By Dr Sharifullah Dorani*
‘[T]he nature of the response [to 9/11] was also shaped by some deeply embedded assumptions and beliefs within the administration about foreign policy and the appropriate role of the military.’[1]
Introduction
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks prompted the George W Bush administration to initiate the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a strategic response built on a set of core policy assumptions. This essay explores these underlying beliefs and premises that guided the administration’s decisions to intervene in Afghanistan and to formulate its subsequent counterterrorism strategy. It delves into the policymakers’ deeply held convictions regarding US military might, the nature of modern warfare, and the anticipated roles of both domestic and international partners. The following analysis will demonstrate that these assumptions, shaped by the ideological frameworks of the neoconservatives and ‘defense hawks’, namely Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, formed the foundation for a policy that was initially perceived as highly effective but ultimately proved to be based on flawed expectations.
The policy assumptions
As explained in the introduction, the Bush Doctrines, the main pillars for the GWOT and, of course, the counterterrorism strategy discussed in my other articles[2] were all supported by belief systems and images of the neocons and the defense hawks, which fitted comfortably with the gut feelings of the President.[3] These belief systems and images formed assumptions that the counterterrorism strategy (and therefore the GWOT strategy) were based upon, assumptions that convinced the principals that the strategy would successfully accomplish its overreaching objectives. They are considered here, but the grounds or reasoning upon which the assumptions were based are excluded for most of them since they are already covered in my other articles. (The same is the case in relation to referencing, as most of them are already acknowledged in the same articles.)
First, the defense hawks, the President and the neocons had an extraordinary belief in US capabilities (money, weaponry, military might, and political influence) and, therefore, seemed to have been incautiously ‘optimistic’ and ‘arrogant’ in assuming that the United States (US) would achieve its revolutionary objectives of rooting out terrorism worldwide.[4]
Second, the overconfidence was partly due to the GWOT being a different war, as it required a small number of troops (equipped with highly technical weapons including US extraordinary air power), since most of the ground forces would be made up of indigenous allies, e.g. the Northern Alliance, who did the actual fighting. Accordingly, the chances of US casualties and big spending were much slimmer. In total, the GWOT was presumed to need thousands of US ground troops, as opposed to hundreds of thousands, and a few billion US dollars, rather than hundreds of billions.
In the period between the ousting of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq, everything was going the administration’s way,[5] including the effectiveness of the assumption in question, as Afghanistan had been ‘liberated’ with a few hundred US Special Forces and CIA operatives, the cost of the war in Afghanistan stood at $3.8 billion by January 2002, and the annual cost of the GWOT was expected to be less than $10 billion.[6]
Third, the support of the opposition groups and the light footprint strategy, as assumed, would ensure that the US was perceived as a supporter rather than an invader or occupier, and the war seen not as by America against the Afghans, or America against Islam, but by Afghans against the ‘Arab foreigners’. Consequently, the US would not meet opposition in Afghanistan (and the countries in which they were going to intervene next).
Fourth, since the Bush Administration saw the Taliban opposition, the Northern Alliance and other warlords as ‘liberators’ and ‘friends’, the administration seemingly assumed that ordinary Afghans would equally welcome them. Rumsfeld and Cheney did not assume that allying with the Northern Alliance and its backers, some of whom were Pakistan’s mortal enemy, such as India, would anger Pakistan, since the US was ‘also supporting the Pashtun’ in the south, thus making sure ‘Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan were met’.
Fifth, once Pakistan accepted the seven US demands,[7] Pakistan was presumed to support the GWOT in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance in the leading role. The Bush Administration assumed that Pakistan would continue to keep supporting seven US demands even when Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan had been reduced from ‘ninety percent’ (during the Taliban regime) to almost ‘zero’ (during the Hamid Karzai Government).[8] Due to this assumption, the Bush Administration (understandably) did not need to leave more troops after the defeat of the Taliban because the Taliban was ‘a spent force’; a pure counterterrorism strategy would suffice in case, just in case, some Taliban or Al Qaeda members were hiding somewhere. Those Taliban/Al Qaeda members who had crossed to Pakistan were assumed to be seriously dealt with by the US’s ‘vital ally’: Pakistan.
