By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
After ‘liberating Afghanistan’, the George W Bush Administration assumed that ‘the coalition of the willing’, and later North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), would shoulder responsibility[1] for the post-Taliban Afghanistan, as the US military role was assumed to win wars, not engage in peacekeeping, policing or building nations. This article briefly studies whether the assumption proved false or true by examining the role NATO played in America’s Afghanistan War during the Bush Administration.
It has two sections. Section one examines the ‘lead nation’ approach, while section two explores caveats raised by some NATO states. The article ends with a conclusion.
The ‘lead nation’ approach
Due to its aversion to nation-building and the preparations for the Iraq War, the Bush Administration, in the Tokyo Conference in 2002, handed over some of the responsibility of rebuilding the Afghan institutions to other states, assuming that these nations would shoulder the responsibility and the costs;[2] this became known as the ‘lead nation’ approach.
Germany, however, seriously failed to fund and manage the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP). For example, it only sent 40 trainers to train 3,500 Afghan officers, forcing the State Department in the middle of 2003 to take over the responsibility. Since it did not have its own branch to train the police, it contracted DynCorp, an American private military contractor. DynCorp did not have the capacity to rebuild a broken police force from scratch in a ‘tribal society’, and thus a frustrated Defense Department had to take over in 2006. In the course of nearly four years, ANP was handled by three different agencies, and by the time the Defense Department took over and ramped up efforts to rebuild, incalculable damage had been done. But even then the ANP continued to be ‘ill-trained, poorly paid, under-equipped, and inadequately armed’.[3]
For a year or so the Italians, who were responsible for rebuilding the justice system, did not send a team of experts to Afghanistan to provide training to the members of the justice system, making the underperforming Germany look ‘good’. The World Bank ranked the Afghan justice system between 2002 and 2006 in the top 2 per cent of the most corrupt countries. In 2007, Afghanistan managed to get a place in the 99.5 per cent of the ‘most ineffective justice systems worldwide’.[4]
The outcome of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) was as bad as the justice system. Japan and the United Nations (UN) only managed to disarm low-profile militia and did not succeed in disarming former Mujahideen commanders (also known as ‘warlords’) and commanders.[5]
The UK’s plan to reduce the cultivation of the opium poppy by 70 percent by 2008 and by 100 percent by 2013 began to look like a ‘cruel joke’ when opium production rose from 185 tonnes in 2001 to 8200 tonnes in 2007, enabling Afghanistan to provide 93 percent of the world’s opium, which brought $4 billion into the Afghan economy, more than half of Afghanistan’s total economy of $7.5 billion for that year.[6]
There was strong evidence to prove that the Taliban largely benefited both financially and politically (in the latter case, by providing security for farming communities) from the illicit drug trade.[7]
The US training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) was relatively successful compared to other areas. However, due to the intertwinement of the five pillars, failures in one neighbouring area meant failures in the others.
The policymakers had incorrectly assumed that these countries would effectively shoulder their responsibility. When the Bush Administration itself was not interested in rebuilding the key institutions, other states obviously would not fully commit. It was a US war and the US should have handled it effectively. But, as an anonymous senior White House official admitted in retrospect, ‘We piecemealed it…One of the problems is when everybody has a piece, everybody’s piece is made third and fourth priority. Nobody’s piece is first priority. Stuff didn’t get done.’[8] If the US had established effective ANA, ANP, and a legal system, villagers in the south and east might have been protected, and hence there would have been little support for the Taliban, and law and order might not have collapsed.[9]It might have led to a strong and effective Afghan government with strong institutions, which would have enabled the Bush Administration to withdraw all US forces from Afghanistan.
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan and the adoption of caveats
‘Caveats deny me the ability to plan and prosecute…I can’t amass them [troops] to where I might have a decisive point…Obviously I can’t move as quickly as I want to.’ Gen. Dan McNeill, the NATO Commander in Afghanistan.[10]
Handing over the responsibility to NATO in the middle of 2003 in order to minimise costs and avoid Afghanistan being a distraction to the next phases of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) contributed further towards the worsening of security in Afghanistan.
