By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States embarked on a ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT) that would define a new era of American foreign policy. This period offers a compelling case study in presidential decision-making and its impact on international affairs.
While both Presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama faced similar challenges in Afghanistan and the broader counterterrorism effort, their approaches to policy formation diverged a great deal. This article examines and contrasts the decision-making styles of President Bush and President Obama, focusing specifically on how their respective methods influenced key policy decisions and their susceptibility to a phenomenon known as groupthink.[1] While both Presidents Bush and Obama faced similar challenges in Afghanistan and the broader counterterrorism effort, their approaches to policy formation diverged.
The first section of this paper will explore President Bush’s operating style, characterised by a centralised, top-down approach that often prioritised a small circle of advisors and personal instinct over broad-based expert consultation. I investigate how this model influenced the decisions to intervene in Afghanistan in later 2001 and to formulate a counterterrorism strategy in early 2002 following the collapse of the Taliban regime.
The second section pivots to President Obama’s’multiple advocacy’ model—a process designed to foster open debate and the consideration of diverse viewpoints—aimed to deliberately avoid the pitfalls of his predecessor’s approach. The focus is on the decision to surge in 2009 and the decision to drawdown in 2011.[2] By comparing and contrasting their methods, this article argues that the distinct decision-making styles of these two presidents had a profound impact on the effectiveness and outcomes of their foreign policies, demonstrating how the process of making a decision can be as consequential as the decision itself. The article ends with a conclusion.
President Bush’s operating style
On the face of it, it seems that the GWOT and counterterrorism strategy decisions were witnessed in an orderly and structured process, but in reality they, especially decision-making relating to the counterterrorism strategy, were the results or products of a process consisting of back-channel dealings (something that would continue to become worse as the GWOT continued in Afghanistan and Iraq), secrecy, and a dysfunctional advisory system; of a centralised operating style that failed to analyse and evaluate all details of the decisions.[3]
In his application of the ‘top-down approach’, or ‘management model’, in decision-making, which emphasised inspiration and guidance from above and loyalty and compliance from below, Bush managed to exclude structured debate and disciplined dissent from those at the bottom who disagreed with the decision.[4] An orderly process requires that policy be evaluated at the bottom levels and then moved up level by level until it reaches the Principals Committee in the National Security Council (NSC), by which time it should be scrutinised by all those with relevant experience.[5] But Bush’s operating style was the other way around. He simply said, in effect, ‘this is the policy, which took me two minutes to make, and now find me ways to implement it’. Experts and career officials from relevant agencies rarely had the opportunity to participate in decision-making, as Bush, unlike President Obama, excluded them.[6] Unlike Obama, Bush seemed not to have liked a prolonged decision-making process known as the multiple advocacy model, in which policy experts were heard, alternative policy options were evaluated, and policy opinions were scrutinised. He wanted decisions fast.[7]
The inclusion of career diplomats and qualified executive branch experts with years of experience (and the adoption of a multiple advocacy approach) might have helped a great deal; the experts might have discussed and disagreed with the Bush Doctrines and advised against the declaration of war to defeat terrorism worldwide because of the sheer impossibility of the task;[8] might not have underestimated the enemy and chances of failure; might have questioned the underlying assumptions; might have prevented the effect of groupthink (explained below); or at least shed some light on the history, culture, society and traditions of Afghanistan and its decades-long disputes with Pakistan.[9] According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, British academic Steven Hurst and Afghan Professor Amin Saikal, being ignorant of the two countries’ details was one major destructive factor, causing the US to announce objectives impossible to achieve.[10]
Learning in detail about the Af-Pak disputes, Bush might have requested concrete pledges from President Pervez Musharraf, and, most importantly, kept a close watch on Pakistan’s behaviour post-Taliban defeat. Had he properly debated the way the warlords were perceived by the Afghans, he might have found alternatives to them, or at least developed a strategy to minimise their influence after the Taliban was defeated. Most importantly, Bush might have discovered alternatives to the decision to invade. In the end, an entirely different decision might have resulted. Instead of discussing these details and the wisdom of the GWOT, the discussion centred on developing a war plan, the issue of how wide terrorism was, and whether Iraq could be included (the Iraq argument’). In addition to Bush’s decision-making style, the Pentagon civilian leadership was responsible for derailing the policy process by constantly bringing in the ‘Iraq argument’.
