By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
Introduction
The presidential candidate, George W. Bush, in 2000, was not someone who knew about the outside world, nor did he seem to be interested in it. He had barely travelled outside America, did not read about other countries, and knew no foreign leaders. During his election campaign, he did not know who Pervez Musharraf was and thought that the Taliban were a rock and roll band.[1] However, in response to allegations that he was inexperienced in foreign policy, Bush would reply: ‘I’ve got one of the finest foreign policy teams ever assembled’.[2] Bush therefore was ‘a foreign policy novice’[3] dependent on the advice of the members of his most experienced team, including (Richard) Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and, at times, George Tenet.
American journalist and author James Mann states:
‘The question was, What shaped the Vulcans’ [the senior policymakers of the Bush Administration] distinctive response to that trauma [9/11]? Not all American leaders would have reacted in the same way as the Vulcans; not all foreign policy teams would have carried out a war on terrorism….What were the instincts, the attitudes, the experiences that lay beneath the Vulcans’ decisions and choices after September 11? The answers to such questions could be found in the careers and ideas of the Vulcans over the previous thirty years…. [T]he Vulcans were influenced by their own experience.’[4]
This article seeks to determine the impact of policymakers’ individual traits, including their belief systems and images, as well as their bureaucratic positions[5] and personal ties, as causal factors or independent variables on the counterterrorism strategy developed by the Bush Administration in early 2002.[6] Since the strategy was an extension of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and made by the same policymakers, the article is equally relevant to the decision to intervene in Afghanistan discussed in my other articles. I can go so far as to argue that the article is relevant to foreign policymaking in the Bush Administration.[7]
The article contains six sections, each of which studies the role of a policymaker in decision-making for Afghanistan. Section one focuses on Vice-President Cheney. Section two studies Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld. Section three studies Secretary of State Powell. Section four focuses on National Security Advisor (NSA) Rice. Section five analyses the role of the neoconservatives in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy. Section six studies President Bush’s role in his administration’s foreign policy. The article ends with a conclusion.
The role of Vice-President Dick Cheney in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy
Vice-President Cheney had worked for three presidents (Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush), been in the House leadership (Minority Whip the second-ranking position in the Republican leadership), and had a seat on the House Intelligence Committee, as part of which he dealt with the Soviet threat to the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia, including Afghanistan.[8] These positions had allowed him not just to gain a world of experience, but also to form a practical sense of how things worked both within Washington and abroad.
A vice-president constitutionally has no line of responsibility and is only there to succeed the president if the president is unable to complete his term. If asked, he could only give advice to the president, and the impact of his advice depended on whether the president listened to it. But Bush listened to Cheney’s advice regarding important policy issues. A grateful Cheney and his esteemed mentor Rumsfeld believed that Bush did so for a number of reasons. Bush knew Cheney had no ‘personal agenda’[9] and thus the advice was treated as free from any personal or political ambition; Cheney kept his advice confidential and did not disclose it to the media, often kept his counsel in the meetings even if he disagreed with Bush, was a good listener, always did his homework, was always on top of information that enabled him to ask important questions in National Security Council (NSC) meetings to provide the President with information that otherwise would have not come to the surface,[10] and got things done in ‘an unfussy way’.[11]
Others, however, claim that Cheney took advantage of Bush’s lack of knowledge in foreign policy and extended his leverage by appointing a team of foreign policy experts, consisting mainly of his staff: in Rice’s view, a team that tried to establish ‘an ultra-hawkish independent power center within the administration’;[12] a team which operated separately from the NSC, reportedly increasing Cheney’s power by far compared to vice-presidents from previous administrations.[13]
It seems that a mixture of personal qualities that Bush seemed to have liked – command of bureaucracy, access to the President, deep knowledge of and experience in foreign policy, having his own foreign policy team, Cheney’s decision not to run for presidency, and Bush’s promise to keep Cheney involved in policymaking – made Bush respect his Vice-President, value his advice,[14] and as such turn him into one of the most influential vice-presidents in the history of America. The Vice-President in turn trusted, respected and admired his esteemed mentor, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.