Like the presumptions regarding the lead nation approach, relying on NATO also proved to be mistaken, as NATO suffered from three factors: firstly, as the situation deteriorated, NATO did not have the counterterrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities (the necessary level of troops, military equipment and other resources) to defend the population from the insurgents; secondly, lack of cooperation/coordination between NATO and the US and the absence of unity of command, such as the one in Bosnia that oversaw reconstruction and stabilisation, meant that every country was operating in the same area with ‘different missions and different rules of engagement’; lastly, and most importantly, some NATO states, such as Italy, Spain, France, and especially Germany refused, despite constant US pressure, to allow its troops in combat missions.[11]
For them, as promised by the Bush Administration, the Afghanistan mission was a reconstruction project or peacekeeping mission, and that was what their parliaments (and in Germany’s case, its constitution) and their populations had allowed them to pursue and hence their ‘caveats’ represented domestic realities.[12] Britain, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and the Netherlands, however, adopted no, or very few, formal caveats. For Bush, the outcome was ‘a disorganized and ineffective force, with troops fighting by different rules and many not fighting at all’.[13]
The adoption of caveats, the lack of equipment and the lack of unity of command strongly hamstrung the ability of NATO commanders (such as Gen. Dan McNeill in the quotation above) to make military plans to deal with an effective and adaptive Taliban insurgency, especially as the Taliban escalated violence in 2007 and 2008.[14]
Conclusion
The Bush Administration’s strategy of delegating responsibility for post-war Afghanistan to NATO and individual ‘lead nations’ proved to be an ineffective approach. The assumption that America’s allies would fully shoulder the burdens of nation-building, while the US focused on counter-terrorism and the subsequent Iraq War, was a critical miscalculation. As the evidence has shown, the ‘lead nation’ approach was essentially a failure. Countries like Germany and Italy, tasked with rebuilding the police and judicial systems, failed to provide adequate resources and sustained commitment, leading to an ill-equipped and corrupt Afghan state apparatus. The poor results in counter-narcotics, led by the UK, further exacerbated instability by empowering the Taliban through the illicit drug trade.
The subsequent reliance on NATO also proved to be a significant challenge. While NATO did contribute to the mission, its effectiveness was severely hampered by a combination of factors. The most critical of these were the ‘caveats’ imposed by key member states such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and France. These restrictions on where and how their troops could operate in combat zones created a disorganised and disjointed military force, undermining the unity of command essential for counter-insurgency operations. Ultimately, the collective failures of the ‘lead nation’ approach and the limitations imposed by NATO’s internal dynamics contributed significantly to the security vacuum and institutional decay that plagued Afghanistan during the Bush Administration. The result was not a successful nation-building project but a protracted conflict that would require a much larger and more sustained commitment for years to come.
References
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Jones, James L., ‘Oral Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JonesTestimony060921.pdf>.
Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: The struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking.
Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin.
Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007.
Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel.
Scott, Peter Dale. 2010. American war machine: deep politics, the CIA global drug connection, and the road to Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Scott, Tyson, and Ann Josh White, ‘Gates hits NATO Allies’ Role in Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, February 7, 2008.
Shanker, Thom and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, The New York Times, December 16, 2007.
Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo.
[1] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 117.
[2] Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 333.
[3] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 122; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 173, 242; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 685.
[4] Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 241-242; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. 204.
[5] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 129-130.
[6] Scott, Peter Dale. 2010. American war machine: deep politics, the CIA global drug connection, and the road to Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, p. 226; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 13, 125.
[7] Jones, James L., ‘Oral Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JonesTestimony060921.pdf>.
[8] Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007.
[9] Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
[10] Scott, Tyson, and Ann Josh White, ‘Gates hits NATO Allies’ Role in Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, February 7, 2008.
[11] Shanker, Thom and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, The New York Times, December 16, 2007; Scott, Tyson, and Ann Josh White, ‘Gates hits NATO Allies’ Role in Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, February 7, 2008; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, pp. 350-352; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 333; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 150, 155, 219; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 250-253; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 203; Jones, James L., ‘Oral Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JonesTestimony060921.pdf>.
[12] Shanker, Thom and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise’, The New York Times, December 16, 2007; Scott, Tyson, and Ann Josh White, ‘Gates hits NATO Allies’ Role in Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, February 7, 2008; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, pp. 350-352; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 333; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 150, 155, 219; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 250-253; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 203; Jones, James L., ‘Oral Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2006, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JonesTestimony060921.pdf>.
[13] Bush, George W. 2010. Decision points. New York: Crownpublishers, p. 211.
[14]Mann, Jim. 2012. The Obamians: The struggle inside the White House to redefine American power. New York: Viking, p. 123; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. 354; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 342; Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 215; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, p. 249.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.