It should have been National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice who could have helped the President by adopting the role of an ‘honest broker’ by ensuring that the contrasting perspectives and policy alternatives from all agencies and experts reached the President in a fair and neutral manner. While Rice, though inadequately, tried it in the intervention decision, she failed to do so in the decision concerning the counterterrorism strategy. In the latter, as seen in one of my articles,[11] she sided with the Defense Department. Perhaps she could not have acted as an honest broker, anyhow, due to Bush’s operating style: after 9/11 Bush was certain of what to do, and did not like his instincts being questioned. This predisposition negated the need of those perspectives that were incompatible with Bush’s instincts, and once Bush made a decision based on his instincts, he would never look back.[12]
Instead of listening to facts, and instead of being an analytical decision-maker (like Obama), he listened to his gut feeling, as well as to the ideas invented in the US by those who had ideological purity and partisan loyalty.[13] The belligerent doctrines produced as a result of Bush’s feelings were not put to scrutiny because they were consistent with the neoconservatives and the defence hawks’ aggressive belief systems and images: ideals, ideas and recommendations .
On the contrary, Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (together with the neoconservatives) privately showed support for them, adding their share to the paralysis of the decision-making process, making the Cabinet system almost collapse.[14]
Between the 9/11 terrorist acts, and the start of the Iraq War − or a period described by American scholar Francis Fukuyama as ‘the neoconservative moment’ −[15] the doctrines had produced impressive results in Afghanistan. Domestic support for the GWOT, especially due to the military success of its first step in Afghanistan, was as high as it had been days after 9/11.[16] So, perhaps no one, including Rice, naturally saw the need to question any aspects of the GWOT and its offshoot, the counterterrorism strategy, and went ahead with the policy opinions of their originators.
It is important to add that the decision-making style that Bush followed was very prone to ‘groupthink’. For the decisions to intervene and to employ the counterterrorism strategy, ‘groupthink’ seemingly occurred. Groupthink occurs when there is a high degree of cohesion (one of the ‘antecedent’ factors), which produces a psychological drive for consensus, suppressing both dissent and consideration for alternatives.[17]
American research phycologist and professor Irving Janis wrote that the most prominent symptoms of groupthink included ‘exaggerating favorable consequences, downplaying unfavorable consequences, denying uneasy feeling, exaggerating the remoteness of action commitment, downplaying the extent to which others will see what is happening […] downplaying personal responsibility’,[18] ‘an illusion of invulnerability, rationalization to discount warnings and other negative feedback, belief in the inherent morality of the group […] pressure on dissenters’,[19] and the illusion of unanimity and excessive stereotyping.[20]
Some of these symptoms of groupthink were seemingly present in the operating style Bush pursued for the abovementioned two decisions (the decision to intervene in Afghanistan and the counterterrorism decision), resulting in a number of consequences (or ‘defects’). Bush and ‘the triangle’ believed that they could easily achieve their ambitious objectives of the GWOT to root out terrorism (a sense of ‘we can easily do it’).[21] They took at face value Pakistan’s pledge to support the GWOT. The shortcomings of the counterterrorism strategy were downplayed, and instead the Defense leadership exaggerated the usefulness of the light footprint strategy. The invasion of Iraq and the installation of a democratic regime were assumed to be as easy as the defeat of the Taliban regime. Alternatives to the invasion of Afghanistan were rarely discussed. Dissent was scarcely there. Powell disagreed with certain aspects of the GWOT, but his voice was drawn out. He, in turn, seemingly tried to downplay personal responsibility. Indeed, he blamed the Defense Department and the Vice-President for most of the shortcomings in the Bush Administration’s strategy of the GWOT.
The policymakers made little attempt to use experts to ascertain more precise information about both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The policymakers were confident that things would turn out well, so they failed to consider what to be done if things went wrong. In other words, they failed to develop a contingency plan, especially in regard to ‘the double game’ played by Pakistan and to the possibility of the US being embroiled in Afghanistan. Bush and most of his advisors believed that by launching the GWOT, they were doing the world a favour by ridding it of terrorism and evil. He and most of his advisors were strongly of the view that the US could afford to fight the war alone if need be. As will be explained in later articles, both decisions resulted in undesirable outcomes.
Obama’s Decision-making process
Obama, on the other hand, used all the methods prescribed by Janis[22] to minimise the ‘dysfunctional consequences’ or ‘defects’ of groupthink. Unlike Bush, he tried to remain neutral between the two opposing groups: the Vice-President Joe Biden and the Commander of US Central Command David Petraeus camps (HUSNA REF TO MY ARTICLES). Moreover, he encouraged an atmosphere of open debate between the two camps, allowing both groups to question each other’s policy assumptions. He was willing to spend a sizeable amount of time to survey all warning signals from the rival group. And, unlike Bush, Obama rarely stereotyped the views of any of the camp. When Biden questioned the importance of the Afghanistan War to US national security, he let him speak his reasons. He gave a great deal of detail to avoid Afghanistan turning into another Vietnam, and therefore imposed a limit (‘caveat’) on US stay in Afghanistan.