The role of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy
Like the Vice-President, Rumsfeld was a dominant and well-known politician with an impressive CV: he had been considered four times for vice-presidency (Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan), once running for presidency; a member of Congress at the age of 30; a White House Chief of Staff/Secretary of Defense (Ford Administration); an Ambassador to NATO (Nixon Administration); Personal Representative of President Reagan to the Middle East; and a successful (and by 2001 quite wealthy) private sector chief executive officer.[15]
Rumsfeld’s standing with the President was dramatically enhanced by Cheney’s close friendship/working relationship with the Secretary of Defense, dating back over three decades, in which, in various positions, Cheney either had worked as an assistant or deputy to Rumsfeld.[16] A very grateful Cheney argues that it was Rumsfeld who brought him from an academic career into politics, helping him secure various positions at the White House in the 1960s and 1970s. Over the years, Cheney tried to express his gratitude by recommending Rumsfeld for certain posts, and eventually managed to have him appointed as Defense Secretary in the Bush Junior Administration.[17] Ultimately, Cheney was able to repay some of the gratitude he had owed to his ‘esteemed mentor’, Rumsfeld.[18]
Cheney was close to the President and Rumsfeld to Cheney, and over time the two made a good team with the President. These two became the driving force when it came to foreign policy, as the President would come to lean a great deal on the experience and stature of his Defense Secretary and Vice-President. Rumsfeld would make policy ideas in NSC meetings, and his close, trusted and old friend/confidant/protégé Cheney would provide additional support for them during the private lunches the President and Vice-President had together. They, therefore, turned into two giants who managed to control decision-making within the Administration.[19]
Policy ideas made by other departments, especially the State Department, did not appear to prevail if the two giants opposed them.[20] Examples are the policy proposals to give terrorism a limited definition, to prevent the Northern Alliance from entering Kabul abandoned by the Taliban in late 2001 before an international force was established, to engage US forces in peacekeeping and nation-building operations, and numerous aspects of US Iraq policy, including the proposition to leave a large number of forces after President Saddam Hussein was toppled. But, as seen in one of my articles,[21] the Defense Department nearly always prevailed when it fought for a policy idea ─ and even for more money. The Pentagon’s budget was increased from $293 billion in 2001 to $427 in 2006. But the budget of the State Department under Powell’s leadership continued to constitute approximately 6 percent of that of the Pentagon.[22]
The role of Secretary of State Colin Powell in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy
Like Cheney and Rumsfeld, Powell, too, had a world of experience in national security issues: a four-star general who had served as a commander of the US Army Forces Command in 1989, a National Security Advisor (Reagan Administration), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bush Senior Administration),[23] and a possible presidential candidate with potential to succeed. It was due to his prestigious figure and his deep experience that the candidate Bush apparently made him part of his team, as it brought political weight to the administration. Bush had an easygoing approach, Rumsfeld claimed, but not in relation to Powell since Bush thought of Powell as a man with a lot of accomplishments.[24]
However, Bush was soon to be ‘disappointed’. Rumsfeld, Cheney and Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith piled up a number of complaints against Powell that seemed to have distanced Powell from the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld triangle, particularly the President.[25] The grievances included refusing to follow the President’s views and instructions, but, preferring to listen to the career diplomats at the State Department (in comparison to Powell, a ‘loyal’ Rumsfeld made sure he held tight control of the generals to ensure that the civilian decisions ─ Bush’s instructions ─ were dutifully followed by the military),[26] criticising the administration’s policies to people outside the administration, leaking information, not working together with the Defense Department, not telling the truth when he claimed that Bush did not take the State Department’s position into account regarding foreign policy, incorrectly claiming to have battled unilateralism and conservatism within the administration, since Powell neither spoke at NSC meetings in strong opposition to the views of the President or others, nor presented clear policy options before the President, being more comfortable talking about poll numbers than recommending policy options, being attuned to public approval, and being hesitant to engage the military but in favour of long-term sanctions. This description of Powell’s behaviour clearly shows that Powell did not favour the President’s course on any given subject, and, instead of opposing it in NSC meetings, the State Department leaked its opposition to the media. In the process Powell came across as good, reasonable and ignored, while Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld as bad, unreasonable and in charge.
