By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘Joe and a sizable number of NSC staffers viewed McChrystal’s proposal as just the latest attempt by an unrestrained military to drag the country deeper into a futile, widely expensive nation-building exercise, when we could and should be narrowly focused on counterterrorism (CT) efforts against al-Qaeda.’[1] President Obama
Introduction
In 2009, the Obama administration faced a critical decision on the future of the war in Afghanistan: to commit to a major troop surge or to pursue a more limited strategy. This pivotal moment was defined by a profound internal conflict between two powerful factions: the military leadership, represented by the General David Petraeus camp, and a more sceptical group led by Vice President Joe Biden. While the Petraeus camp argued for a full-scale counterinsurgency, the Biden camp vigorously opposed this approach. Their arguments, rooted in a deep-seated apprehension about the war’s scope and feasibility, provide a crucial counter-narrative to the prevailing military perspective.
While this article focuses on the arguments the Vice President Joe Biden camp put forward in the Af-Pak review to oppose the military’s proposed counterinsurgency strategy, my other article examines the General David Petraeus camp’s counterarguments. This article explores the core tenets of the Biden camp’s opposition to the proposed counterinsurgency strategy during the ‘Af-Pak’ review. It examines four primary arguments that shaped their position: the belief that Afghanistan held minimal relevance to US national security interests; the assertion that the necessary prerequisites for a successful counterinsurgency were absent; the critical role of Pakistan-related problems that the surge would fail to address; and the historical warning that Afghanistan risked becoming another ‘graveyard of empires’ or ‘another Vietnam’.
By analysing these arguments, this paper will illuminate the complex and multifaceted reasoning behind the Biden camp’s stance. Their views were not simply a rejection of the military’s plan but a comprehensive alternative vision for US engagement, reflecting a cautious and realist approach to a long-entrenched conflict. The debates they raised, both within the administration and in the public sphere, ultimately influenced the final, compromised strategy that would define America’s policy in Afghanistan for the years to come.
The article contains four sections, each covering one of the four primary arguments. The article ends with brief concluding remarks.
The ‘Afghanistan-having-minimal-relevance-to-US-national-security-interests’ argument
The Taliban did not constitute an enemy because they were not connected to Al-Qaeda, would not allow Al-Qaeda to return to a the Taliban-led Afghanistan, given the fact that Al-Qaeda carried a real security threat to Afghanistan, and only fought US forces because the latter were present in Afghanistan or else the Taliban had an inward/national outlook. Moreover, intelligence reports suggested that Al-Qaeda operatives were not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan, and would not return from their safety of Pakistan to a hazardous Afghanistan, where the US had numerous bases and freely conducted operations.
Afghanistan therefore was not as important as the military was trying to portray it, and the US did not have to employ the expensive counterinsurgency strategy to defeat those insurgents who were not an enemy, and whose defeat would not be essential to the defeat of Al-Qaeda. The strategy would further compel the US to overlook other domestic and international interests ─ and threats.
The US received Al-Qaeda threats not just from Afghanistan but also from other countries such as Yemen and Somalia, so the US should see Afghanistan in the global context and understand that it could not afford, politically and financially, to respond with a counterinsurgency strategy to every country with the presence of Al-Qaeda. To those, such as George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton and the few others,[2] who argued that the US had a moral duty to stabilise Afghanistan, the Biden group questioned how much treasure and lives the US needed to sacrifice to bring about such an Afghanistan.
The ‘missing-prerequisites-of-counterinsurgency strategy’ argument
The Biden camp opposed the counterinsurgency strategy not only for being expensive, but also for not being the right strategy for Afghanistan.
A counterinsurgency strategy required competent and effective indigenous security forces as well as good and reliable government to take over the responsibility (hold and build) once an area was cleared by US forces. The security forces would establish security and a competent government would quickly, honestly, and effectively provide basic services to win over the population.