He listened carefully to David Petraeus’s claim that Afghanistan was very important to US national security. He partly agreed and therefore approved the surge. Time and again, however, he raised questions with regard to the role of Pakistan in the Afghanistan War, allowing for a detailed analysis of the impact of Pakistan in the employability of the new strategy.
Whenever he was unsure about an aspect of the policy opinions/assumptions, Obama would consult lower officials and experts from outside of the administration. Moreover, he discussed the contrasting views of the two groups with trusted associates. One was former Secretary of State Colin Powell. Obama even took a step further by assigning the role of the devil’s advocate to Biden to press the military to present a better case for more troops. Biden, with the backing of Obama, established a small group, mostly made up of former military men, to discuss the military plan presented by Commander of the International Assistance Force in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal and Petraeus. The group eventually came up with its own alternative military plan. Obama allowed the plan to be considered, even though it upset the military or Petraeus camp. Obama was a president who strongly favoured the consideration of alternatives.
All the steps taken by Obama suggest that he aimed at curbing the emergence of groupthink. Indeed, his advisors made it clear by saying that Obama tried to avoid a decision-making style followed by Presidents Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush.[23] Janis argues that in some small groups but not all, ‘conformity pressures begin to dominate, the striving for unanimity fosters the pattern of defensive avoidance [which causes the symptoms of groupthink, e.g. exaggerating favourable consequences], with […] the characteristic reliance on shared rationalizations that bolster the least objectionable alternative’.[24] Conformity was exactly what Obama’s decision-making style ─ ‘multiple advocacy’[25] ─ avoided. Thus, the results (the decision to surge and the decision to draw down were not ‘groupthink’.[26]
Conclusion
The decision-making styles of President Bush and President Obama present a stark contrast that significantly impacted the outcomes of their respective foreign policies. As seen, Bush’s centralised, ‘top-down’ approach to decision-making often bypassed expert advice and structured debate, relying instead on his own instincts, a small circle of advisors, and partisan loyalty. This style, which discouraged dissent and led to a reliance on ‘gut feelings,’ created an environment ripe for groupthink—a phenomenon where the desire for consensus overrides rational analysis and critical evaluation of alternatives. This led to an overestimation of the US’s capabilities, an underestimation of the challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a failure to consider vital cultural and historical context. The resulting decisions, the intervention and counterterrorism strategies, were arguably less informed and ultimately resulted in what many scholars considered to be negative consequences.
In contrast, Obama’s ‘multiple advocacy’ model actively sought out and encouraged diverse viewpoints and a prolonged, deliberative process. By welcoming structured debate, listening to opposing camps, and consulting with experts both inside and outside his administration, Obama purposefully worked to mitigate the risks of groupthink. His willingness to question assumptions and consider alternatives, as seen in his handling of the Afghanistan troop surge in late 2009, allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of the complex geopolitical landscape. Consequently, while not without its own challenges, Obama’s operating style enabled him to make more informed decisions, demonstrating that a process that incorporated diverse perspectives and scrutinised policy options was likely to lead to more considered and effective outcomes in complex foreign policy issues.
References
Aldag, Ramon J., and Sally Riggs Fuller, ‘Beyond Fiasco: A Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes’, Psychological Bulletin, 1993, <http://web.mit.edu/writing/2012/Grad_Summary_Readings/beyond_fiasco_final.pdf>
Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman; Art.
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster.
Dobbins, James, ‘Who Lost Iraq?’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62828/james-dobbins/who-lost-iraq>.
Dobbins, James, Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, March 08, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DobbinsTestimony070308.pdf>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Groupthink Model: The Impact of Groupthink on Decision Making Case Study: The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, Political Reflection Magazine, 25 October 2019.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the President Bush War Cabinet make the counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan? Who said what, how and why?’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press.
Flood, Philip, ‘Book review: Zone of Crisis Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq by Amin Saikal’, The Sunday Morning Herald, October 10, 2014.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield Pub.
Hurst, Steven. 2009. The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10391778.
Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Jentleson, Bruce W. 2014. American foreign policy: the dynamics of choice in the 21st century. New York: Norton.
Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>.
Neack, Laura, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick Jude Haney.1995.Foreign policy analysis: continuity and change in its second generation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1031_bush_pfiffner.pdf>.
Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2(June), 2011, pp. 244-262, p. 256<http://www.marioguerrero.info/326/Pffiner2011.pdf>.
Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin.
Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford[England]: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Tony, Ludovic Hood, and James Dobbins, ‘Losing Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63019/tony-smith-ludovic-hood-and-james-dobbins/losing-iraq>.
Washington Post-ABC News Poll: State of the Union’, January 28, 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data012802.htm>.
‘Washington Post-ABC News Poll: America at War’, March 11, 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data031102.htm>.
‘Washington Post – ABC News Poll: Iraq’, February 11, 2003, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data021103.htm>.
Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster.
[1] For the groupthink model, see Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Groupthink Model: The Impact of Groupthink on Decision Making Case Study: The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, Political Reflection Magazine, 25 October 2019; Janis, IL (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
[2] Research is in progress for both of the decisions, and the articles will be published on CEPSAF.
[3] Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1031_bush_pfiffner.pdf>; Smith, Tony, Ludovic Hood, and James Dobbins, ‘Losing Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63019/tony-smith-ludovic-hood-and-james-dobbins/losing-iraq>; Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. XLI.
[4] Dobbins, James, ‘Who Lost Iraq?’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62828/james-dobbins/who-lost-iraq>.
[5] Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1031_bush_pfiffner.pdf>.
[6] Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard choices. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, p. 135.
[7] Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2(June), 2011, pp. 244-262, p. 256, <http://www.marioguerrero.info/326/Pffiner2011.pdf>.
[8] Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1031_bush_pfiffner.pdf>.
[9] Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, P. XLII.
[10] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 589. Steven Hurst dedicates a chapter on how taking no account of the absence of preconditions for democracy in Iraq failed Bush’s quest for democracy in Iraq, in Hurst, Steven. 2009. The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10391778, pp. 182-223. Saikal claims that the absence of cultural and historical knowledge of Afghanistan (and Iraq) proved detrimental to the US involvement in Afghanistan (and Iraq), Flood, Philip, ‘Book review: Zone of Crisis Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq by Amin Saikal’, The Sunday Morning Herald, October 10, 2014.
[11] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the President Bush War Cabinet make the counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan? Who said what, how and why?’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
[12] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 49.
[13] Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1031_bush_pfiffner.pdf>; Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2(June), 2011, pp. 244-262, p. 256 <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2011.03853.x>, p. 256; Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>; Dobbins, James, Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?, ‘Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate’, Hearing Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, March 08, 2007, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DobbinsTestimony070308.pdf>;
[14] Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. XLI.
[15] Fukuyama is quoted in Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press, p. 2.
[16] ‘Washington Post-ABC News Poll: State of the Union’, January 28, 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data012802.htm>; ‘Washington Post-ABC News Poll: America at War’, March 11, 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data031102.htm>; ‘Washington Post – ABC News Poll: Iraq’, February 11, 2003, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data021103.htm>.
[17] Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 1-13, 175; Jentleson, Bruce W. 2014. American foreign policy: the dynamics of choice in the 21st century. New York: Norton, p. 48; Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford[England]: Oxford University Press, p. 17.
[18] Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman; Art, p. 284.
[19] Aldag, Ramon J., and Sally Riggs Fuller, ‘Beyond Fiasco: A Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes’, Psychological Bulletin, 1993, <http://web.mit.edu/writing/2012/Grad_Summary_Readings/beyond_fiasco_final.pdf>
[20] Neack, Laura, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick Jude Haney. 1995. Foreign policy analysis: continuity and change in its second generation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, pp. 107-108; Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield Pub, pp. 69-70; Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. 2008. Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases. Oxford [England]: Oxford University Press, p. 354.
[21] Dobbins, James, ‘Who Lost Iraq?’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62828/james-dobbins/who-lost-iraq>; Smith, Tony, Ludovic Hood, and James Dobbins, ‘Losing Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63019/tony-smith-ludovic-hood-and-james-dobbins/losing-iraq>
[22] Aldag, Ramon J., and Sally Riggs Fuller, ‘Beyond Fiasco: A Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes’, Psychological Bulletin, 1993, <http://web.mit.edu/writing/2012/Grad_Summary_Readings/beyond_fiasco_final.pdf>; Neack, Laura, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick Jude Haney. 1995. Foreign policy analysis: continuity and change in its second generation. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, pp. 108-109; Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory. Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield Pub, pp. 72-73.
[23] Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, pp. 157-158.
[24] Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman; Art, p. 284.
[25] Pfiffner, James, ‘Decision Making in the Obama White House’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June), 2011, <http://www.marioguerrero.info/326/Pffiner2011.pdf>
[26] As explained above, the articles covering those two decisions will soon be published on CEPSAF.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.