By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘Afghanistan ‘is slipping toward failure. The Taliban is back, violence is up, drug production is booming and the Afghans are losing faith in their government. All the legs of strategy ─ security, counternarcotics efforts, reconstruction and governance ─ have gone wobbly. If we should have had a surge anywhere, it is Afghanistan.’ Senator Joe Biden’s evaluation of US Afghan policy in 2008[1]
Introduction
This article is preoccupied with the ‘evaluation phase’, focusing on the views/reviews/recommendations of the George W Bush Administration’s counterterrorism strategy (and the Afghanistan War in general) by Congress and the media, as well as other influential actors/organisations, of which their joint contribution constituted the public debate on the policy (and on the Afghanistan War). By doing so, the section brings to life the milieu in which the Bush Administration found itself in the Afghanistan War in 2008. A series of my other articles (on false policy assumptions)[2] as well as this article indicate how the counterterrorism strategy, the offshoot of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) strategy, badly failed at the implementation[3] and evaluation phases, forcing the Bush Administration to opt for (or take the first step towards) a counterinsurgency strategy or COIN in the true sense of the word, marking the second turning point in US Afghan policy. It also becomes clear that the failure of the counterterrorism strategy (and therefore the GWOT strategy) at the implementation and evaluation phases forced the Bush Administration by 2008 to drop its Grand Strategy of Destroying Terrorism for a more doable one of containing terrorism.
The article ends with some concluding remarks, as part of which it briefly sums up how belief systems and images, bureaucratic politics, and favourable domestic influences swayed the strategy towards counterterrorism strategy in 2002; just what Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Vice-President Dick Cheney and the neoconservatives desired. But in 2008, the false assumptions, mounting domestic pressure by a variety of actors, the absence of Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives from the government, the irrelevance of Cheney, the belief systems and images of new actors, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Commander of US Central Command General David Petraeus, and their strong bureaucratic positions, redirected US Afghan policy towards the direction of counter-insurgency operations.
The evaluation of the counterterrorism strategy and the tilt towards a counterinsurgency strategy
By 2007, and particularly 2008, criticism mounted by members of Congress, Democrats in particular ─ most notably Senators Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden ─ the press, and area experts over the George W Bush Administration for its ‘failure’ in the Afghanistan War. They pointed towards the reports suggesting how the security situation had worsened, how the number of suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices had dramatically increased, how the Taliban had established a parallel administration in some areas, how corrupt the Afghan Government had become, particularly the police and the judicial system, how drug production had risen, how poverty and unemployment were feeding insurgency, and how Afghans had been frustrated with the Afghan Government and the coalition forces’ inability to deal with insurgency.
Instead of pursuing Al Qaeda and working on stabilising Afghanistan, something that had a direct link with US national security, the Bush Administration made its task much more complex by invading Iraq. Iraq was not the first line to battle international terrorism, the assessments maintained, but the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in which the instigators of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) (and the perpetrators of the 9/11 atrocities) still lived freely and posed a threat to the US and the allies in both Afghanistan and their own countries. The US invasion of Iraq helped not just to raise the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also to weaken US allies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
President Bush vowed not to repeat his father’s mistake of abandoning Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, but he surprisingly made the same mistake (by Bush Senior) that facilitated the initial instability and the eventual takeover of Afghanistan (in September 1996) by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. There was a unique window of opportunity when there was goodwill for the international community to succeed, but this closed quickly when the Bush Junior Administration did not commit sufficient resources and military forces. The evaluation jointly concluded that the Iraq War, the miscalculations in the US Afghan strategy (the false policy assumptions, especially the light footprint strategy, discussed in my other articles),[4] and the incompetence of the administration sent the ‘good’ and ‘necessary’ war in Afghanistan off course, facilitating the conditions for Al Qaeda and the Taliban to make a triumphant comeback in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[5]
There were some ─ including Joe Biden, General James Jones, Admiral Mike Mullen, and Rashid, among many others ─ who talked of a possible US strategic defeat in Afghanistan (a possible takeover by the Taliban) and the border areas (the ‘epicentre of terrorism’), and warned the administration of the consequences of losing its anti-terrorism war: a significant rise in global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and drug production; significant damage to US (and the UN and NATO) future power and prestige; and a possible disintegration of NATO.[6] However, the US could turn around the misfortune, the losing war, if it came up with ‘a smarter strategy and a lot more attention and resources’.[7] A new or smart strategy in the environment of 2008 meant a counterinsurgency or COIN, which had just saved the US from ‘failing’ in Iraq. A counterinsurgency was seemingly what Obama and Clinton had in mind to apply in Afghanistan, provided they won the 2008 presidential election.