While the above account of Powell’s behaviour is open to question, it is obvious that Powell did not appear to feel that he was an insider, but an outsider, who found himself more in agreement with his career diplomats than the President ─ the former are foreign policy experts who often do not agree with contradictions. Consequently, as it seems, Powell found it hard to become part of the circle which was driving the policy. The State Department ─ ‘the first among equals’ under the Constitution, which, in principle, is at the core of foreign policy decision-making ─ should have been the one to influence and implement foreign policy.[27] Powell in theory was the most important advisor to the President with regard to foreign policy as he was in charge of coordinating the US activities overseas, yet it was the Defense Department that drove foreign policy.[28]
Powell also found it hard to become part of the inner circle due to the incompatibility of his belief system, including past (military) experience. Cheney and Rumsfeld had little faith in economic sanctions and favoured military options,[29] and therefore naturally found themselves in agreement with the Bush Doctrines[30] that required tough and offensive actions against terrorists. The Vietnam veterans, such as Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, were cautious about wars because many civilian leaders, some of whom had some kind of deferment (e.g. Cheney, who had a student and later a parent deferment), did not understand war, as they studied it in an intellectual way, and had not seen first-hand ‘their friends get their heads blown off’ for a cause the American public did not believe in. Powell did not trust those civilian officials who had no war experience, and once they pushed for war, Powell saw them as the ‘latter-day versions of Vietnam’s Robert McNamara’. Powell was appalled and frustrated by the ‘docility’ of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for blindly fighting the war in Vietnam without asking the political leaders, who almost entirely had started the war, to lay out clear objectives for them.[31]
Due to his frustration with the way the Vietnam War was managed by the civilian leadership, Powell developed conditions, later known as Powell Doctrines, for when to engage the US military in war.[32] As explained in one of my articles,[33] many of these doctrines were incompatible with numerous aspects of the counterterrorism strategy, and consequently Rumsfeld disregarded them, managing to lose Powell’s voice in the policymaking process.
Powell partly refrained from being insistent on his doctrines because the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and its subsequent policies were essentially military decisions and, due to his military background, he could not influence them ─ he thought some members of the administration, especially the turf-conscious Rumsfeld, might feel sensitive.[34] In September 2001, for example, when Secretary of State Powell telephoned Musharraf about the seven US demands,[35] Rumsfeld was quick to complain that some of the demands had military implications, and yet the Defense Department had not been consulted.[36] Though Powell and Rumsfeld previously did not work closely together, Powell must have been aware of the saying among the Republicans that, when it came to defending one’s bureaucratic turf, Rumsfeld did not lose. Rumsfeld remained the best in terms of a power struggle or a test of wills inside the government.[37] When Rumsfeld became White House Chief of Staff in the Ford Administration, he consolidated his power and cut the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s, and, in order to consolidate his power further, he, as many assumed, engineered the Halloween Massacre of the Cabinet reshuffle. During the Bush Administration, he made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers almost irrelevant; when Rumsfeld appeared before the press, he took care to do almost all the talking, as Myers usually stood quietly alongside or behind Rumsfeld. ‘It was a reversal of the way the Cheney-Powell briefings had been conducted’ during the Bush Senior Administration.[38]
Ironically, Rumsfeld, as Feith himself admits, would defend the realm of his department, but would equally not hesitate to encroach on the turf of other departments. For example, the Defense Department’s advice regarding the GWOT was not limited to the viewpoint of the Defense Department, but encompassed a national and ‘government-wide view’ that corresponded to the President’s views.[39]
With such a bureaucratic man (and with such a driving and combative style, someone who ‘didn’t have the best bedside manner in the world’)[40] in the lead of the Pentagon, who had the overwhelming support of the Vice-President and the trust of the President, Powell could do little when it came to military decisions, such as counterterrorism strategy, or the decision to launch the GWOT. Moreover, with the President and Vice-President not trusting him, and with his doctrines being thrown out of fashion, he could hardly persuade the President to take his policy opinions in an anti-terrorism war that was run mainly by the Defense Department; a war in which the US military was seen as the main, if not the only, solution to ‘root out’ terrorism.
Neither would the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage influence the counterterrorism strategy. Armitage was close to and extraordinarily loyal to Powell, and their friendship went back to the Vietnam War. Supportive of the Powell Doctrines, he shared a similar outlook with Powell on events and people. Like Powell, Armitage was a Vietnam veteran, mistrustful of people with strong views and ideologies, such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, as their experiences of Vietnam had taught them that events in many cases outrun someone’s preconceptions. Like Powell, he disliked Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (the feeling was mutual on Rumsfeld’s side) and did not get on with Cheney, whom he believed to have not supported him in the Bush Senior Administration to win the approval of Congress as Secretary of the Army ─ Cheney likewise disliked him for his continuous grumbling over the matter.[41]
The role of NSA Condoleezza Rice in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy
The National Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice had previously worked exclusively in the Bush Senior Administration and therefore had been close to none of the two camps. Bush, however, was close to Rice and liked and trusted her more than anyone in the Cabinet. Rice had daily access to Bush, knew the President far better than the rest of Cabinet, and both spent a lot of time together.[42]
Due to this personal access and special depth of likeness by the President, Rice could have been one of the most influential NSAs and a strong voice in matters debated at NSC, but she seemingly failed to make herself heard due to three obstacles.