Pointing to a number of shortcomings within both the Afghan Government (pervasive corruption, criminality, lack of a political class, lack of a strong, able and cooperative president, failing to reach all parts of Afghanistan, and limited revenue base) and ANSF (illiteracy, drug addiction, the presence of ‘ghost forces, high attrition rate, lack of representation), these two important prerequisites of a counterinsurgency strategy, essential for bringing a counterinsurgency strategy’s ultimate goal, security, and for transferring responsibility to the Afghans, were missing in Afghanistan, and building both was a slow process that required years (not the 19-month period proposed by the military) of training. More troops would only deepen the dependency on US forces by the ANSF.
Secondly, a successful counterinsurgency strategy, according to Petraeus’s own counterinsurgency strategy manual and studies conducted by the RAND Corporation, required one counter-insurgent for every 50 Afghans, but even if Obama approved the 40,000 troops, the military leaders would not have anywhere near 600,000 counter-insurgents for about 30 million Afghans. The military’s counterargument, that the 600,000 number was not required (though a robust build-up of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) would help McChrystal to reach the right number) because McChrystal’s counterinsurgency or COIN operations focused on certain provinces in the south and east (as, according to the military leaders, provinces in the rest of the country, especially in the North, were peaceful), was flawed since insurgents, as rational strategists, would either go underground for the duration US troops were there, or relocate themselves to places or provinces where there were no or fewer coalition and US forces. If this happened, would the military be able to establish security? Would the military then not be asking for more US troops?
Thirdly, a successful counterinsurgency strategy required a duration of 10 to 14 years, but given that the US had been in Afghanistan for more than seven years, it was politically, financially, and practically impossible to sustain a heavy footprint for ten more years.
Fourthly, a counterinsurgency strategy worked in the urban Iraq but not in the rural, landlocked, mountainous, vast Afghanistan with numerous inherent complexities: having a different mix of population divided by factionalism; suffering deeply from poverty, unemployment, the illegal narcotic trade and three decades of civil war; having an insurgency (the Taliban) that was indigenous and from the largest ethnic group; and sharing 2,500 miles of porous border with Pakistan (which worried the Biden camp the most, especially when none of the requested troops were going to be placed there). According to the counterinsurgency strategy expert, the French David Galula (referenced below), these were all conditions that worked against a counterinsurgency strategy.
The ‘three-Pakistan-related-problems’ argument
The ‘three-Pakistan-related-problems’ argument was the most concerning as far as Pakistan’s role in relation to the employability of a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan was concerned.
Firstly, the projected counterinsurgency strategy did not extend beyond the Afghanistan borders to the sanctuaries in Pakistan, and so, as long as the terrorist safe havens in Pakistan remained, where the Taliban rested and rearmed and then crossed into Afghanistan, it did not matter how many troops the US deployed to Afghanistan because an end to the insurgency would not be brought.
Secondly, Pakistan held the key to ending the conflict in Afghanistan, and US Afghan policy was against the interests of Pakistan in Afghanistan, as it aimed at creating a unified Afghan government which was sympathetic to India, Pakistan’s mortal enemy, and at wiping out the Taliban, the very forces supported by Pakistan for its geopolitical interests in the region. By proposing a counterinsurgency strategy, the military leaders were not only ignoring Pakistan’s concerns, such as the increasing India influence in Afghanistan, but also even further undermining Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and the region. Pakistan, of course, would not allow this to happen, and would increase its support for the insurgency in Afghanistan and exploit even further the ideology of religious resistance that the West had fostered during the Soviet invasion. Therefore, no matter how many US troops fought in Afghanistan, an end to the insurgency was impossible if Pakistan continued (and it would) to support the insurgency in Afghanistan.
Thirdly, Pakistan, situated at the crossroad of a strategic region (bordering Afghanistan, China, India and Iran – all important to the US in different ways), had a population six times greater than Afghanistan, possessed nuclear weapons, most of the Al-Qaeda operatives and almost all the Taliban top members (the hardcore and the irreconcilable) had their camps in Pakistan, and was politically unstable.
