By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘After reading McChrystal’s sixty-six-page assessment, I shared Joe’s skepticism. As far as I could tell, there was no clear exit strategy; under McChrystal’s plan, it would take five to six years just to get U.S. troop numbers back down to what they were now. The costs were staggering, at least £1 trillion for every thousand additional troops deployed. Our men and women in uniform, some on their fourth or fifth tours after close to a decade of war, would face an even greater toll. And given the resilience of the Taliban and the dysfunction of Karzai’s government, there was no guarantee of success.’ [1] President Obama
Introduction
The high-stakes 2009 debate over US strategy in Afghanistan was a clash not only of policies but of fundamental beliefs. As the Obama Administration undertook its comprehensive Af-Pak review, two primary factions emerged: one championed by Vice President Joe Biden and the other by General David Petraeus. While my other articles have explored their opposing arguments in detail, this essay delves deeper to uncover the conflicting and shared assumptions that underpinned their respective proposals.
The choices made during this period were driven by more than just data and military doctrine; they were rooted in deeply held convictions about the nature of the conflict, the players involved, and the potential for a successful outcome. This article analyses these assumptions, organising them into two key sections: those that were a source of significant disagreement between the two camps and those that were surprisingly shared, revealing a more nuanced picture of the strategic deliberations. By examining these underlying assumptions, we can better understand the core disagreements that defined one of the most consequential foreign policy reviews in recent American history.
To avoid repetition, however, the underlying reasons or grounds for most of the assumptions are excluded since they have already been discussed in my articles mentioned above.[2]
The conflicting assumptions
First, the Biden camp assumed that most empires failed in Afghanistan, so the US would be likely to follow suit. As Afghanistan had become a Vietnam for the Soviet Union, it was further assumed, Afghanistan would equally become another Vietnam for the US. However, the military leaders and their supporters did not assume that the US would meet the same fate as the Soviets because, unlike the Soviet Union, the US enjoyed the support of the majority of Afghans and the US would employ a counterinsurgency strategy to protect Afghans but the Soviet soldiers were killing Afghans. They equally rebutted the Vietnam assumption, as they had done in relation to Iraq.
Second, a counterinsurgency strategy, according to its manual, required certain conditions ─ including a reliable government, sufficient security forces, secure borders, one counter-insurgent for fifty Afghans, a 14-year duration, and a suitable environment ─ to be in place before the strategy was effective, but these conditions, as explained in one of my articles, were absent in Afghanistan and hence the chances of success were minimal. The military leadership acknowledged the shortcomings, but assumed that it did not matter greatly because their proposed counterinsurgency strategy would, like Iraq, establish security (of Afghans against all threats) and the shortcomings would be remedied.
Third, there were numerous assumptions regarding Pakistan: firstly, the proposed counterinsurgency strategy did not extend beyond the Afghanistan borders into the safe haven in Pakistan, so it was assumed by the Biden camp that the US would not win regardless of how many troops they deployed to Afghanistan. The military leaders admitted that the Pakistani safe havens were a problem, but they assumed that the counterinsurgency strategy would provide the Afghan people with security and other basic needs, and therefore the Afghans would naturally side with their government, causing the camps in Pakistan to become irrelevant; secondly, for the Biden group, Pakistan was assumed to hold the key to ending the conflict in Afghanistan, and since the surge would further undermine Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and the region, Pakistan would create obstacles to undermine the proposed counterinsurgency strategy. The military did not assume that Pakistan held the key to the Afghan conflict, and if the US established security, Pakistan’s role would be minimised. Moreover, Pakistan and the US were assumed to have shared the same interests and enemy in the region; thirdly, the US footprint in Afghanistan was assumed to be feeding insecurity in Pakistan, and, by applying a counterinsurgency strategy, it might make it worse. The US presence in Afghanistan was, on the contrary, assumed by the military to be helping Pakistan’s security and stability. These were the numerous assumptions relating to Pakistan.
Fourth, the Biden camp did not assume that the Taliban would pose a danger to the US and hence did not classify it as an enemy; and there was no need to defeat them (assumed to be too ambitious, unachievable, and an unnecessary goal as far as US interests were concerned in Afghanistan). Consequently, Afghanistan was not as important as the military made it appear, and thus a counterterrorism-plus-strategy would suffice in order to hunt terrorism and (a less ambitious goal) disrupt the Taliban. For the military, both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were assumed to pose threats to US interests and both were one enemy, and both needed to be defeated. The two camps also had contrasting assumptions regarding the Taliban reconciliation: the Biden camp assumed that it was possible to make peace with the Taliban even if they applied a counterterrorism-plus-strategy, but the military contended it was only plausible to reconcile themselves with the Taliban when the US had an upper hand in the fight; something that they did not have during the Af-Pak review, and could only be achieved by a counterinsurgency strategy.
Fifth, hard though it might be, the Biden camp did not assume a US retreat from Afghanistan to be strategically detrimental to US interests. The military, however, assumed that if the US retreated (which they called ‘defeat’), it would have severe consequences: a significant rise in global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and drug production; significant damage to US (and the UN and NATO) future power and prestige; and a possible disintegration of NATO.