The first was her tendency to stay out of policy fights between Powell and Rumsfeld. Instead she often bridged differences in the policymaking process, rather than bringing different policy options to the President to make a decision. She would employ a policy suggestion from one department and process from another. In trying to seek consensus, she temporarily mollified agencies but left fundamental differences unaddressed; consequently, the unhappy agency (most of the time, the State Department) would leak its policy options through the media. Thus, instead of being debated in the NSC, these policy opinions were scrutinised in the media.
Rumsfeld disapproved of this ‘detrimental’, ‘uncommon’ and ‘academic’ way of handling the policymaking process, which did not take advantage of Bush’s willingness/firmness to make difficult decisions, and prevented the NSC from engaging in the candid, open and fair hearing of views. Rumsfeld, on numerous occasions, suggested solutions to Rice (in effect, telling Rice how to run her NSC), but she refused, perhaps believing that bringing interagency differences before the President would have shown a personal shortcoming on her side.[43]
Second, as Provost at Stanford University, she had no senior-level experience in government, and consequently ‘had some painful professional growing up to do before she would reach the stage of taking on either Cheney or Rumsfeld with either directness or success’.[44] Consequently, as a novice NSA, she was more tolerated than respected; that was particularly true in relation to Rumsfeld and Cheney. Even, on occasions, Powell made things difficult for her. At times Rumsfeld refused to share war planning with her, and Cheney took away major responsibilities from her, such as chairing the Principals Committee. Standing up to the two was complicated, due to their long experiences in the executive government and to the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld (plus the neoconservatives) triangle whose policy suggestions were the driving forces behind the GWOT; those policy ideas that, by the time of the counterterrorism strategy, had evidently proved to have been quite effective and successful.[45]
Standing against them could have been detrimental for her career, so Rice was careful to avoid confrontation with them.[46] What Rice did do instead was to get on with her job by focusing on how to achieve Bush’s instructions by translating them into policy. In the process she neither questioned Bush’s instincts, the assumptions they were based upon and their likely consequences, nor went against policy opinions made by Rumsfeld and Cheney.[47] Furthermore, in the first few years, Bush was certain of what to do and the Defense leadership’s policy ideas fitted well with how to achieve Bush’s ‘what-to-do’, so she could hardly question these policy opinions at any rate. Bush’s increasing certainty in his convictions and Cheney and Rumsfeld’s overwhelming influence over the President made it difficult to run a decision-making process in which all different points of view were discussed in detail. The decision-making instead was conducted in secrecy, making it difficult for Rice to question any aspect of the GWOT as well as the counterterrorism strategy.
Finally, the realist Rice (from the school of Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft) believed (like Bush) that America was doing the world a favour by expanding the number of free and democratic states and thus creating a new balance of power that favoured freedom. Accordingly, Rice genuinely did not disagree with the calling of ‘realism in the service of ideals’.[48] The compatibility of this aspect of her belief system with Bush and the neoconservatives must have been another reason why Rice did not go against the Bush Doctrines and Cheney and Rumsfeld’s broad definition of terrorism. Consequently she did not mind if policymaking was hijacked by the two gigantic policymakers ─ and, to a certain extent, by the neoconservatives.
The Role of neoconservatism in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy
While the role of neoconservatism in the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq is widely documented, its influence on the initial intervention in Afghanistan receives less scholarly attention. The GWOT was a single strategy that first applied to Afghanistan and then, with additional justifications, to Iraq.[49] The invasion of Iraq would likely have been impossible without the 9/11 attacks, which provided the catalyst for the GWOT. This suggests that if neoconservatives played a role in the Iraq War, they must also have influenced the strategy in Afghanistan.