For all of the above factors, stability in Pakistan was considered the primary US objective, yet the surge was detrimental to that particular objective in two ways. First, the intensification of war could make it worse for Pakistan, as it could cause more influx of militants and Afghan refugees into Pakistan,[3]make more vulnerable the US-NATO ground supply route that the Pakistani Army safeguarded, undermine the present fragile political consensus in Pakistan to fight the insurgents, and further strengthen Islamic groups against the Pakistani Government, as the former would use Pakistan’s cooperation (the proposed counterinsurgency strategy required even more) as a reason to continue to fight against Pakistan’s government. Most, if not all, of Pakistan’s civilian and military officials argued that US presence in Afghanistan united the Pashtun on both sides of the line, and thus strengthened Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pashtuns from both sides of the Durand Line joined the Afghan and Pakistani the Taliban to fight against the US and coalition forces and their ‘puppets’, the Pakistani and Afghan governments. Pashtun nationalism in Pakistan was an issue that Pakistan was sensitive to, since it could result in its internal destabilisation, similar to the 1971 Bengali nationalistic uprising that resulted in the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.
Second, the proposed counterinsurgency strategy would further unbalance the allocation of resources in favour of Afghanistan, which at the time of the Af-Pak review, to the resentment of Pakistan, was 30:1. For the Biden camp, Afghanistan’s most important relevance to US interests in the region was its proximity to Pakistan (and, of course, Al-Qaeda, which was mostly located in Pakistan), and it was important to get Pakistan right or else the US would not win ─ the proposed counterinsurgency strategy was sending the Af-Pak strategy more and more in the wrong direction. Biden strongly disagreed with the military assertion that stability in Afghanistan meant stability in Pakistan. If anything, it was the opposite. Consequently, even if the US sacrificed hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of US lives for a counterinsurgency strategy to stabilise Afghanistan (a big ‘if’), it would not guarantee stability in Pakistan.
The ‘Afghanistan-another-graveyard-another-Vietnam’ argument
The Biden camp feared that the US would not ever be able to stabilise Afghanistan the way the military wished for. Instead Afghanistan was becoming another Vietnam for the US because Afghanistan, like Vietnam, was incrementally sucking the US into an endless war. Moreover, using as evidence the appalling failures of past empires over 2,500 years in Afghanistan, most notably the Soviet Union and the British Empire, the Biden camp worried that the US would equally fail in Afghanistan.
History showed that the twenty-eight million or so Pashtuns on the Pakistan’s side, as well as the fifteen million Pashtuns on the Afghanistan side, would unite against a force that they deemed to be an invader, e.g. the Soviet Union. The US faced the same Pashtun insurgency that the Soviets had faced in the 1980s, and if the US could not succeed with tens of thousands of troops on the ground, it would not with more ─ more troops would simply prolong failure.
Given this reality, some,[4] including the Democratic base in Congress, argued for a total withdrawal, but most believed it was wise for the US to apply a less expensive strategy, namely, the counterterrorism-plus-strategy.
The ‘counterterrorism’ part of strategy would pursue Al-Qaeda (if there was any) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the ‘plus’ part would provide trainers to build up a moderate number of ANSF to retain security, and expand reconciliation to ‘peel off some Taliban fighters’. The number of US/NATO forces present in Afghanistan would be sufficient to carry out the job until more ANSF were trained to take over responsibility for their country.
A counterterrorism-plus-strategy was flexible enough to follow the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan or any other countries. It had the capability (since it was inexpensive and could therefore be sustained indefinitely) to eventually disseminate Al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan that would lead to the group’s eventual defeat. It was able to defend US interests without having to commit to rebuild the war-shattered Afghanistan. It also had the potential to make it possible for US forces to secure a way out of Afghanistan in the near future.