Indeed, the two wars had become a dominant issue for the 2008 presidential campaign, and the Obama and Clinton primary campaigns, and later Obama’s presidential campaign, made it the central part of their foreign policy stance. They consistently told the Americans that the Bush Administration invaded Iraq (a ‘bad’ and ‘reckless’ decision) at the expense of the Afghanistan War (a ‘good’ and ‘necessary’ war). Both Clinton and Obama promised Americans that, if they won the election, they would withdraw troops from Iraq (the war of ‘choice’) and redeploy them to Afghanistan, the true front on the GWOT.[8]
For Biden, if he and Obama won, they would even make good on Bush’s Marshall Plan for Afghanistan, that is, the military victory to be followed by a moral victory that would result in better lives for the Afghans. They would also, unlike Bush, show a serious commitment towards Pakistan, as President Pervez Musharraf supported the Taliban because Bush did not provide enough financial support to Pakistan.[9] All these promises were a clear sign that the counterinsurgency would be employed regardless of who won the upcoming election.
Due to congressional, media and area experts’ criticism of the Afghanistan War, President Bush, on September 9, 2008, announced the ‘silent surge’ for Afghanistan. He would bring home 8,000 troops from Iraq and more than half of them, about 5,000, would be redeployed to Afghanistan after the month he left office. Additionally, in November 2008, he would send to Afghanistan a marine battalion followed by a combat brigade to join the 31,000 US troops already in Afghanistan. All of these troops would take part in the ‘silent surge’.[10]
The administration officials told The Washington Post that the fifteen percent influx of troops laid the groundwork for more troops in the future,[11] adding that the surge was in response to senior leaders at the Pentagon who had been calling for months for more troops (following the Iraq surge, more troops in 2008 meant a counterinsurgency strategy) in Afghanistan to combat the growing Taliban threat there, but the ongoing war in Iraq made such a commitment impossible. However, the declining violence in Iraq allowed for troops to be deployed to Afghanistan.[12] Like 2001, Afghanistan again became ‘a front-burner issue’ for Washington.[13]
Indeed, during the time Bush announced the silent surge, his top civilian and military aides were conducting numerous ‘major new reviews’ (by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Commander of US Central Command David Petraeus, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Commander of US/ISAF forces in Afghanistan David D. McKiernan, and senior NATO Military Commander, General Bantz J. Craddock) of the war strategy and overall mission in Afghanistan.[14] These reviews were to assess the fissures over the Afghan policy: what was the right number of troops in Afghanistan, how best to spend the billions of US dollars, and what was the best way to deal with the deteriorating situation in Pakistan? The main priority of these assessments was to explain why the US was not winning in Afghanistan seven years after the intervention.