Neoconservatives were integral to the Bush administration from its beginning. Key figures such as Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Hadley, and Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby served as advisors during the 2000 presidential campaign.[50] As Deputy Secretary of Defense, Wolfowitz was the most influential neocon, and he strategically placed his allies in key positions. These included Libby as Cheney’s Chief of Staff, Zalmay Khalilzad at the National Security Council (NSC), Douglas Feith as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Richard Perle, a ‘godfather’ of the movement, as the head of the Defense Policy Board.[51]
The close working relationships between these figures were crucial. Wolfowitz had a strong, enduring bond with Vice President Dick Cheney, dating back to the George H W Bush Administration, and he was also highly respected by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld relied on Wolfowitz’s ‘encyclopedic’ knowledge of the Middle East, which gave Wolfowitz significant influence beyond the typical duties of a Deputy Secretary of Defense.[52]
According to Feith, Wolfowitz was instrumental in shaping the early counterterrorism strategy, particularly the use of the Northern Alliance as a proxy force in Afghanistan. While the CIA had also suggested this, Wolfowitz’s advocacy demonstrated the neocons’ impact on the decision to intervene.[53]
To understand the full extent of the neoconservative influence, one must recognize their core tenets and how they aligned with the views of Cheney and Rumsfeld. Influenced by thinkers like Irving Kristol, neoconservative ideas are characterized by:
–A preference for direct military action over deterrence and containment.
–The willingness to use preemptive strikes against perceived threats.
–Support for unilateral action when US interests are at stake.
–Belief in US global pre-eminence and its responsibility to shape the security environment by promoting democracy .[54]
These principles were evident in the Bush Doctrines, which underpinned the GWOT and emphasised military strength, a proactive and offensive posture, and the promotion of democracy.[55]
However, attributing the Bush Doctrines solely to neoconservative influence oversimplifies the dynamics of the administration. Cheney and Rumsfeld were not just passive recipients of neocon ideas; they were active proponents of a similar ‘offensive realist’ or ‘conservative nationalist’ worldview. Both men were signatories to the Project for the New American Century’s (PNAC) Statement of Principles in 1997, a key document of the neoconservative movement.[56]
Cheney and Rumsfeld shared many of the same views as the neocons: a strong belief in US military superiority, a preference for offensive action, and a commitment to American exceptionalism. They, too, were proud of the nation’s unmatched military strength and were confident in its ability to win wars. This ideological compatibility made it difficult to isolate the precise influence of the neoconservatives from that of Cheney and Rumsfeld. All three groups shared an ‘incautious optimism’ and a willingness to use force to reshape the world, a mindset that directly contributed to the decisions to intervene in both Afghanistan and Iraq.[57]
A key difference in perspective existed regarding the long-term US goals. While Bush and the neocons were enthusiastic about spreading democracy, Cheney and Rumsfeld were more pragmatic and less committed to nation-building. However, they were united in their desire to move the GWOT toward Iraq. Rumsfeld, in particular, had a long-standing desire to confront and defeat what he considered rogue nations like Iraq, which he saw as a security threat to the US. He and Cheney were not keen on a prolonged peacekeeping presence in Afghanistan and saw it as a stepping stone to their ultimate objective: to move to the next step in the GWOT, Iraq.
Ultimately, while the neoconservatives were a powerful force in the Bush administration’s policymaking, their influence was amplified by a deep ideological alignment with senior leaders, particularly Cheney and Rumsfeld. This shared worldview, more than the singular influence of any one group, drove the aggressive foreign policy that led to both the war in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq.
It is therefore right to claim that the Bush Administration consisted of an alliance between the ‘defence hawks’ and the neocons, and 9/11 only ‘solidified’ the alliance.[58] 9/11 provided the defence hawks and the neoconservatives the chance to turn their (consistent) views into policy,[59] thereby, forming the GWOT strategy. Bush as President was ‘an eager enabler’, not an ‘active architect’ in the making of the GWOT. His gut feeling or instinct was to be tough and aggressive towards terrorism. So Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives’ belligerence fitted very well with the President’s own inclinations.[60]
President Bush
Cheney and Rumsfeld, together with the neocons, might have been unable to launch America into such a broad war had President Bush not agreed with them. The Afghanistan and Iraq invasions reflected the temperament of the President himself. ‘George W. Bush considered himself a visionary, comfortable with big ‘strategic plays’ and scornful of piecemeal, incremental policymaking unworthy of America’s greatness’.[61] The ‘top-down, no-nonsense, decisive, macho leader’ wanted, like Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt, to be seen as a ‘transformational’ president, someone who was in the process of changing the direction of history by making terrorism ‘obsolete’ on the face of the earth and instead spreading democracy.[62] Since the goal to root out terrorism was so wide and lengthy,[63] Bush accepted the Pentagon’s reasoning to employ a narrow counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Bush administration’s counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan was not merely a reaction to the trauma of 9/11 but a direct product of the bureaucratic politics and deeply held beliefs of its most influential policymakers. President Bush was personally and ideologically predisposed to a decisive, unilateral, and militaristic response to global threats. Consequently, as my analysis demonstrates, the foreign policy novice President Bush naturally deferred to a core group of seasoned advisors, a dynamic that ultimately empowered a specific worldview at the expense of others.