These were the views of the Biden camp ─ namely, Biden, Donilon, Emanuel, Axelrod, Brennan, General James Cartwright, Douglas E. Lute, Eikenberry, and even Richard Holbrooke ─[5] those who supported the camp in Congress, especially members of the Democratic Party,[6] the press,[7] and other outside actors or area experts, who either directly supported or found their belief systems consistent with the camp.[8]
Conclusion
The Biden camp’s arguments during the 2009 ‘Af-Pak’ review presented a clear and compelling case against a full-scale counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Their strategic scepticism was not a simple rejection of military advice but a reasoned critique based on four interconnected pillars. First, they fundamentally challenged the premise that Afghanistan’s strategic relevance justified a costly, large-scale intervention, arguing that the primary terrorist threat from al-Qaeda had shifted to Pakistan. Second, they pointed to the lack of essential prerequisites for a successful counterinsurgency strategy, namely a competent Afghan government and security force, which they believed would render the strategy ineffective. Third, they highlighted the insurmountable ‘Pakistan-related problems’, arguing that as long as the Taliban enjoyed sanctuary and support across the border, no amount of troops in Afghanistan could secure a victory. Finally, they invoked historical parallels to the Soviet and British empires, framing Afghanistan as a ‘graveyard of empires’ that would ensnare the US in an endless and unwinnable conflict.
In essence, the Biden camp’s position advocated for a strategic recalibration—a shift from a nation-building mission to a focused counterterrorism approach. Their views, though initially at odds with the military’s robust proposal, were critical in shaping President Obama’s final decision. While Obama did approve a troop surge, the limitations he placed on the deployment—a firm timeline and narrowed objectives—were a direct reflection of the very concerns raised by the Biden camp. This outcome underscores the profound influence of their arguments and serves as a powerful reminder of how internal debates and clashing belief systems can ultimately forge a compromised and cautious foreign policy, even in the face of intense pressure from the military establishment.
References
Barker, Peter, ‘Obama to Weigh Buildup Option in Afghan War’, The New York Times, August 31, 2009.
Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009.
Bearden, Milton, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, October 1, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan>.
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster.
Coll, Steve, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, October 1, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan>.
Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>.
Eikenberry Karl. W, ‘US embassy cables: Karzai feared US intended to unseat him and weaken Afghanistan’, The Guardian, July 07, 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables>.
Eikenberry, Karl, ‘Statement Of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 9, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EikenberryTestimony091209a1.pdf>.
Ignatius, David, ‘A Middle Way on Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, September 2, 2009.
Galula, David, and John A. Nagl. 2006. Counterinsurgency warfare theory and practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. <http://library.dur.ac.uk/search~S1?/YGalula&searchscope=1&SORT=D/YGalula&searchscope=1&SORT=D&SUBKEY=Galula/1%2C2%2C2%2CE/frameset&FF=YGalula&searchscope=1&SORT=D&2%2C2%2C>.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Kane, Paul, ‘Pelosi: Democrats facing voter ‘unrest’ over war spending, troop increase’, The Washington Post, November 24, 2009.
Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry opening statement at hearing on Strategy For Afghanistan, September 16, 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement090916p.pdf>.
Kerry, ‘Testing Afghanistan Assumptions; The Lesson of Vietnam is Don’t Commit without a Clear Strategy’, The Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2009.
Kerry, John F., ‘Excerpts From Senator John Kerry’s Speech on Afghanistan,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/excerpts-from-senator-john-kerrys-speech-on-afghanistan>.
Lodhi, Maleeha, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, October 1, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan>.
Lugar, Dick, ‘Opening Statement for Hearing on Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement091001a.pdf>.
Lugar, ‘Opening Statement for Hearing on Afghanistan’, December 9, 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement091209a.pdf>.
Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach, ‘What Leaving Afghanistan Will Cost; Parsing the President’s War Promises’, Foreign Affairs, May 9, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137621/gayle-tzemach-lemmon/what-leaving-afghanistan-will-cost>.
Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking,
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[1] Obama, Barack. 2020. A Promised Land. Viking, pp.432-33.
[2]Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co; Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach, ‘What Leaving Afghanistan Will Cost; Parsing the President’s War Promises’, Foreign Affairs, May 9, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137621/gayle-tzemach-lemmon/what-leaving-afghanistan-will-cost>.
[3] Gates was told by Pakistani officials that ‘Pakistan is the victim of the export of the Afghan Taliban’, Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 204.
