NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. [The White House] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan>.
[4] Obama, Barack, (2009).REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON A NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.[The White House] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan>; Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [The White House], 1 December 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address>
; O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 160, 163, 167-169, 189-190, 207, 216-217, 280, 319-321; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 119-21; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 140; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 362, 557; Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009; Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry opening statement at hearing on Strategy For Afghanistan, September 16, 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement090916p.pdf>; ‘Opening Statement’, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-on-president-obamas-national-security-team-nominations>; Kerry, ‘Excerpts From Senator John Kerry’s Speech on Afghanistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/excerpts-from-senator-john-kerrys-speech-on-afghanistan>.
[5] Obama quoted in Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 251, 263, 280-281; Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009,; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 372. See also, Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, pp. 432-33.
[6] Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 117.
[7]Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 49.
[8] ‘U.S. Budget Deficit Hit Record $1.4 Trillion in 2009’, Fox News, October 07, 2009.
[9] Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-p-leffler/september-11-in-retrospect>
[10] Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [The White House], 1 December 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ‘From Hope to Audacity; Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-to-audacity>.
[11] Haass, Richard N., ‘Hearing on Afghanistan: What is an Acceptable End-State, and How Do We Get There?’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 3, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistan-what-is-an-acceptable-end-state-and-how-do-we-get-there>; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 167-168, 280; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 86;Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 50.
[12] Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [The White House], 1 December 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address>.
[13] Petraeus, David H., ‘Statement of General David H. Petraeus to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, December 9, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PetraeusTestimony091209a1.pdf>; Clinton, Hillary R., Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead, ‘Secretary Of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ClintonTestimony091203a1.pdf>; James, Frank. ‘Won’t Measure Afghan Success By ‘Enemy Killed’: McChrystal’, npr, June 2, 2009.
[14]Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry opening statement at hearing on Strategy For Afghanistan, September 16, 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement090916p.pdf> ; Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [The White House], 1 December 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address
[15] Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009.
[16]Woodward, Bob. ‘McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure’, The Washington Post, September 21, 2009.
[17] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 175, 311.
[18] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 258-260.
[19] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p.438.
[20] O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 73.
[21] Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 3.
[22] Langer, Gary, ‘Exclusive: Obama’s Numbers Plummet on Afghanistan War Worries’, ABC News, 2009, October 21, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Politics/ afghanistan-abc-news-washington-post-poll/story?id=8872471>; Balz, Dan and Jon Cohen, ‘U.S. deeply split on troop increase for Afghanistan war’, The Washington Post, October 21, 2009.
[23] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 319.
[24] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 352, 369.
[25] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 319-320.
[26] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 320.
[27] Mackubin, Thomas Owens, ‘All in: the education of General David Petraeus’ by Broadwell, Paula, Bernon Loeb, reviewed by Mackubin Thomas Owens, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137553/paula-broadwellvernon-loeb/all-in-the-education-of-general-david-petraeus>‘Opening Statement’, ‘Kerry on President Obama’s National Security Team Nominations,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-on-president-obamas-national-security-team-nominations>; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, 15-17.
[28] Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 133.
[29] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 231.
[30] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 364.
[31] Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 25; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 283.
[32] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 320-321.
[33] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 321.
[34]Gerson, Michael, ‘In Afghanistan, No Choice but to Try’, The Washington Post, September 4, 2009 ; Graham, Lindsey, Joseph I. Lieberman and John McCain, ‘Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan’, The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2009; ‘Topic A: Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fight?’ The Washington Post, August 31, 2009.
[35] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 191.
[36] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 162, 229-230, 242-243.
[37] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 375.
[38] Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 52.
[39] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 247.
[40] Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 118.
[41] Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, p. 75.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.