The partnership of Vice-President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld emerged as the central driving force. Their long-standing personal relationship, coupled with their shared ‘offensive realist’ or ‘conservative nationalist’ beliefs, allowed them to dominate the decision-making process. This powerful alliance marginalised the peacekeeping/nation-building approach advocated by Secretary of State Powell, whose foreign policy doctrines were cast aside in favor of a swift, military-centric response.
Despite her access to the President, National Security Advisor Rice struggled to mediate these clashes, often failing to present a full spectrum of policy options and thereby reinforcing the dominance of the Pentagon’s perspective.
Furthermore, the influence of neoconservatives, while present and significant, was not an independent force but rather an echo of the core philosophies already (generally speaking) held by Cheney and Rumsfeld. Their ideas, which favoured military intervention and the pre-emptive use of force, were so aligned with the views of the administration’s two giants that it becomes difficult to distinguish their separate impact.
Ultimately, the bureaucratic landscape of the Bush administration—with its clear hierarchy of influence and deep-seated ideological divisions—determined the course of a war that would define the era. The decision to intervene in Afghanistan, and the subsequent counterterrorism strategy, was less about a rational, deliberative process among equals and more about the ascendance of a few dominant figures whose long-held beliefs were finally given the power to be implemented on a global scale. This dynamic not only shaped the initial response to 9/11 but also set the stage for subsequent, far-reaching foreign policy decisions, including the invasion of Iraq.
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[1] Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. XLV; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 255; Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. 2003. America unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp. 1-18.
[2] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. x.
[3] Quinn. A., ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April, 2013, pp. 267-281, p. 269.
[4] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 364.
[5] For bureaucratic politics, see Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman; Art, Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: Its Application, Its Limitations, and Its Strengths’, 9 October 2018, Political Reflection Magazine, 4(5): 36-46.
[6] Dorani, Sharifullah, How did the President Bush War Cabinet make the counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan? Who said what, how and why?, CEPSAF, October 2025.
[7] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART I’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-in-afghanistan-part-i/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART II’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-for-afghanistan-part-ii/>
[8] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 140-142, 151, 242.
[9] Dickerson, John, ‘Cheney’s Dreadful Lack of Ambition’, Slate, November 21, 2005.
[10] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 306; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 320.
[11] Quinn. A., ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April, 2013, p. 275.
[12] Quinn. A., ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April, 2013, p. 277.
[13] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 275; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. 356.
[14] Bush, George W, Address to the Republican National Convention, September 2, 2004,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
[15] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 265; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 238-239.
[16] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 130-131, 140, 176, 285.
[17] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 49, 70-71, 153.
[18] Quinn. A., ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April, 2013, p. 274; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, p. 204.
[19] Ware, John. (2011). Afghanistan: War without an End [the BBC]. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=byCH5p_en1A>; Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 169; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 69; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 275.
[20] Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. LI.
[21] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the President Bush War Cabinet make the counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan? Who said what, how and why?’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
[22] Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. L.
[23] Kegley, Charles W, and Eugene R. Wittkopf. 2012. American foreign policy: pattern and process. New York: St Martin’s press, pp. 351, 399, 414.
[24] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 321-324.
[25] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 185-188, 298, 381-382, 425-426;Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 322-324; Feith, Douglas J. 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, p. 34.
[26] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 197; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 443; Desch, Michael C., ‘Bush and the Generals’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2007, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2007-05-01/bush-and-generals>
[27] Kegley, Charles W, and Eugene R. Wittkopf. 2012. American foreign policy: pattern and process. New York: St Martin’s press, p. 344.
[28] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 70; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. L.
[29] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 197.
[30] For the Bush Doctrines, see Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>.