Certain anonymous White House officials revealed that in the last months of the Bush Administration there was ‘a new urgency’ to adjust the strategy ‘to put the mission in Afghanistan on the right path’ for the next president.[15] To do so, in addition to the above reviews, leading assessments on Afghanistan began in the last week of September 2008 within the White House with a series of high-level meetings. They were to provide Bush’s senior advisors with a number of recommendations within two weeks. One of the issues the assessments were going to study was whether to increase the troop levels in Afghanistan and adopt a robust counterinsurgency. During this period, Gen. David D McKiernan requested 15,000 combat and support troops beyond the 8,000 additional troops Bush had approved for deployment early in 2009.[16] Bush was going to approve it, but decided against it once the Obama team urged him to leave the decision for Obama.[17]
While Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote generally of those reviews on Afghanistan, they specifically mentioned a review by Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan Douglas E Lute, in which Lute called for ‘a more robust counterinsurgency effort, including more troops and civilian resources in Afghanistan and closer cooperation with Pakistan to go after the extremists’.[18] Bush and Cheney added that after a National Security Council debate, and after National Security Advisor (NSA) Stephen Hadley checked with his counterpart General James Jones from the incoming administration, it was decided to quietly pass along the strictly classified report. It was up to the new administration, said Bush, to revise the report as they saw fit and then adopt it as their own.[19]
Cheney, however, was surprised the following year to hear Obama’s Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel claiming that the Bush Administration had left them with no plan. Referring to the Lute assessment, Cheney implied that the Bush Administration did leave Obama with a plan that required a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.[20]
Concluding remarks
By 2008, the Bush Administration’s initial counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan was widely seen as a failure, having been overshadowed by the Iraq War. The mounting criticism from political figures, the media, and military leaders created a domestic consensus that a new approach was needed. The administration responded by making a pivotal shift towards a counterinsurgency or COIN strategy: the announcement of the ‘silent surge’, Bush’s willingness to approve the pending troops request (troop surge in Afghanistan) by McKiernan, the appointment of counterinsurgency strategy expert/author, Petraeus, as the Head of CENTCOM, Cheney’s claim that they had a plan (a counterinsurgency strategy) for Afghanistan but passed it to the Obama Administration, and the favourable domestic environment for the counterinsurgency strategy in 2008 America (especially the calling of all official assessments and the three domestic actors, most notably the presidential candidates and Congress, for the application of the strategy in Afghanistan) were all indications that the Bush Administration, which had just successfully applied a counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq against all the odds, was equally eager to employ the very strategy written by Petraeus in Afghanistan, had it had more time on its watch. While it did not have the time to apply the strategy, it at least moved in the direction of a counterinsurgency strategy, marking the first step towards the second turning point in US Afghan strategy. This strategic pivot, though incomplete at the time, represented a crucial turning point that would profoundly shape the US’s future involvement in Afghanistan.
As seen in this and other articles,[21] the influence of the policymakers’ belief systems and images, their bureaucratic opposition and domestic influences were key causal factors in shaping both the decision to employ the counterterrorism strategy and the tilt towards a counterinsurgency strategy. Rumsfeld and Cheney, the defense hawks, as well as the neoconservatives, persuaded President Bush to adopt a counterterrorism strategy, steering him away from nation-building and peacekeeping. Their views aligned with Bush’s ‘transformational temperament’ and belief in his role as a ‘big player’, making him receptive to their hawkish approach. Cheney’s unwavering support for his old friend, Rumsfeld, made Rumsfeld the primary driver behind this decision. The success of the Afghanistan mission by 2002 kept the domestic support for the administration as intact as it had been in the days after 9/11. Congress, the media, the area experts and the general public were generally all supportive of the GWOT to expand to tackle terrorism and other rogue states. This support equally strengthened the role of the Rumsfeld-Cheney and neoconservative circle at the expense of Secretary of State Colin Powell.
However, by the end of the Bush Administration’s first term in office, especially by the middle of the second term, it became abundantly clear that the GWOT strategy, and its derivative, the counterterrorism strategy, had been based on false assumptions and failed badly at the implementation[22] and evaluation phases. This time, the failure of the strategy politically hurt the engineers of the strategy: Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives. Their bureaucratic ‘locations’ were weakened, belief systems proved mistaken, and domestic actors (Congress, the media, the area experts, and the general American people) turned against them. Consequently, their sway with the President was lost. They could no longer influence decision-making, such as the decision relating to the Iraq surge. It was Rice, Gates, Hadley, and Petraeus who influenced Bush in the last years of his second term, and hence Bush tilted towards a counterinsurgency strategy. Bush himself was the main subject of criticism by the domestic actors, and by 2008, he had squandered his political capital and, owing to the inability to find WMD in Iraq, blown his credibility; he seemed to no longer consider himself a big player. He evidently listened and acted on the advice of his close advisors, but perhaps it was too late to change the course of the ‘forgotten war’.
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Bush: ”Quiet Surge’ of Troops Sent to Afghanistan’, Fox News, September 9, 2008.
Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers.
Carlotta, Gall and Jeff Zeleny, ‘Obama’s Visit Renews Focus on Afghanistan’, The New York Times, July 20, 2008.
Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition.
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[1] Joe Biden’s evaluation of US Afghan strategy in 2008, in Biden, Joe, ‘Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten’, The New York Times, March 2, 2008.
[2] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Policy assumptions of the George W Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror’’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025; <https://cepsaf.com/policy-assumptions-of-the-george-w-bush-administrations-war-on-terror/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The impact of the Iraq War on the Afghanistan War and its consequences for the Bush War Cabinet’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-impact-of-the-iraq-war-on-the-afghanistan-war-and-its-consequences-for-the-bush-war-cabinet/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, The ‘small footprint’ strategy’s impact on the Afghanistan War, CEPSAF, October 2025; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of NATO in the Afghanistan War’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
[3] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Policy assumptions of the George W Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror’’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025; <https://cepsaf.com/policy-assumptions-of-the-george-w-bush-administrations-war-on-terror/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The impact of the Iraq War on the Afghanistan War and its consequences for the Bush War Cabinet’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-impact-of-the-iraq-war-on-the-afghanistan-war-and-its-consequences-for-the-bush-war-cabinet/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, The ‘small footprint’ strategy’s impact on the Afghanistan War, CEPSAF, October 2025; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of NATO in the Afghanistan War’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
[4] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Policy assumptions of the George W Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror’’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025; <https://cepsaf.com/policy-assumptions-of-the-george-w-bush-administrations-war-on-terror/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The impact of the Iraq War on the Afghanistan War and its consequences for the Bush War Cabinet’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-impact-of-the-iraq-war-on-the-afghanistan-war-and-its-consequences-for-the-bush-war-cabinet/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, The ‘small footprint’ strategy’s impact on the Afghanistan War, CEPSAF, October 2025; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of NATO in the Afghanistan War’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
[5] For the evaluation, see Gardner, David. ‘Bush to pull 8,000 U.S. troops out of Iraq and reveals plans for a ‘quiet surge’ in Afghanistan’, The Daily Mail, September 9, 2008; Eggen, Dan, ‘Focus Is on Afghanistan As Bush Lays Out Plans’, The Washington Post, September 10, 2008; McGurk, Christopher, ‘Testimony of Christopher McGurk’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign relations, April 23, 2009, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McGurkTestimony090423a1.pdf>;Rubin, Barnett R. ‘Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/RubinTestimony060921.pdf>; Rubin, Barnett R., ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62270/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan>; Biden Joe, ‘Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten’, The New York Times, March 2, 2008; ‘A Conversation with Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service]’,The Council on Foreign Relation, February 25, 2008; The Good War, Still to Be Won’, The New York Times, August 20, 2007; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 94; Carlotta, Gall and Jeff Zeleny, ‘Obama’s Visit Renews Focus on Afghanistan’, The New York Times, July 20, 2008; Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. xxxix; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, pp. 2, 321, 327; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, p. 208; Loyn, David. 2008. Butcher and Bolt. London: Hutchinson, p. 271; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p.197.
[6] Schmitt, Eric and Tom Shanker, ‘Bush Administration Reviews Its Afghanistan Policy, Exposing Points of Contention’ The New York Times, September 22, 2008; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, pp. XLII, xxxix; Biden Joe, ‘Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten’, The New York Times, March 2, 2008.; Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007.