Sixth, it was presumed that other terrorist groups and, most importantly, rogue states would change their behaviour if Bush showed resolve and hit the Taliban regime hard.
Seventh, Bush strongly assumed that, after the ousting of the Taliban regime, a relatively democratic and stable Afghanistan would be born. The US, as assumed, was a force for good in the world and it should therefore try to help the world, especially South Asia (including in Afghanistan) and the Middle East by spreading democracy. Bush assumed that the people of these subcontinents would support US intervention, since they had been oppressed for years but had no chance to liberate themselves.[9]
Eighth, Cheney, Rumsfeld, the neoconservatives and Bush were not concerned by losing or gaining support of coalition/allies. The GWOT was a US war, and, if need be, it could fight it alone.
Ninth, after ‘liberating Afghanistan’, however, it was assumed that the coalition of the willing, and later NATO, would shoulder responsibility[10] for post-Taliban Afghanistan, as the US military role was assumed to win wars, not engage in peacekeeping, policing or building nations.
Tenth, the Bush Administration partly employed such bold objectives because of the extraordinary support it received from both within (from Congress and the general US public) and outside (NATO historically invoking Article 5, most Muslim states showing support, and allies contributing troops and treasure) the US. The administration assumed that by adopting the task of safeguarding the values integral to the US, as well as many other liberal democracies, it would continue to receive the same internal and external support in the next step of the campaign. It was presumed that terrorism and states supporting terrorism were an enemy not only to the US, but also to the Western way of life, civilisation, democratic and liberal values, and Islam itself.[11]
Islam was a peaceful religion but terrorists blasphemed it by giving it a strict interpretation. Numerous international terrorist organisations that used radical Islam as their ideology were bent on destroying the many Muslim countries in the Middle East (i.e. Saudi Arabia) and South Asia (i.e. Pakistan). Thus Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neocons assumed that it was doing the world a favour by ridding it of terrorism. In Afghanistan it had succeeded and the policymakers did not want to get stuck any longer to police the streets. It sought to expand its mission of eliminating terrorists and rogue states. So Iraq was next.
Eleventh, the President, the defense hawks and neocons assumed that the Iraq War would not affect their counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan because the Iraq War would end as quickly as the Afghanistan War.[12] Incidentally, some call it the ‘Afghanistan War’, but the policymakers strongly assumed by the beginning of 2002 (especially at the time they made the counterterrorism strategy) that there was no war in Afghanistan ─ it had ended, as the Taliban and Al Qaeda were gone: killed, injured, imprisoned, or simply disappeared. Rumsfeld made a public announcement to that effect in early 2003.[13] If there was no war in Afghanistan, the US would not be engaged in two wars, but one: only in Iraq. Like the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War would, too, be successful within months, and the US would be moving to the third target: perhaps one of the states from the ‘axis of evil’: Iran or North Korea.[14]
Conclusion
In sum, the policies of the Bush administration in response to 9/11—particularly the decision to intervene in Afghanistan and the counterterrorism strategy as well as the formulation of the Global War on Terror (GWOT)—were built upon a series of deeply held and, as history later revealed, often flawed assumptions. From the overly optimistic belief in the power of a ‘light footprint’ strategy to the presumption of unwavering support from key allies like some NATO countries and certain neighbours of Afghanistan, the administration’s worldview was shaped by a profound faith in its own military and ideological superiority. Policymakers, driven by the aggressive ideals of the neoconservatives and the defense hawks, assumed a swift, low-cost victory and the easy establishment of a democratic Afghanistan. They seemingly believed that the GWOT could be fought primarily with air power and special forces and that a post-Taliban Afghanistan would require minimal US commitment.