[31] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 39-40, 53-54, 119, 185; Desch, Michael C., ‘Bush and the Generals’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2007, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2007-05-01/bush-and-generals>
[32] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 39-40, 53-54, 119, 185.
[33] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘THE BUSH DOCTRINES AND THE GWOT IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: the role of ‘gut feelings’ and ‘instincts’ in the making of those doctrines’, CEPSAF,21 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-bush-doctrines-and-the-gwot-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-role-of-gut-feelings-and-instincts-in-the-making-of-those-doctrines/>.
[34] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 69.
[35] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART I’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-in-afghanistan-part-i/>
[36] Feith, Douglas J. 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, p. 16.
[37] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 58.
[38] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 58. p. 196; Woodward, Bob. 2010. Obama’s wars. New York; Simon & Schuster, p. 32.
[39] Feith, Douglas J. 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, p. 52.
[40] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 443.
[41] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 54, 55, 121; Ware, John. (2011). Afghanistan: War without an End [the BBC]; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 68; Quinn. A., ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April, 2013, p. 281.
[42] Daalder, Ivo H., and I. M. Destler, ‘In the Shadow of the Oval Office; The Next National Security Advisor’, The Brookings Institution, January/February, 2009, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2008/12/01-national-security-adviser-daalder>; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 324; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 69; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 315.
[43] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 326-329; Tenet, George, and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the centre of the storm: my years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, p. 210; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 367; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 69.
[44] Quinn. A., ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April, 2013, pp. 276-277.
[45] O’Hanlon, Michael E., ‘Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58022/michael-e-ohanlon/a-flawed-masterpiece>
[46] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 316.
[47] Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. 2003. America unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
[48] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 148, 316; Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>; Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-pleffler/september-11-in-retrospect>.
[49] Steven Hurst claims that the invasion of Iraq is impossible to imagine without the terrorist attacks of the 9/11, in Hurst, Steven. 2009. The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10391778, p.1.
[50] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 252; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 251.
[51] Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 22, 112-13, 251, 273; Feith, Douglas J. 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 24-28, 34, 42.
[52] Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, p. 278; Feith, Douglas J. 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 71, 75; Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, p. 347.
[53] Feith, Douglas J. 2008. War and decision: inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the year War on terrorism. New York, NY: Harper, pp. 65, 75-84.
[54] Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press, pp. 26-27, 32- 34; Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan, ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 1996, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52239/william-kristol-and-robert-kagan/toward-a-neo-reaganite-foreign-policy>; Defense Planning Guidance 1992 by Zalmay Khalilzad; Defense Planning Guidance 1993 by Libby; Statement of Principles, Project for the New American Century, June 3, 1997, <http://cf.linnbenton.edu/artcom/social_science/clarkd/upload/PNAC—statement%20of%20principles.pdf>; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 52, 76, 200, 210- 213;Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>
[55] Bush, George W, West Point Commencement, June 1, 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
[56] Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. LII; Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. 2003. America unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp. 1-18; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 199;Gordon, Philip H., ‘Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63009/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won>;Marshall, Joshua Micah, ‘Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59380/joshua-micah-marshall/remaking-the-world-bush-and-the-neoconservatives>; Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press, p. 29.
[57] Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and unknown: a memoir. New York: sentinel, pp. 24, 33-34, 205, 231-232; Cheney, Richard B., and Liz Cheney. 2011. In my time: a personal and political memoir. New York: Threshold Edition, pp. 333, 374-377, Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, pp. XLVI-XLVII; Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, pp. 115, 231, 238, 256; Quinn. A., ‘A House Divided’, Extended review article. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1, April, 2013, p. 269; Hurst, Steven. 2009. The United States and Iraq since 1979 hegemony, oil and war. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10391778, p. 7; Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘September 11 in Retrospect; George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68201/melvyn-pleffler/september-11-in-retrospect>; Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press, p. 33; Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-07-01/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>.
[58] Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press, pp. 29, 31-32.
[59]Mann, Jim. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: the history of the Bush’s war cabinet. New York: Viking, p. 364.
[60] Pfiffner, James, ‘Policymaking in the Bush White House’, The Brookings Institution, October, 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/10/31-bush-pfiffner>.
[61] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 48.
[62] Nye, Jr, Joseph S., ‘Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-07-01/transformational-leadership-and-us-grand-strategy>; Bush, George W, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>; Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
[63] Bush, George W, Department of Defense Service of Remembrance at the Pentagon, October 11, 2011,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.