[4] Will, George. F. ‘Time to Get Out of Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, September 01, 2009.
[5]The views of the members of the Biden camp are found in the following sources: Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 40-44, 71, 102, 159-160, 162-163, 166, 167- 170, 187-189, 190-191, 215-218, 221, 225-227, 237-238, 285, 297-298, 320-321, 334; Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2012. Little America: the war for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 118, 123-126; Singh, Robert. 2012. Barack Obama’s post-American foreign policy: the limits of engagement. London: Bloomsbury academic, pp. 67, 73; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 230-234, 237; Eikenberry Karl. W, ‘US embassy cables: Karzai feared US intended to unseat him and weaken Afghanistan’, The Guardian, July 07, 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables>; Eikenberry, Karl, ‘Statement Of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 9, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EikenberryTestimony091209a1.pdf>; Simon, Steven. ‘Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/can-right-war-won/p19765>; Baker, Peter, ‘How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, December 5, 2009.; Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>; Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, pp. 64, 131, 135; O’Hanlon, Michael, ‘Staying Power: The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Beyond 2011’, The Brookings Institution, September/October, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/25-afghanistan-ohanlon>; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 357, 362, 371-384; Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, pp. 25, 129-149.
[6]Kerry, John F., ‘Excerpts From Senator John Kerry’s Speech on Afghanistan,’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/excerpts-from-senator-john-kerrys-speech-on-afghanistan>; Kerry, ‘Chairman Kerry opening statement at hearing on Strategy For Afghanistan, September 16, 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KerryStatement090916p.pdf>; Kerry, ‘Testing Afghanistan Assumptions; The Lesson of Vietnam is Don’t Commit without a Clear Strategy’, The Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2009; Tyson, Ann Scott. ‘Mullen: More Troops ‘Probably’ Needed’, The Washington Post, September 16, 2009; Barker, Peter, ‘Obama to Weigh Buildup Option in Afghan War’, The New York Times, August 31, 2009; Kane, Paul, ‘Pelosi: Democrats facing voter ‘unrest’ over war spending, troop increase’, The Washington Post, November 24, 2009; Lugar, Dick, ‘Opening Statement for Hearing on Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement091001a.pdf>; Lugar, ‘Opening Statement for Hearing on Afghanistan’, December 9, 2009, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LugarStatement091209a.pdf>
[7] Will, George. F. ‘Time to Get Out of Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, September 01, 2009; Ignatius, David, ‘A Middle Way on Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, September 2, 2009; ‘Topic A: Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fight?’ The Washington Post, August 31, 2009; Tyson, Ann Scott. ‘Mullen: More Troops ‘Probably’ Needed’, The Washington Post, September 16, 2009
[8]Crowley, Michael, ‘Hawk Down’, New Republic, September 24, 2009, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/hawk-down>; (for conditions of the counterinsurgency strategy) Simon, Steven. ‘Can the Right War Be Won? Defining American Interests in Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/can-right-war-won/p19765>; (for conditions of the counterinsurgency strategy) Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & C, pp. 151-161; (for prerequisites of the counterinsurgency strategy) Galula, David, and John A. Nagl. 2006. Counterinsurgency warfare theory and practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. <http://library.dur.ac.uk/search~S1?/YGalula&searchscope=1&SORT=D/YGalula&searchscope=1&SORT=D&SUBKEY=Galula/1%2C2%2C2%2CE/frameset&FF=YGalula&searchscope=1&SORT=D&2%2C2%2C>; Stewart, Rory, ‘Testimony of Rory Stewart, Senate on Foreign Relations Committee Hearing’, September 16, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/StewartTestimony090916p1.pdf>; Mueller, John, ‘How Dangerous Are the Taliban: Why Afghanistan is the Wrong War’, Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/john-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the-taliban>; Bearden, Milton, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, October 1, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan>; Lodhi, Maleeha, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, October 1, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan>; Coll, Steve, ‘Afghanistan’s Impact on Pakistan’, October 1, 2009, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/afghanistans-impact-on-pakistan>;Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 200.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.