By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘Tension between the White House staffers and the Pentagon got worse, with NSC staff feeling stonewalled when it came to getting information in a timely fashion and Gates quietly fuming over what he considered to be the NSC’s constant micromanagement. The bad blood even spilled over into relationships within departments.’ [1] President Obama writes about the surge decision
Introduction
President Barack Obama’s policymaking team for the decision to surge (and, in most cases, for the decision to withdraw) US troops in Afghanistan could be divided into five: the Vice-President, ‘the inner circle’, ‘the outsiders’, the General David Petraeus camp, and the President himself. Each, and its influence on the decision to surge, are considered as part of my analysis.
In foreign policy decision-making, the role of a president’s inner circle is often as consequential as that of the cabinet and formal advisors. During his presidency, Barack Obama created an influential ‘inner circle’—a close-knit team of trusted aides who shared his political and ideological sensibilities. This article will examine the pivotal role of this inner circle in shaping the Obama administration’s approach to the war in Afghanistan, specifically their influence on the decisions to surge and withdraw US troops.
Drawing a clear distinction between these insiders and the more traditional ‘outsiders’ of the administration, this analysis will reveal how the inner circle’s unique access, shared background, and deep-seated loyalty allowed them to become a powerful force in a highly centralised White House. Despite facing a powerful and at times adversarial military establishment, the inner circle consistently worked to protect the President’s vision, control the narrative, and ensure that his strategic priorities remained at the forefront of the debate.
By exploring their actions during the critical Af-Pak review and beyond, this article argues that the inner circle’s influence, while not absolute, was critical in navigating a complex policy landscape and ultimately steering the administration toward its preferred course of action in the long-running conflict.
The Inner Circle
Like President John Kennedy, who had ‘set up a little state department’ in the White House,[2] Obama established his own foreign policy team made up of his inner circle. Generally speaking, the members of the inner circle were those who helped Obama during the 2008 election, and Obama appointed them around him, either in the White House or in the National Security Council (NSC).
They shared many characteristics with Obama, including age (relatively young and consequently seeing themselves as a ‘new generation’ in foreign policy ), work experience (none worked previously in the main executive branches of the government, but on foreign policy in academia or Congress, e.g. Chief of Staff Denis McDonough and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes), and opposition to the Iraq War before it began.[3] Most of them were old friends and helped each other to get a position in the Obama team during the presidential campaign and later in the administration. McDonough, National Security Council Chief of Staff Denis Mark W. Lippert, Rhodes and Senior Advisor to the President David Axelrod were among those with whom Obama spent plenty of time.
After and before a meeting with his Cabinet-level advisors, such as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates or National Security Advisor James Jones, and after the morning intelligence briefings in which some of the inner circle were present, too, Obama would ask for McDonough, Lippert and Rhodes’s views on the topics he had already discussed or topics he was likely to discuss. At times, Obama would even discuss with them the options he had in mind for a final decision. While ultimate decisions were made by Obama, including the decision to surge (and the decision to withdraw), they helped him reach those decisions. In effect, the inner circle was ‘an extension of the President himself, the Chief Obamian’, and accordingly wielded enormous power in the making of foreign policy .[4]
Like many of his predecessors, including Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bush Junior, Obama centralised policymaking within the White House. Obama’s White House not only tightly controlled every aspect of national security policy, but also interfered in operational details: for example, Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Afghanistan-Pakistan Douglas E. Lute Lute would continue to monitor the strategy in Afghanistan. But unlike Bush Junior, Obama’s ‘rational’ approach required decisions to be made on the basis of ‘information’ not ‘emotions’.[5]
Obama preferred to have a deliberate and highly analytical process in which all contrasting views and options were analysed, and hence the President invited not only his immediate advisors to the decision-making, but also career diplomats and experts to directly confront their policy suggestions, disagreements, and, at times, themselves in front of the President. Obama did not want to repeat the disorderly decision-making process of President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 and Bush Junior in 2002-3, in which both presidents failed to examine the reasoning, judge the consequences, and discuss the alternatives.