[7]Jones, James L., ‘Oral Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JonesTestimony060921.pdf> ; Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007; The Good War, Still to Be Won’, The New York Times, August 20, 2007; Dobbins, James, Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, March 08, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DobbinsTestimony070308.pdf>; Schmitt, Eric and Tom Shanker, ‘Bush Administration Reviews Its Afghanistan Policy, Exposing Points of Contention’ The New York Times, September 22, 2008; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
[8] Seelye, Katharine Q., ‘Clinton Talks About Stepping Up Effort in Afghanistan’ The New York Times, February 29, 2008; Gardner, David. ‘Bush to pull 8,000 U.S. troops out of Iraq and reveals plans for a ‘quiet surge’ in Afghanistan’, The Daily Mail, September 9, 2008; Carlotta, Gall and Jeff Zeleny, ‘Obama’s Visit Renews Focus on Afghanistan’, The New York Times, July 20, 2008; Biden Joe, ‘Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten’, The New York Times, March 2, 2008 ; A Conversation with Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service]’, The Council on Foreign Relation, February 25, 2008; Obama, Barack, Presidential Candidacy Announcement, February 10, 2007,<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobamacandidacyforpresident.htm>; Obama, Barack, Senate Speech on Iraq War After 4 Years, March 21, 2007,<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamasenatefloorspeechoniraqwar4years.htm>; Obama, Barack, New Hampshire Primary Concession Speech, January 8, 2008,<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamanewhampshireconcessionspeech.htm>; Obama, Barack, Policy Speech on Iraq at the Ronald Reagan Building, July 15, 2008,<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamairaqwarreaganbuilding.htm>.
[9] Biden Joe, ‘Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten’, The New York Times, March 2, 2008.
[10] ‘Bush: ”Quiet Surge’ of Troops Sent to Afghanistan’, Fox News, September 9, 2008; Spillius, Alex, ‘President Bush announces ‘quiet surge’ into Afghanistan’, The Telegraph, September 8, 2008; Eggen, Dan, ‘Focus Is on Afghanistan As Bush Lays Out Plans’, The Washington Post, September 10, 2008; Gardner, David. ‘Bush to pull 8,000 U.S. troops out of Iraq and reveals plans for a ‘quiet surge’ in Afghanistan’, The Daily Mail, September 9, 2008.
[11] Eggen, Dan, ‘Focus Is on Afghanistan As Bush Lays Out Plans’, The Washington Post, September 10, 2008.
[12] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 218; Eggen, Dan, ‘Focus Is on Afghanistan As Bush Lays Out Plans’, The Washington Post, September 10, 2008.
[13] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 222-223; Eggen, Dan, ‘Focus Is on Afghanistan As Bush Lays Out Plans’, The Washington Post, September 10, 2008.
[14] Barnes, Julian E., ‘Urgent shift in works on Afghanistan’, Los Angeles Times, December 28, 2008; Schmitt, Eric and Tom Shanker, ‘Bush Administration Reviews Its Afghanistan Policy, Exposing Points of Contention’ The New York Times, September 22, 2008 ; Bruno, Greg, ‘Searching for an Afghan Strategy’, Council on Foreign Relations, January 22, 2009; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 222-223.
[15] Schmitt, Eric and Tom Shanker, ‘Bush Administration Reviews Its Afghanistan Policy, Exposing Points of Contention’ The New York Times, September 22, 2008.
[16] Schmitt, Eric and Tom Shanker, ‘Bush Administration Reviews Its Afghanistan Policy, Exposing Points of Contention’, The New York Times, September 22, 2008.
[17] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 222-223.
[18] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 218; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 500-501; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, pp. 222-223; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 40-44.
[19] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 40-44; Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 218.
[20] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 501.
[21] Dorani, Sharifullah, What was the Bush Administration’s Afghan strategy for the intervention decision, what factors influenced it, and who was bureaucratically responsible for making it?, CEPSAF, 16 August 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/what-was-the-bush-administrations-afghan-strategy-for-the-intervention-decision-what-factors-influenced-it-and-who-was-bureaucratically-responsible-for-making-it/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, CEPSAF, 27 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of domestic factors in the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Afghanistan’, CEPSAF, 31 April 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-domestic-factors-in-the-bush-administrations-decision-to-invade-afghanistan/>.
[22] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘Policy assumptions of the George W Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror’’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025; <https://cepsaf.com/policy-assumptions-of-the-george-w-bush-administrations-war-on-terror/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The impact of the Iraq War on the Afghanistan War and its consequences for the Bush War Cabinet’, CEPSAF, 17 October 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-impact-of-the-iraq-war-on-the-afghanistan-war-and-its-consequences-for-the-bush-war-cabinet/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, The ‘small footprint’ strategy’s impact on the Afghanistan War, CEPSAF, October 2025; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of NATO in the Afghanistan War’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.