These assumptions, while reflecting a sense of purpose and resolve, ultimately led to significant policy missteps. They fostered a mindset that underestimated the complexities of the Afghan conflict, the duplicitous nature of allies, and the long-term requirements for nation-building and counterinsurgency. As my other articles explore, the gap between these foundational assumptions and the realities on the ground had a profound and lasting impact, demonstrating that even a powerful nation’s policy can falter when built on an incorrect understanding of its challenges and its own role in the world.
References
Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
Bush, George W, State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress, January 29, 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
Bush, George W, West Point Commencement, June 1, 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, 27 March 2025, CEPSAF, https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART I’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-in-afghanistan-part-i/>.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the President Bush War Cabinet make the counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan? Who said what, how and why?’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, 27 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/>.
Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press.
Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war.
Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
O’Hanlon, Michael E., ‘Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58022/michael-e-ohanlon/a-flawed-masterpiece>.
Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. XLVIII; Loyn, David. 2008. Butcher and Bolt. London: Hutchinson.
Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007.
Rubin, Barnett R., ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62270/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan>.
Rubin, Barnett R., and Ahmed Rashid, ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64604/barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashid/from-great-game-to-grand-bargain>.
Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo.
[1] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 48-40.
[2]Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, 27 March 2025, CEPSAF, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/>; Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the President Bush War Cabinet make the counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan? Who said what, how and why?’, CEPSAF, October 2025.
[3] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘The role of personal beliefs of President Bush and his advisors in the making of the GWOT strategy’, 27 March 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/the-role-of-personal-beliefs-of-president-bush-and-his-advisors-in-the-making-of-the-gwot-strategy/>
[4]Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press, pp. 31-32; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, p. XLVIII; Loyn, David. 2008. Butcher and Bolt. London: Hutchinson, p. 293.
[5]Dumbrell, John, ‘The Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq; British and American perspectives, ed. James Pfiffner and Mark Phythain. 2008. Collage station: Texas A&M university Press, p. 2.
[6] O’Hanlon, Michael E., ‘Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58022/michael-e-ohanlon/a-flawed-masterpiece>
[7] Dorani, Sharifullah, ‘How did the Bush Administration decide to intervene in Afghanistan? Policymaking for the GWOT strategy in Afghanistan – PART I’, CEPSAF, 27 June 2025, <https://cepsaf.com/how-did-the-bush-administration-decide-to-intervene-in-afghanistan-policymaking-for-the-gwot-strategy-in-afghanistan-part-i/>
[8] Rubin, Barnett R., ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62270/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan>; Rubin, Barnett R., and Ahmed Rashid, ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64604/barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashid/from-great-game-to-grand-bargain>; Rashid, Ahmed. 2009. Descent into chaos: the world’s most unstable region and the threat to global security. London: Penguin, pp. 229, 286, 290; Jones, Seth G. 2009. In the graveyard of empires: America’s war in Afghanistan, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, pp. 271, 312; Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 110, 214; Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 338.
[9] Bush, George W, West Point Commencement, June 1, 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
[10] Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. 2011. Afghanistan: how the west lost its way. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 117.
[11] Bush, George W, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 2001,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
[12] Gates, Robert Michael. 2014. Duty: memoirs of a Secretary at war, p. 115.
[13] Rohde, David and David E. Sanger, ‘LOSING THE ADVANTAGE; How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan went Bad’, The New York Times, August 12, 2007; Tanner, Stephen. 2009. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the great to the war against the Taliban. Philadelphia: Da Capo, p. 322.
[14] Bush, George W, State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress, January 29, 2002,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf>
*Sharifullah has a PhD from Durham University in the UK on America’s Afghanistan War. He has authored several articles and two acclaimed books: The Lone Leopard, a novel set in Afghanistan, and America in Afghanistan, published by Bloomsbury Publishing. Sharifullah is the founder of CEPSAF and the South Asia and Middle Eastern Editor at CESRAN International.