But to the frustration of the President and his inner circle, Obama’s ‘multiple advocacy’ approach to policymaking led to policy being debated in the media and Congress. Petraeus’s interview in Gerson’s article, McChrystal’s speech in London, Mullen’s statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the leaking of some highly classified documents ─ in all of which the military leaders publicly supported a counterinsurgency strategy, asked for resolve, and shunned Biden’s proposed counterterrorism-plus-strategy as unworkable ─ are examples that made the inner circle and the President furious.[6] (Obama was frustrated with the argumenet that the US needed to send more troops to show resolve, as it could mean ‘doubling down on bad decisions’ the US already had made.[7])
The inner circle did their best to protect the President. McDonough and Donilon on a number of occasions contacted either Colonel Erik Gunhus, Petraeus’s spokesman, or Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon spokesman, to complain that resources and strategies were something the President decided, and he was willing to debate them with the military leaders, but it was wrong of the military leaders to publicly lobby for a strategy by giving interviews or leaking documents (e.g. McChrystal’s assessment) while Obama was conducting a review to discuss the strategy. It was an attempt, they added, to force the President to approve the proposed counterinsurgency strategy. Obama had to have a meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen and Petraeus to tell them that he believed the military leaders conducted a subtle campaign in public in order to ‘jam him’, adding that he felt ‘disrespected’, ‘trapped’ and ‘boxed-in’.[8] The military leaders did have the right to give Obama military advice, but by giving it publicly they undermined Obama’s authority over the military.[9]
The State Department and the military leaders, on the other hand, complained that the White House (the inner circle, in another word) launched a subtle campaign against the proposed counterinsurgency strategy and leaked documents to weaken the case for more troops. They gave the leaking of Eikenberry’s cables as an example. The military leaders were not happy with the cables (written without consultation with McChrystal) being requested by the White House.[10]
Despite assurances from Gates, US Commander in Afghanistan Stanley McChrystal and Petraeus that they would keep their views within the Cabinet and the Pentagon,[11] the military continued with its campaign up to the end of the Af-Pak review and even beyond,[12] as Petraeus found other ways (through hawkish Senators and pro-military experts) to communicate his messages.[13] This ‘adversarial’[14] nature of policymaking undermined the entire decision-making process. It turned most attention towards the military aspect of the strategy, failing to discuss in detail the political, diplomatic and civilian part of the strategy. It did not serve the President as it prejudged Obama’s decision, forcing Obama to reach for a compromise. According to Gates, the NSC staff could have acted as an ‘honest broker’, but, due to the damaging rift, they defended one group against the other and failed to remain neutral.[15]
Even though the inner circle and the Biden camp were close to Obama and found their views compatible with those of the President, they (and the President) could not influence the decision entirely in their favour because they faced a very powerful camp: the military. But the military camp’s power demonised once their policy assumptions (covered in one of my articles) failed in Afghanistan and Petraeus was moved to the CIA.
Conclusion
The Obama administration’s policy-making on Afghanistan demonstrates that the President’s ‘inner circle’ played a crucial role in shaping the final strategy. This small, trusted group—comprised of long-time political aides who shared Obama’s scepticism toward open-ended military commitments—functioned as the President’s ideological and political defence system within a centralised White House.
Their primary contribution was not necessarily winning the initial ‘surge’ debate—where they were ultimately forced into a compromise by the formidable influence of the military camp (Petraeus, Gates, etc.). Instead, their role was to ensure that the President’s priorities of limiting duration and forcing an exit strategy remained central to the debate, thereby preventing the military from imposing an endless war.
Despite the adversarial nature of the ‘Af-Pak’ review, the inner circle’s constant pressure protected the President’s Authority: By actively challenging the military’s public lobbying, they ensured the final decision was seen as the President’s own, not one imposed on him. They also successfully incorporated the July 2011 withdrawal date and a limited scope into the final order, acting as the force behind the ‘escalate-then-exit’ strategy.
Ultimately, the inner circle’s limited success during the surge decision grew into full control over the later withdrawal decision in 2011, especially once the military’s influence diminished. Their impact confirms that in a centralised presidency, a small group of trusted political advisors, acting as an ‘extension of the President’, can wield immense power, particularly in protecting the leader’s long-term political and strategic vision against powerful institutional pressures.