Sixth, it was assumed that Congress (and the American public in general) was turning against the war, and if the American casualties and US spending went up in a war without an end, Congress would terminate funding. The military assumed it did not matter if Congress was turning against the war, as their planned counterinsurgency strategy was assumed to be successful in Afghanistan, and once the military showed success, Congress would change its mind and support the war. It was the case with the Iraq War, too, before the surge, but many Senators changed their minds.
Seventh, major risks emanated from corrupt governance, not from lack of security, US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry assumed.[3] But the military leaders assumed that major risks emanated from lack of security, not corrupt governance.
Eighth, it was assumed by the military that the surge would work like ‘ink-blots’ that would expand across the map of Afghanistan, but the Biden camp did not buy this assumption.[4] Instead the Biden camp assumed that insurgency would expand to those parts of Afghanistan that were peaceful during the Af-Pak review.
Ninth, after the announcement of the surge, the limit on the duration of the military engagement (the caveat) was assumed to allow them to accelerate the transfer part of the strategy, because it would give all sides (the Afghan Government and the Americans) a sense of urgency.[5] The military supporters, however, assumed the caveat would prove detrimental to the surge as friends and foes would think that the US would leave again before it secured a stable Afghan Government with competent security forces.[6]
Assumptions that neither group showed opposition to
Firstly, it was assumed that Pakistan might stop cooperation, or worst of all, its weak government might collapse if the US applied more pressure on Pakistan.[7]
Secondly, Afghanistan never had an effective central government to provide governance in the rural parts,[8] and the Bush Administration’s objective for such a government was mistaken. By focusing on a central government, the US ignored the rural population, who were the centre of the Taliban’s focus. Therefore, the new strategy would support, in addition to key governmental institutions, Afghan traditional and conservative networks or structures at tribal or community levels in order to provide some form of (decentralised) governance to rural Afghanistan.[9]
Thirdly, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was presumed to be one of the main causes of the problems (including corruption) in Afghanistan, and President George W Bush’s close relation with Karzai was one of the reasons that other US policymakers could not pressurise Karzai to bring meaningful reforms, as no one else from the US Government had any real leverage or could speak with authority. It was seemingly assumed that Karzai had the power and the capacity, but not the willingness to introduce meaningful reforms, including curbing corruption. The policymakers, especially Biden and NSA James Jones, assumed that changing the nature of the relationship (Obama being less accessible, firm and even harsher) would force Karzai to bring reforms.[10]
Fourthly, the diplomatic aspect of the surge, as assumed by the State Department, would enable the State Department to work with NATO as well as Russia, China, India and other Muslim countries to develop a regional solution whereby neighbours, especially Pakistan, focused on economic integration and cooperation.[11]
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Af-Pak review and the subsequent troop surge were not the result of a single, unified strategy, but rather a complex and often contradictory set of policies born from fundamentally opposing assumptions held by the Biden camp and military leaders. These conflicting views extended to every critical aspect of the conflict, from the likelihood of a Vietnam-style failure and the viability of a counterinsurgency strategy, to the true nature of the Taliban threat and the pivotal role of Pakistan. While both sides acknowledged certain shared challenges, their differing beliefs about the war’s ultimate goals, the necessary level of force, and the strategic implications of withdrawal created a deep divide. This clash of assumptions, which proved far more significant than any disagreement over tactical details, meant that the final policy was a fragile compromise.
References
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Clinton, Hillary R., Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead, ‘Secretary Of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ClintonTestimony091203a1.pdf>.
Christophe, Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement with Pakistan Can – And Can’t – Do’, Foreign Affairs, October 12, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136413/christophe-jaffrelot/what-engagement-with-pakistan-can-and-cant-do>.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Obama’s Orders for Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategy of November 29, 2009, in Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster.
Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [The White House], 1 December 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address>.
O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>.
Will, George. F. ‘Time to Get Out of Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, September 01, 2009.
Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster.
[1] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, p. 433.
[2] The same applies to referencing, as most of them are already acknowledged in the articles mentioned.
[3] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 296.
[4] Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 327.
[5] Clinton, Hillary R., Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead, ‘Secretary Of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ClintonTestimony091203a1.pdf>; Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. [The White House], 1 December 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 571-572.
[6] O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>.
[7] Christophe, Jaffrelot, ‘What engagement with Pakistan Can – And Can’t – Do’, Foreign Affairs, October 12, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136413/christophe-jaffrelot/what-engagement-with-pakistan-can-and-cant-do>.
[8] Will, George. F. ‘Time to Get Out of Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, September 01, 2009; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 219.
[9] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 7; Obama’s Orders for Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategy of November 29, 2009, in Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster.
[10] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 37, 71; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 337.
[11] Clinton, Hillary R., Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead, ‘Secretary Of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ClintonTestimony091203a1.pdf>.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.