References
Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ‘From Hope to Audacity; Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-to-audacity>.
Desch, Michael C., ‘Obama and His General; Should McChrystal Solute and Obey?’, Foreign Affairs, October 27, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general>.
Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Hastings, Michael, ‘The Rolling Stone profile of Stanley McChrystal that changed history’, The Rolling Stone, June 22, 2010.
Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>.
Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>.
Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking.
McChrystal’s Speech in International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009.
McGurk, Brett, ‘Agreeing on Afghanistan: Why the Obama Administration Chose Consensus This Time’, CNN, June 22, 2011, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/22/agreeing-on-afghanistan/>.
Obama, Barack , Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech, July 27, 2004,<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/convention2004/barackobama2004dnc.htm>.
Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking.
Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June), 2011, pp. 244-262, p. 245, <http://www.marioguerrero.info/326/Pffiner2011.pdf>.
Rosenberg, Matthew, Peter Spiegel, ‘Top U.S. General Under Fire; Afghan War Strategist McChrystal Summoned to Explain Magazine Comments’, The Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2010.
Tyson, Ann Scott. ‘Mullen: More Troops ‘Probably’ Needed’, The Washington Post, September 16, 2009.
Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster
[1] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 438.
[2] Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June), 2011, pp. 244-262, p. 245, <http://www.marioguerrero.info/326/Pffiner2011.pdf>.
[3] Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. xxi, 46, 68-69, 71, 75, 132-134; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 587; Obama, Barack , Democratic National Convention Keynote Speech, July 27, 2004,
<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/convention2004/barackobama2004dnc.htm>.
[4] Hirsh, Michael, ‘The Clinton Legacy’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139110/michael-hirsh/the-clinton-legacy>; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, ‘From Hope to Audacity; Appraising Obama’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65720/zbigniew-brzezinski/from-hope-to-audacity>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 384-385; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. xx-xxi, 82-83, 141-143, 211.
[5]Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June), 2011, p. 249; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 289, 566, 585-586.
[6] McGurk, Brett, ‘Agreeing on Afghanistan: Why the Obama Administration Chose Consensus This Time’, CNN, June 22, 2011, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/22/agreeing-on-afghanistan/>; Desch, Michael C., ‘Obama and His General; Should McChrystal Solute and Obey?’, Foreign Affairs, October 27, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general>; Kaplan, Fred, ‘The End of the Age of Petraeus; The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 157-159, 173-177, 197; Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009; Tyson, Ann Scott. ‘Mullen: More Troops ‘Probably’ Needed’, The Washington Post, September 16, 2009; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 367-370; Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June), 2011; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. 135-36; Dodge, Toby, and Nicholas Redman. 2011. Afghanistan: to 2015 and beyond, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 61; McChrystal’s Speech in International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009;
[7] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p.438.
[8]Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 172-175, 197; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. 135-136; Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 368-369. According to Gates, some in the White House characterised the military leaders as ‘insubordinate’ and ‘in revolt’ and thus turning the atmosphere even more ‘poisonous’, Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 377.
[9] Desch, Michael C., ‘Obama and His General; Should McChrystal Solute and Obey?’, Foreign Affairs, October 27, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general>.
[10] Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009,; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 157; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 370; Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, pp.435.
[11] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 368.
[12] Rosenberg, Matthew, Peter Spiegel, ‘Top U.S. General Under Fire; Afghan War Strategist McChrystal Summoned to Explain Magazine Comments’, The Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2010; Hastings, Michael, ‘The Rolling Stone profile of Stanley McChrystal that changed history’, The Rolling Stone, June 22, 2010; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 384-85, 557.
[13] Desch, Michael C., ‘Obama and His General; Should McChrystal Solute and Obey?’, Foreign Affairs, October 27, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general>; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 159, 194, 206.
[14] McGurk, Brett, ‘Agreeing on Afghanistan: Why the Obama Administration Chose Consensus This Time’, CNN, June 22, 2011, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/22/agreeing-on-afghanistan/>.
[15] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 384-388.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.